ANIMA SEN GUPTA

Classical Sāṁkhya: A Critical Study

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Foreword

Dr. Anima Sen Gupta of Patna University, now retired, has earned a name for herself as a sound scholar and as an authority on the Sāṁkhya School of Indian Philosophy. Coming from a highly connected Bengali family of intellectuals, she has to her credit a distinguished academic career, after which she has engaged herself for the last 35 years in her vigorous academic pursuits, which have indeed borne good fruit both in her teaching and writing.

Though actively interested in all schools and branches of Indian Philosophy, Dr. Anima Sen Gupta has specialised in the study of the Sāṁkhya thought as would be evident from her several pioneering works on it, which she has already published.

Incidentally, she has contributed ten authoritative articles, very weighty indeed, on the various facets and thinkers of the Sāṁkhya Philosophy, designed in our *Marathi Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*, and our editors have been highly impressed by these thoughtful writings.

The present book *Classical Sāṁkhya: A Critical Study* reveals once more her acute scholarship and deep insight into the subjects she has dealt with. Needless to say, this work is stimulating and illuminating.

I commend this book to scholars interested in various facets and phases of Samkhya philosophy. I hope Dr. Anima Sen Gupta, will continue to make similar contributions to philosophical scholarship by further works on Indian philosophy.

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Prelude

The Sāṁkhya-Yoga philosophy is perhaps the oldest philosophical thought and discipline that has come down to us as a sacred heritage. There may be differences of opinion among scholars regarding the source of the Sāṁkhya-Yoga philosophy but its antiquity is never disputed.

Philosophical endeavour in India is spiritual in the sense that the quest here, has generally stemmed from an urge to know the inner essence of human personality so as to enable a man to grasp in a deeper and proper manner the mystery of both Life and Mind. A philosopher, here, has never been inspired to give only "a general description of the whole universe mentioning all the most important kinds of things which are known to be in it."

Sages and saints of India have realised fully that the outer life of man which emerges from his constant contact with the external world and which also receives its due nourishment from the external world, does not constitute the complete life of man. It is just a temporary and finite display of man's real essence which is embedded in his inner life. The external life, which is spread out in the external world, is unable to cater to the higher needs of a man's life. Man, in ignorance, thinks that wealth and power, name and fame can satisfy his inherent urge for lasting delight and happiness. He therefore, gets stuck in the muddy soil of the comflicting biological and moral interests of the practical world. He never realises that there can not be any prospect of real peace and happiness of life through intense and interested enjoyment of wealth, power and other worldly materials. The tragedy of this outer life lies in the fact that it can never offer a man steady and unalloyed peace and happiness. Since the external world is a moving, changing world, the outer life that bursts forth in it, is also always unsteady, always palpitating and always flowing towards its inevitable end.

Naturally, therefore, queries arise in thinking and reflecting minds regarding the real purpose and meaning of human life and also regarding its relation to the external world. What really is the true

significance of human life? Does it mean nothing more than its manifestation in the physical, biological and psychological planes? Should we, therefore, accept that this limited, changing and decaying life, which bursts forth, develops and withers away in the day-today world of experience, constitutes the complete picture of human life? Does the goal of human-life lie in getting finished in the wilderness of this tragic empirical Vortex? Does man really vanish completely for ever after living a finite life of limited horizon and limited scope? Is there no other deeper, more delightful and more lasting horizon for him beyond this frail, limited and sorrow-striken one? Is he fated to swing constantly between waves of pleasure and pain which form the texture of this short empirical life? Is his restless mind his only guiding star? Is there no other higher and steadier luminary to emit bright and steady light for him so as to enable him to control his unsteady mind?

What, in fact, does a man do in his empirical life? He only creates his own sorrows and joys by making the external world an object of his sense-enjoyment. Is there no steady pivotal principle beyond his unsteady mental states? If this finite and limited psycho-physical existence is the final fate of man, then what is the meaning and purpose of human-existence? We must, therefore say, that man is created finite and that finitude is the last word for him. In that case, life will cease to be an alluring one. A man may live such a life under compulsion but it will never bring for him the message of hope and delight.

In actual life, however, man is found to possess an inherent desire for ever lasting delight and permanent peace. This desire is an inherent movement in him,— an impetus to go forward. This is the truth that lies at the root of human-life. Now, the finite and limited life of man cannot become the supporting principle of that peace or delight which knows no bounds and never dies. The support must be eternal and infinite both in Delight and Serenity. The sages of the upaniṣads have been able to grasp this truth fully and so they have declared "Bhumaive sukham. Nālpe sukhamasti." The joy, which is reflected in this limited and finite life every now and then, is really the joy of an infinite and inexhaustible source of Delight and Peace from which everything is emerging in delight, is living in delight and is also finding its culmination in delight. Hence the sages have declared that this infinite Reality is the limitless source of light and

being not only of human-life and mind but also of the whole visible world.

"Tameva bhāntamanubhāti Sarvam.
Tasya bhāsā sarvamidam vibhāti".

Indeed, the smaller truths of life are nothing but spontaneous expressions of the supreme Truth of life and the world. Both the world and the life of man are rooted and supported by one supreme Truth. This truth is a spiritual one which is pure and infinite, eternal and also beyond the psycho-biological life of man. It can never become an object of knowledge of the empirical world. Man can never know the highest Reality by the usual scientific method of the practical life. The Mind, which is the object of study of western psychology, is not the highest spiritual reality or the soul, the direct experience of which can be obtained through yogic discipline and moral purification. The mind, studied in western psychology is not the revealer. It has no light of its own. This mind is also an object to be revealed (udbhāsya.) It is because the mind of Western psychology falls in the category of the known that mental phenomena can be dissected, analysed and described in a fruitful manner by the Scientific method so as to enable a man to understand the complexity of his character in a better manner. Such an understanding, no doubt, enables him to become more accommodating and more rational in his practical behaviour, but it can not open his eye of wisdom.

Psycho-biological phenomena such as perception, conception, memory, will etc. belong to the mind and not to the soul or the principle of pure consciousness. All mental phenomena constituting the subject-matter of western psychology are illuminated by pure consciousness which gives them life and meaning. Kant, in the west, has also held that the transcendental unity of apperception is the synthetic unity of consciousness, which is original and unchanging. According to him, however, this pure consciousness can not be directly experienced by us. The sages of ancient India, on the contrary, have asserted that this pure consciousness which constitutes the real being of man, can be directly experienced by rising above all gross and subtle things of the world and also by attaining an intense state of concentration in which knowledge of non-self disappears completely. This supramental spiritual experience is the experience of eternal peace and serenity which a man, rising above the psycho-biological life of sorrows and sufferings, is able to taste and enjoy. It is because

the sages of our country have been able to have a direct acquaintance with Truth and Reality through spiritual discipline that Indian philosophy is regarded as spiritual in character. Philosophy, here, has started with an enquiry into the nature of this eternal and unchanging spiritual Truth.

The direct realisation of this abiding and unruffled truth is not, however, possible unless the intellect and the mind become steady, pure and transparent. The impure thoughts and impure emotions (like self-centred attachment, anger, hatred, greed, delusion etc)., disturb the internal organs and spoil their power of catching the reflections of Truth. So, one has to practise restraint seriously on all fronts of the empirical life so as to drive away all impurities from his mind. The primary necessity to become fit for such a spiritual discipline or sādhanā is to remove completely all passions and impure thoughts, emotions and will from the mind so that the mind may not be disturbed by undersirablc mental happenings, if it is to realise the shining light of the soul in all its divine calmness and purity. This needs intense psychological analysis and plunging by means of which all the levels of mind, namely conscious, unconscious and superconscious, can be discovered and known in a proper manner; this enables the seeker of truth to have a glimpse of that abiding light shining beyond all the levels of the mind and illaminating them in a wonderful manner. Yoga or the science of spiritual psychology is the science that aims at showing the path of the spiritual discipline which enables a man to have a direct emperience of his self as pure consciousness which is calm and serene, above and beyond the empirical life of limited resources and limited delight. The Sāṁkhya has declared that the real essence of man is the supreme spiritual principle which is steady, qualityless and beyond the sphere of the guṇas where as the yoga philosophy has laid down the rules of spiritual sādhanā by means of which man can realise himself as this Supreme 'Essence and Light'. The Sāṁkhya and the yoga constitute one comprehensive system of philosophy and religion and these two are inseparable. According to this system, man has to know first the constitutive principles of the universe and then to understand and know, through study and reasoning, that the soul is his real being. This knowledge, then inspires him to meditate on the tattvas for their direct experience and also to attain the unruffled and illuminating state of his real being by the practice of detachment and

Kriyā-yoga.

Generally, in practical-life man remains absorbed in various practical problems relating to his everyday life and existence. Many people believe sincerely that this visible world and the empirical life of man, are all that can be regarded as real. There is nothing behind and beyond the phenomenal life and phenomenal existence. So, there is nothing wrong in running after the small gains and losses of this practical life. A man should, however, make attempts to regulate his practical life in a proper manner by establishing social relations of mutual trust and mutual 'give and take.' He should always act from an utilitarian point of view since his duty does not extend beyond this. There is no other higher truth beyond this world and the worldly-life of human beings.

The sages of ancient India, however, have realised convincingly through direct experience that there is another horizon of Life which exists as the glittering foundational principle of this phenomenal manifestation. The entire phenomenal creation is getting lighted by the ever-shining luminosity of this principle and is also enriching the practical life of man with its multicoloured experiences as a result of which the world has become fascinating to all who are living in it. The light that is shining beyond the world is the original light of the lives of all living beings. This light is to be seen and experienced by a man in the deep recess of his inner being. The Sāṁkhya-yoga system has shown man the proper way of discovering and realising this supreme light in him by means of self-analysis, self-correction, concentration, meditation etc. The path of this thorough self-analysis, deep understanding, concentration and meditation (as laid down in the yoga) is not, however, an easy way of discovering the highest and the best in man. "Durgam pathastat". Even then, if a man follows this path with faith and sincerity of purpose he is sure to have some experience of peace and tranquility of mind and the memory of this bliss will then act as a source of inspiration and courage to him in his further up-hill journey of spiritual life. As the mind becomes more and more steady, as its impurities are more and more removed, as the noble emotions of love, friendship, compassion etc., are more and more aroused, the aspirant begins to experience more and more of that absolute peace which emanates from the soul. If an aspirant proceeds with firm conviction, his mental peace grows deeper and becomes more and more abiding. Since the aspirant is

knowing his own mind and is also discovering all its levels in a series of ascending movements, he is plunging more and more into an unfathomable sea of peace and serenity. He also feels keenly that his approach to this inner essence is not a negative one. There is no denial here; on the contrary, there is the forceful realisation of the eternal truth. The empirical personality of man which has a colourful existence in the visible world, blossoms for a while only being supported by the slender stem of this eternal truth. Indeed there is no scope for the pessimistic thought that the supramental state of complete silence and serenity is a state of deficiency and imbecility as the mind in this level has become completely inoperative and still. It is to be remembered that the cessation of mental modifications does not mean blowing out completely the light of the soul. Mind itself is illuminated and made an instrument for psychical activities by the light of the soul. In the ordinary state, a man remains imprisoned in the cobweb of his own mental activities and can not perceive the transcendental 'Torch Light' which is reflecting through it; but when the mind loses its power and becomes dead, one gets a direct experience of the light of the soul which constitutes its real essence.

In fact, to stop the mind is to stop the manifestation of the not-self; the self-revealing light which makes effective the manifestation of the not-self, is not blown out. It remains in its pure and ever shining form. When the mind becomes completely inoperative, consciousness becomes very deep and serene and shines in its purity and lustre. This is the final bursting forth of the Infinite and Eternal Light. Such a state can never be a state of Vacuity or dullness.

Ordinary human beings are living all the time in the midst of the creative movements of their minds: their intellectual activities, moral activities, religious activities and various practical activities are the outcome of the multifarious operations of their minds. 'Object-knowledge' always presupposes mental activities and 'object-knowledge' is the type of knowledge that guides and controls man in his expirical life. Hence, it is difficult for the average man to imagine that being which remains as a principle of pure awareness even when the mind is stopped. To the average man, therefore, not to be mentally active is equivalent to becoming an unconscious and inert thing. A man remains a living and intelligent being only so long as his mind acts. What is therefore that state of steadiness in which the mind is not operative? If the mode in the form of 'I am' is not there, what else is there to keep a man enlivened? This apprehension however, is baseless. In fact, what remains in this state is the real essence. The awareness or the Light Infinite which shines in this supreme state is beyond the sphere of thought and language. This is the state of pure and complete awareness and it is this state which in the Upanishads, is regarded as 'avāng manasogocaram:' What is completely arrested is the knowledge of the not-self; pure consciousness is ever shining. When the mind operates and assumes various modes, thereby, creating variations in the enjoyable experiences of the empirical life, man focusses his attention on the mental states only and loses light of the Supreme Light which is the real revealer of the entire creation. The light of the soul can burst forth in its real infinite illumination only when the mind becomes totally inoperative. The Spiritual knowledge and discipline, advocated by the Sāṁkhya-yoga enables a man to have a deep and profound realisation of this Supreme Principle of his life, which is called the Puruṣa or the atman. The realisation of the self is indeed the realisation which leads a man to the apex of his being by linking the best of his empirical life with the eternal life of the Spirit.

The analytical technique of the west too enables a man to attain freedom from the oppression of repressed desires and complexes but this freedom is a freedom of our normal worldly life. One who acquires this freedom is better able to avoid maladjustment with the environment, he lives in. The analytical technique will never be able to give him effective guidance to discover the level of pure conciousness which is behind our worldly experiences. The highest level of human personality (which is the level of pure eonsciousness-principle or puruṣa) can however, be discovered and experienced directly by the method of Yoga, or spiritual psychology. What therefore the Yoga discipline unfolds is beyond the reach of the analytical theory and technique of western psychology. A thorough analysis of the constitutive principles of human personality as well as of the phenomenal world has become the subject-matter of the classical Sāṁkhya because without a clear grasp of these principles, one can not have a vision of the ever shining beyond" which is in us and which alone is the inexhaustible truth and peace. Every man who will accept the truth promulgated by the Sāṁkhya philosophy and who will also lead a life of detachment, and moral purification as enjoined

by the Yoga practice, will surely reach the state of final enlightenment and lasting peace.

"Nāsti Sāṁkhya samaṁ Jñānam,
Nāsti Yoga samaṁ Balam"

With the above background I shall now pass on to the introductory chapter of this book in which I have discussed some of the basic problems of this system of philosophy.

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13 April 1982

Anima Sen Gupta

Introduction

The Classical Sāṁkhya is a dualistic system because it explicitly recognizes the independent existence of the dual principles of Puruṣa and Prakṛti. In fact, the nature of Puruṣa and Prakṛti and their relationship forms the central doctrine of the philosophy of this school. The most important point in the Upanishadic Philosophy is the doctrine that the inmost self is of the nature of pure consciousness and that it is the ground of all our experiences. The Ātman is identical with Brahman. The diverse powers of Nature have no reality independent of it. But in the Upaniṣads, an attempt to show how from the one reality, the empirical world has sprung up, is nowhere visible. We are simply told that this universe has originated from Brahman and that ultimately it will return to it.

The Sāṁkhya doctrine has taken up the task of explaining how this world of multiplicity has gradually come into existence through the process of evolution from Prakṛti. In this glorious act of creation, Prakṛti is vitalised by the sannidhi of Puruṣa. Multiplicity, however, proceeds directly from Nature and not from the spiritual principle. The spiritual reality is self or Puruṣa which is of the nature of pure consciousness. Puruṣa is ever pure in nature and all impurities of action and passion are only falsely ascribable to it. The relation of the soul with the world is merely external and artificial. It is through ignorance and passion, gathered from the ceaseless flow of karma from beginningless time, that we ascribe to the soul all the impurities of our worldly life. The realisation of the pure nature of the self and also of its distinction from Prakṛti is the goal of this ceaseless cycle of births and rebirths.

The productive agent of the universe is Prakṛti or Nature. This agent is constituted of the three guṇas-sattva, rajas and tamas. The state of Prakṛti is the equilibrium of the three guṇas; when the equilibrium is disturbed due to puruṣārtha saṁyoga, the world of multiplicity comes into being. Nature is supposed to be impregnated with

a sort of unconscious teleological force by virtue of which the guṇas are capable of providing the puruṣas with experience of various sorts and also of liberating them from bondage through the dissolution of buddhi which is the bond of the apparent union between the transcendental puruṣa and Prakṛti. There is no real relation between buddhi and puruṣa. But due to the presence of transcendental illusion in buddhi from beginningless time, the distinction between the two is not realised. This illusion is mentioned as the bondage of Puruṣa. The Classical Sāṁkhya thinks that the illusion is of the nature of the non-discrimination between the Puruṣa and the Prakṛti and that this avidyā is the cause of all misery. When this illusion is removed permanently, the puruṣa becomes free in its nature as pure consciousness and this is the state of mokṣa or liberation from the sorrows and sufferings of the world.

The Philosophy of sāṁkhya is not merely a dualistic system; it is also a realistic and rationalistic system. A realistic system, as we know, is a system which believes that the object of cognition is different from and independent of cognition. In the opinion of a realistic philosopher, the object of valid cognition (pramājñana) is never non-existent or unreal (asat). It is only the object of an erroneous cognition which can be regarded as asat in some sense or other. Again, the relation or sambandha may, sometimes, be proved to be false but the relata or sambandhi can never be false. The Sāṁkhya, being realistic in attitude, has not made any distinction between mithyā and tuccha as has been done in the advaita vedānta. The object, which is negated in the empirical life, can, very well, be described either as mithyā or as tuccha.

Realism, however, may be merely epistemological, a form which is not incompatible with Idealism, or it may be both epistemological and metaphysical. One who holds that an object known is independent of the knowing mind, may still hold that the object is spiritual in nature. Here, the man is a realist only in the epistemological sphere: In the metaphysical sphere, he is an idealist. A metaphysical realist admits the independent existence of the non-spiritual object outside the sphere of knowledge also.

The Philosophy of Sāṁkhya is realistic both from the epistemological and metaphysical points of view. In the field of epistemology, the Sāṁkhya Philosophers have admitted the independent existence of the object of cognition. The object of phenomenal knowledge is

different from phenomenal knowledge and is also independently existent. The object of cognition is always revealed in cognition as something given, as *idam* and such a revelation is due to *viṣaya's* own power of intelligibility. (Pratyupasthitamidam svamāhāt myena vastu.) Since, the object of cognition possesses sattvaguṇa, it possesses knowability or intelligibility and it is because of the intelligibility that the object gets related to somebody's experience. Had there been no object to be known, there would not have been any cognition. That which is revealed in cognition as 'idam', is real and existent. It becomes an object of phenomenal knowledge by means of its own jñeyatva dharma. The very fact that the object is revealed in cognition, shows that they are different. (Vedyatvasyābhedavyāpyatvābhāvāt kuto bhedapratipakṣatvaṁ, (*TV*, IV. 14).

The vijñanavādī says that because the knowledge of an object and the knowledge of the knowledge of that object occur simultaneously, knowledge and the object known are non-different. Knowledge is always apprehended along with the object of knowledge and never apart from the object of knowledge. Vācaspati has emphatically asserted that the non-difference between the knowledge and the object of knowledge cannot be proved by this *sahopalambhaniyama*. It is, indeed, true that the presence of knowledge always indicates the presence of an object of knowledge; but from the absence of knowledge, nobody can infer the absence of objects. We can never argue that since we are not knowing the object, the object does not exist. So, the non-difference of the object from its cognition cannot be proved. Worldly objects are not mere vijñāna as they are always experienced as objects external to cognition (Na vijñānamātram vāhyapratiteḥ).

Further, one and the same object can be presented to many buddhis or cognitions. So, the object cannot be of the form of any one of these cognitions. It has got its own sattā and it exists independently of cognition. This is because one and the same object can arouse different kinds of cognitions in different minds. That which arouses different cognitions, can never be of the form of any one of these cognitions. (Vastusāmye cittabhedāt tayaḥ vibhaktaḥ panthāḥ).

In the metaphysical sphere too, the Sāṁkhya system is a realistic one. This is because according to this school, the unconscious mutable root cause of this world is a pāramārthika tattva. It is metaphysically real, independent and different from puruṣa or the

principle of consciousness.

Although, according to Sāṁkhya, the sannidhi of puruṣa is necessary for creation, still Prakṛti does not depend on puruṣa for its existence. It is true that Puruṣa vitalises Nature by means of its sannidhi and thereby makes it fit for creation; but that does not in any way impair the independent nature of Prakṛti. The reflection of consciousness in Prakṛti simply becomes the exciting force behind creation; it is neither the material cause, nor the efficient cause of creation. Puruṣa is related only seemingly to the world through reflection. There is no real relation between the world and the principle of consciousness. The world is sat independently of Puruṣa and the root cause of the world is naturally different from puruṣa and is independently active.

Had the Sāṁkhya Philosophers admitted any such power in Puruṣa by means of which Prakṛti had become active in creation, the svataḥ pariṇāmi nature of Prakṛti would have been absolutely meaningless. All objects of the world are the effects of a svataḥ pariṇāmī Prakṛti and are also dependent on it.

Even though, the adriṣṭas of jīvas are regarded as sahakārī (assisting) kāraṇa in creation, still this also does not make creation dependent on Puruṣa. Changes are constantly going on in the infinite bosom of Nature. Even when there is no creation, there is svarūpa pariṇāma in the guṇa reals. So, adriṣṭa is not the cause of pariṇāma; it is the cause simply of diversities in creation. Adriṣṭas actually cause diversities in enjoyment. It cannot make Prakṛti dynamic or active.

The Sāṁkhya is also a rationalistic system. This is because the Sāṁkhya system has established the reality of its metaphysical principles by means of yukti or reasoning. Only those things which cannot be proved either by perception or by inference, are to be accepted on the basis of scriptural evidence.

The advaita vedānta uses the upaniṣadic text "neha nānāsti kiñcana" to prove the falsity of the whole world. The Sāṁkhya, however, does not believe in the falsity of the world. From the Sāṁkhya point of view this mahāvākya may mean that before creation, there was no creative diversity in the cetānaviṣṭā intelligised Prakṛti. It is because the advaita vedānta has believed in the falsity of the whole world that the creative process of the advaita vedānta is just a *vyānjanā* and not a reality. In the Sāṁkhya, however, the creative process is a real one. Just as in actual life, we find that if a heap of dried leaves and fire are kept very close to one another, the leaves assume a blazing form immediately and by nature. This is a fact of experience. So, the Sāṁkhya has also held that the palpitating rajas, along with sattva and tamas is undergoing changes constantly and naturally, thereby forming different combinations. The result is the creation of this multifarious universe.

In the empirical life, we find that all objects are by their very nature, undergoing constant changes and modifications. Hence, it is quite rational to suppose, on the basis of worldly experience, that the root cause of the world is also a svarūpa pariṇāmītattva. The Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas believe in atomistic creation; in the opinion of this school of philosophers, the activity in the atoms is generated by God —a hypothesis which may not stand the test of reason and experience. The case is different with the Sāṁkhya school. This school has not introduced God as the prime mover; but it has shown that since every worldly object is sakriya (active) and pariṇāmī (mutable) the root cause of the world must be of the same nature. This is real yukti and not mere imagination of the human mind.

Chapter 1

Epistemology

Nature Of Knowledge

Sāṁkhya, like advaita-vedānta, has admitted a difference between pure consciousness and phenomenal knowledge or vṛtti jñāna. Pure consciousness, devoid of all relations to buddhi, is the form of śuddha-puruṣa. This pure puruṣa is mere revealing consciousness and as such it is indifferent and nevtral. This form of consciousness is different from intellectual understanding of puruṣa and Prakṛti as two (vṛttyātmaka viveka)—an understanding which is a dharma or characteristic of buddhi. Puruṣa or mere revealing consciousness, in its pure form, is a witness, a seer, a non-agent and is also unaffected by misery.[1] That pure consciousness is neutral is also expressed by the statement 'Na Prakṛtiḥ, na vikṛtiḥ, puruṣah'.[2] Puruṣa is buddheh Pratisaṁvedi." In its pure form, it is eternal, ever-free and all-pervading.

In the asaṃprajñāta samādhi in which all buddhivṛttis are annihilated, this pure consciousness shines by its own light. So, the stage of asaṃprajñāta samādhi is not a stage of unconsciousness. On the contrary, it is the stage of full consciousness in its pure and eternally free form. Just as in Tantra, vimarśa is regarded as the pure mirror in which Śiva experiences his svarūpa,[3] in the same manner, pure sāttvika buddhi of the Sāṁkhya-yoga School serves as the nirmalādarśa (stainless mirror) which reflects the nature of self in the asaṃprajñāta-stage when all buddhivṛttis are stopped. Consciousness, therefore, in its pure form, cannot be the revealer of any natural object (Prākṛtika viṣaya). It, then, reveals only its own true form.

In the impure form, however, puruṣa-caitanya remains apparently associated with buddhi through reflection and is not discriminated from the latter. So puruṣa falsely appears as the viṣayī of viṣaya-jñāna (object-knowledge) caused through the operation of the intellect and this falsity (doṣa) is never felt in the empirical stage.

[1]*Sāṁkhyakarika*, 19. [2]*Sāṁkhyakarika*, 3. [3]*Kāmakalavilāsa.*

It is, therefore, evident that puruṣa is not the real substratum of vṛtti-jñāna. The real ādhāra (locus) of object-knowledge is buddhi. Puruṣa seems to have object-knowledge because of reflection acting in co-operation with ignorance. Activity, agency enjoyment and object-knowledge have the same locus, i.e., the intellect which is a product of Prakṛti. Object-knowledge always presupposes the prior emergence of "I-consciousness" and as such this knowledge can never arise in pure puruṣa in which there is no vṛttl. Like advaita vedānta, Sāṁkhya too, believes that pure consciousness is not even "pure-I" (śuddha aham). In the Tantra as well as in the Philosophy of Rāmānuja-school, the ultimate reality is supposed to be of the form of pure aham which is different from āhaṁkārika aham. This is due to the fact that these schools admit the ultimate reality as the creator of the world. According to Rāmanuja-school, for example, Brahman, the ultimate spiritual principle, is the real creator of the world. In the beginning of creation, God desired to be many. The "I" became the "This" by stimulating its own sentient and non-sentient aspects. The desireful supreme entity cannot be impersonal pure consciousness.

According to Sāṁkhya, however, puruṣa or the spiritual reality is a disinterested spectator of the world-show. It is neither the material cause of the universe, nor is it the efficient cause. Puruṣa does not desire to be many and it does not actively participate in the work of creation. It vitalises Prakṛti merely by its sannidhi. Hence, the Sāṁkhya-school has not felt the need for describing puruṣa as śuddha aham. It is true as an orthodox system, Sāṁkhya has got to explain the upaniṣadic text "Eko'ham Vahusyām". Advaita vedānta has explained this creative desire of God as a vṛtti of Māyā which is His upādhi. Vaiṣṇava Philosophy and Tantra do not have to face any difficulty in explaining this upaniṣadic text as according to both, the ultimate reality possesses the form of Śuddha aham. There is, however, no clear explanation of this upaniṣadic text in the Sāṁkhya literatures available in the present age; but judging from the position of the Sāṁkhya-school, it can be reasonably said that this creative desire is to be admitted as a vṛtti of cetanāviṣṭā Prakṛti. Puruṣa is pure and immutable consciousness devoid even of I-ness. There is no logical error in such admission as in the advaita-vedānta too, the creative desire is a vṛtti of Māyā.

Now, object-knowledge is always due to the operation of buddhi.

Buddhi, on the one hand, receives reflection of consciousness from puruṣa and on the other hand undergoes modification in the form of the object which has stimulated it. Vṛttijñāna, therefore, being a modification of buddhi, may be regarded as attributive in nature and since in the opinion of the Sāṁkhya-school, there is tādātmya between substance and attribute, this vṛtti-jñāna may also be regarded as substantive in nature.

The vṛtti-jñāna of the Sāṁkhya-school is, thus, not very different from the ray-like substantive-attributive knowledge of Rāmanuja-school so far as its object-revealing nature is concerned. Regarding the locus of this knowledge, there is, however, important difference. According to Sāṁkhya, consciousness cannot be directly related to an object. Relation takes place only indirectly through vṛtti which is nothing but the modification of the intellect in the form of the object. So, buddhi is regarded as the locus of vṛtti-jñāna. According to Rāmānuja, the soul in its empirical state, is the locus of object-knowledge. The soul gets directly related to the objects but since the soul is immutable, it cannot go out to the object to get related. Rāmānuja, therefore, has admitted the existence of ray-like knowledge in the soul in the place of the vṛtti-jñāna of the intelligised buddhi of the Sāṁkhya-school. This ray-like knowledge of Rāmānuja is capable of expansion and contraction. By expanding this ray-like knowledge, the soul gets directly related to the object.

Relation between the knower and the object of knowledge

Although buddhi is the locus of knowledge and there is no real relation between the soul and the object of knowledge, still it appears as if puruṣa or the soul is having this phenomenal knowledge on account of reflection acting in co-operation with non-discrimination or (aviveka). In other words, puruṣa falsely appears as the knower of the object. Here, we should remember that according to the dualistic Sāṁkhya, puruṣa does not form an element of the experiencing ego which is formed in the intellect with the reflected consciousness of the self combined with buddhi's own conceptual determinations. In object-knowledge, therefore, the object is really related to intelligised buddhi (through vṛtti) and is only seemingly related to puruṣa through reflection. "So'yaṁ buddhi tattvavarttinā jñāna sukhādinā tatprativimvitastachhyāyā pattyā jñāna sukhādimāneva, bhavati".[1] **So the problem to be discussed next is the problem** of the nature of relation that exists between the intelligised buddhi and the object.

Relation between the intelligised buddhi and the object

Although there is real relation between the intelligised buddhi and the object, still this relation is not direct in the sense that the object is not revealed directly. The object is revealed only indirectly through vṛtti (i.e., the form of the object assumed by the intellect). Vṛtti is the prativimba of the object and the object is the vimba. So, the relation between the buddhi vṛtti and the object is of vimba-prativimba form. The object gets revealed through its prativimba. It is the prativimba which is directly cognized. The vimba or the object is cognized by the intelligised buddhi only indirectly. So, the relation between the intelligised buddhi and the object is indirect (parokṣa sambandha). Since the intelligised buddhi is related to viṣaya through vṛtti, the relation between the intellect and the object may be described as paramparā-sambandha. The sāṁkhya-theory, therefore, is not a form of direct realism in which the object is directly revealed in knowledge. In this respect, the sāṁkhya-theory resembles the theory of the advaita-vedānta but differs from the theory of knowledge upheld by the nyāya-school or by the school of Rāmānuja. According to the latter school, it is the object and not its vṛtti which is directly manifested in knowledge. Thus, according to the sāṁkhya and the advaita-vedānta, three factors are involved in knowledge: the intelligised buddhi or antaḥkaraṇāvacchinna caitanya as the knower, vṛtti of the object which amounts to knowledge when consciousness is reflected through it, and the object. (It is, of course, true that in the sāṁkhya-realism, there is no such thing as prameyāvacchinna caitanya). According to Nyāya and the Rāmanūja-school, on the other hand, there is no intermediate factor in the form of vṛtti. The object is revealed directly to the knower and this direct revelation of the object is knowledge. For the sāṁkhya and the advaita-vedānta, knowledge is the direct revelation of the vṛtti and an indirect revelation only of the object (through vṛtti). In the case of perception vṛtti arises immediately (aparokṣa).

From the above it would be apparent that there is resemblance between the sāṁkhya and the advaita-vedānta in regard to the theory

[1]Vacaspati, *Sāṁkhyatattvakaumudī*, Karika 5.

of knowledge. So it will not be out of place if we discuss in brief outline, the position of the advaita-vedānta in relation to knowledge, specially in relation to perception, inference and śabda—the three sources recognized by the Sāṁkhya philosophy.

According to the advaita-vedānta, in the case of perception, antaḥkaraṇa goes out to the object of perception through the sense-organ which is in contact with the object, as a result of which, it becomes so modified as to assume the form of the said object. Perception is the immediate knowledge in which the antaḥkaraṇa vṛtti is non-different from the object and is illuminated by the consciousness of the self.

Although the sense-organs here are not āhamkārika, still they are produced from the five tanmātras (apañcikṛta bhūta) which, being very subtle and simple, are more or less of the form of energy. For that reason, there is no difficulty in assuming that the visual and auditory organs can reach their respective objects. Antaḥkaraṇa, however, is taijasa in nature, although it is composed of five elements taken in combination. (Pañcabhūtairmilitairmanobhuddhyahaṁkāra cittāni jāyante).

Hence, there is also no logical incongruity in thinking that antaḥkaraṇa too reaches the object and then, assumes the form of the object. Here, also, what is directly related to antaḥkaraṇa is its vṛtti. Through vṛtti, antaḥkaraṇa is related to the object of perception. It is because the antaḥkaraṇa is reaching the object and, therefore, getting changed into the form of the object that the question, how does the vṛtti correspond to the object—does not arise at all. Sea-water, coming out of the sea, reaches a river and assumes the form of the river. Here, there is no difficulty in admitting that the form of the river which the water assumes resembles the actual river-form.

The erroneous perception poses no difficulty either for the advaita-vedānta or for the sāṁkhya. Take the case of the 'conch-shell-silver illusion'. The advaitin will say that it is *Śuktitva prakāraka avidyā* which covers the true form of the śukti and projects the form of anirvacaniya rajata (This is a case of anirvacaniya sṛṣṭi or indescribable creation made by avidyā). It is because there is the creation of the anirvacaniya rajata that there is no difficulty in understanding how rajatākārā vṛtti arises in the antaḥkaraṇa as a result of sense-object contact. According to Sāṁkhya, however, there is sadasatkhyāti in the case of illusory perception. In 'idamrajatam,' the perception of 'idam' is the perception of *sadavastu* and so there is no difficulty in understanding how 'idamvṛtti' arises in the buddhi. So far as the arousal of the rajatākārā vṛtti in the intellect is concerned, the sāṁkhya will say that rajatākārā vṛtti arises in the intellect as a result of the combined operation of the awakened rajatavāsanā and the non-discrimination of rajata and śukti (vivekāgraha). Now, here, although *idamvṛtti* and *rajata-vṛtti* are two different vṛttis, still due to reflection of one and the same consciousness through two vṛttis, knowledge arises as one.

In the case of inference, on the other hand, both the sāṁkhya and the advaita—vedānta will hold that the buddhi or the antaḥkaraṇa will be modified into the form of the inferred object on account of the modification of the intellect or anataḥkaraṇa in the form of the mark (hetu) which is perceived by the sense-organ and which is in universal relation with the major term or the inferred object. Since one and the same consciousness is reflected through two vṛttis, (i.e.) Pratyakṣa vṛtti of the hill and vahnyākāra vṛtti), there is the arousal of one knowledge. In the case of śabda, intellect or antaḥkaraṇa assumes the form of the object (vṛtti) about which an assertion has been made by the āpta puruṣa. As soon as the word is uttered by the speaker and understood by the hearer, the intellect or the antaḥkaraṇa assumes the form of the object signified by the word. Hence, we find that according to the sāṁkhya and the advaita-vedānta, the object is never known directly either by the buddhi or by the antaḥkaraṇa. In this respect, the sāṁkhya and the advaita vedānta are so very close to each other that if we substitute antaḥkaraṇāvacchinna caitanya in the place of caitanyaprativimbitabuddhi, then the sāṁkhya theory will become almost indistinguishable from the advaita-theory so far as the relation between the real experiencing ego (Paramātā) and the object is concerned.

Now, since puruṣa appears as the knower without really being so, it becomes necessary for us to consider also the nature of relation that can be logically supposed to exist between puruṣa and the object of knowledge.

Relation between puruṣa and the object of knowledge

So far as puruṣa is concerned, there is no real relation between it and the object of knowledge. Even the relation between puruṣa and

buddhivṛtti is apparent and is caused by reflection and non-discrimination. According to vacāspati, due to sannidhāna, a reflection of consciousness is caught in the buddhi by virtue of which all viṣayākārā vṛttis of buddhi get apparently changed into consciousness. This apparent change in the character of vṛttis gives rise to a sense of false identity (ekameva darṣanam) between puruṣa and buddhi. It is on account of this non-discrimination that puruṣa seems to have knowledge of the objects through vṛttis (which are then falsely owned by puruṣa).

According to vijñāna-bhiksu, however, the intellect reflects the consciousness of puruṣa and becomes intelligised; the result is that the inherent ahaṁkārā of buddhi is falsely appropriated by the self. After that the viṣayākārā vṛttis of the intellect are reflected back in the self and it appears as if puruṣa is knowing objects through vṛttis. Truly speaking, there is no real relation of puruṣa either with buddhi and its vṛttis or with objects imaged through vṛttis. The seeming relation of puruṣa and buddhi-vṛtti may, therefore, be described as false tādātmya (caused by sannidhi and vivekāgraha of puruṣa and buddhi) according to Vācaspati and abhivyānga-abhivyānjaka relation according to vijñāna bhiksu.

Due to vivekāgraha, the puruṣa seems to be the knower who knows the object in an indirect manner through vṛtti. There seems to be a false *paramparā* relation between puruṣa and the object although in reality puruṣa is asamga having no connection with the world of Prakṛti.

That non-discrimination is potent enough to create false knowledge has also been admitted by the Prabhakara School of Mīmāmsā; because according to akhyātivāda of this school, erroneous perception arises because of non-discrimination between memory and perception and also between their objects. In the case of the perception of silver in a conchshell, it has been stated:

20. *Nanvatra rajatā bhāsaḥkathameva ghatiṣyate*
Uccate śuktiśa kalaṁ grihitaṁ bhedavarjitam
21. *Śuktikayā viśeṣāye rajatādbhedahetavaḥ*
Tena jñātā abhi bhavaj jñātā sāmānya rūpata
22. *Anantaraṁ ca rajatasmitirjātā tathāpica*
Manodoṣāh tadityāṁśa parāmarśa vivarjitam
23. ***Rajatam viṣayikrityā naiva***
śuktervivecitam
Smrityā to rajatā bhāsa
upapanno bhaviṣyati
(Prakarano pañcikā 4-26-29)

Both grahaṇa and smaraṇa fail to cognize the difference that exists between their objects (idam and rajatam) due to mental disability (mānasikadoṣa) as a result of which there is no discrimination between perception and memory knowledge. (grahaṇa-smaraṇa ceme vivekānavabhāsini) In the absence of discrimination, grahaṇasmaraṇātmaka knowledge too, appears in a manner similar to what is experienced in the knowledge of real silver.

According to Sāṁkhya, however, there is no non-discrimination between perception and memory: there is the failure to discriminate one object from the other. Here, agrahaṇa is of svarūpa bheda (i.e., of the difference that exists in the natures of two objects) and also of the difference that exists between two vṛttis. Sāṁkhya believes that knowledge can also be false. This is because Sāṁkhya holds that just as knowledge or jñāna is a disposition of the intellect, in the same manner ajñāna too, is a disposition of the intellect. Prabhakara, on the other hand, believes that all knowledge is true by nature. The question of falsity arises only when we proceed to use that knowledge in our practical life.

Although Prabhākara has introduced aviveka to account for erroneous perception, still we should remember that the aviveka of Sāṁkhya is different from the aviveka of the Prabhākara school.

The aviveka of Sāṁkhya is primarily ontological, anādi and apriori. It is epistemological only in the sense that it is a failure to discriminate between the self and the not-self. Prabhākara's aviveka is purely epistemological as it works in the field of knowledge only. It is not a creative force of the ultimate material stuff; nor is it the cause of the self's attachment to worldly objects. It is not even anādi.

Can Puruṣa be a Sākṣī in the Advaita Sense?

From the above discussion, it is clear that there is no real relation between puruṣa and vṛtti-jñāna. The relation is apparent and false. Even then puruṣa has been described as Sākṣī. In the advaita-vedānta too, there is the mention of Sākṣī-caitanya which is necessary to produce vṛtti-jñāna. All objects of knowledge become viṣayas of Sākṣī either through the operation of the Pramāṇas (in the case of

jñāta viṣaya) or through the operation of ajñāna (in the case of ajñāta-viṣaya).[1] The question, therefore arises: does the sākṣī of Sāṁkhya possess the same epistemological status as is possessed by the sākṣī-caitanya of the advāita-vedānta?

In the *Sāṁkhyakārikā* (no. 19) Puruṣa has been described as a witness, a seer only without any activity. The said Kārikā runs as follows:

"Tasmāt-ca viparyayāt siddham sākṣītvam asya puruṣasya."

The use of the word '*sākṣītvam*' in the Kārikā has led some scholars of India[2] to assume that puruṣa of the Sāṁkhya philosophy is similar to the *jiva-sākṣī* of the advaita-vedānta: but in the Sāṁkhya philosophy, the objects to be revealed only by the witnessing self (*jivā-sākṣī*) are not mentioned after the fashion of the advaita-vedānta. (*Vedāntadarśane paramārtha-tattva*).

kind of objects revealed only by the sākṣī-Caitanya or the witnessing self

The objects which are generally admitted as the objects of the witnessing consciousness (*jīva-sākṣī*) are those which are not cognized by the activity of the *pramāṇas* (sources of knowledge). Internal organ and internal modes (*antaḥkaraṇa-vṛttis*) are, for example,

[1]Pramāṇa makes an object viṣaya of sākṣī by producing jñātatvadharma in the object of knowledge whereas ajñana does the same by producing ajñātatvadharma in the object.

[2]Dr. Sita Ram Goswami, *Vedāntadarśaneparamārtha-tattva*, p. 15 (original book written in Bengali) 'Puruṣa has been described as sākṣī in the *Sāṁkhyakārikā* (19). . . .Those who believe in sākṣī do not recognize that the mind is an organ (indriya). Those who admit that the mind is an organ do not believe in sākṣī. So, pleasures and pains which are generally admitted as objects of internal perception, are all objects to be known only by the sākṣī according to the view of the Sāmkhyas. Although, puruṣa has been mentioned as sākṣi in the *Sāṁkhyakārikā*, yet the objects to be known only by the sākṣī have not been clearly mentioned. It is because Sāṁkhya has admitted the existence of sākṣī without clearly determining the objects which are to be known only by the witness, its definition of perception given in kārikā 5 has confused the commentators to a great extent. The commentators have thought that this definition gives us the characteristics of both external perception and internal perception. But truly speaking, according to Sāṁkhya, external perception occurs through the functioning of the external sense-organs: internal perception is not due to the operation of any indriya. This is sākṣī pratyakṣa. Unless this position is admitted, recognition of puruṣa as sākṣī is senseless like the utterings of a mad person.

admitted as objects to be cognized only by the witness (*Sākṣya-vastu*). Things of the world are known through *vṛttis* (internal modes) originating from the activity of the means of knowledge (*pramāṇas*). The internal modes, however, are cognised only by the witness in the individual self without the functioning of any one of the approved sources of knowledge. According to the Vedanta-paribhāṣā, which does not admit that the mind is an *indriya* (sense-organ), pleasures, pains etc., are also objects to be revealed by the witnessing consciousness.

Jīva-sākṣī of the Advaita-vedānta

In the philosophy of the Advaita-vedānta, the knowing and the experiencing self is regarded as false and phenomenal. This false and phenomenal ego is a mixture of this (*idam*) and not this (*anidam*). In other words, it is a unified category of *antaḥkaraṇa* and *cit*, both fused into one. So, this "I', of the advaita-vedānta is both objective and subjective, changing and also the static perceiver of changes. "I" is recognized both as unhappy and as the object of love. The changing aspect of the experiencing ego is known as the *pramātā* and it is this *prāmatā* that reaches the external object through the *antaḥkaraṇa*. But a changeable ego alone is not capable of explaining how different experiences of the ego, happening at different periods of time, can be gathered together round a single and identical conscious centre so as to give rise to such phenomena as a feeling of identity, memory, recognition etc. In addition to *pramātṛ-caitanya* or changeable consciousness, a static witnessing self (*jīva-sākṣī*) has got to be recognized in the philosophy of the Advaita school. Hence, in the non-dualistic philosophy, the *jīva* or the experiencing ego comprises both *jīva-sākṣī* and *pramātā*. Consequently, objects to be known exclusively by the *jīva-sākṣī* are definitely mentioned in the philosophy of the Advaita-school.

In the philosophy of the Sāṃkhya, however, no mention of *pramātṛ-caitanya* as distinguished from the *sākṣī-caitanya* is found in any context. Here the individual or the *jīva* refers to that puruṣa which has been caught in the snare of *prakṛti* through reflection. Due to reflection, the unconscious intellect appears as conscious and it is the intelligised *buddhi* that actually gets related to the objects through its modifications. Modification of the intellect, in the form of the object, is the *pramāṇa* and the reflection of puruṣa in it is

pramā. Although, in the opinion of this school *buddhi* or the intellect is the real substratum of knowledge, still it appears as if puruṣa is having this phenomenal knowledge because of reflection acting in co-operation with ignorance. Since in the Sāṁkhya, puruṣa appears as the knower of the object, there is no need to assume the existence of another *sākṣī* in the Vedānta sense. When buddhi comes in contact with the worldly objects, it assumes the forms of these objects, and all these forms or modes (*vṛttis*) apparently get changed into knowledge through the reflection of *cit* in the intellect. Due to *aviveka*, this apparent change in the character of *vṛttis* gives rise to a false sense of non-discrimination between puruṣa and *buddhi*. It seems as if puruṣa is non-different from *buddhi* and there is only one principle and not two. Here, although the puruṣa of sāṁkhya seems to perform the same function as is performed by the *jīva-sākṣī* of the Advaita-vedānta, the two do not possess the same status. *Jīva-sākṣī* of the Advaita-vedānta is the static consciousness within the experiencing ego, the changeable aspect of which is the *pramātā*. Both *sākṣī* and *pramātā* are equal (*samakakṣa*) in the sense that both of them are false and limited in space and time. In the philosophy of Sāṁkhya, on the other hand, the puruṣa (the *sākṣī*) has been admitted as real and it is not limited in space and time. It does not form an element of the experiencing ego (which is formed in the *buddhi* with the reflected consciousness of puruṣa united with *buddhi's* own conceptual determinations).

Sākṣī or witness literally denotes that principle which is capable of revealing anything independently that occurs before it. Therefore, any *tattva*, which is self-revealing and is also the revealing principle of the world, may be called *sākṣī* or the witness. In order to be described as *sākṣī*, it is not necessary for consciousness to assume the role that has been taken up by the *jīva-sākṣī* of the Advaita-school. Moreover, if puruṣa is brought down to the level of the phenomenal *jīva-sākṣī* then the followers of the Advaita will not be in a position to raise any objection against the Sāṁkhya theory of multiplicity of selves as *jīva-sākṣīs* are many in number.

In fact, non-recognition of *sākṣī-caitanya* as distinguished from the *pramātṛ-caitanya* in the manner suggested by the Advaita-vedānta has not created any difficulty in the epistemological position of the Sāṁkhya Darshana. Cognition, plesures, pains etc. actually subsist in *buddhi* and the spirit simply appears to have knowledge of objects, pleasures, pain etc. through reflection and *aviveka*. *Ekameva darśanam, khyātireva darśanam*, happens to puruṣa and not to a fictitious knower formed of *sākṣi-caitanya*, and *pramātṛ-caitanya*. Phenomenal knowledge is gained in the following manner.

Perception: In the case of perception, say the visual perception of a jar, the eye comes in contact with a jar as a result of which there are certain *indriya-vṛttis* which are presented to the mind. The mind analyses and synthesises those *vṛttis* and presents them to the intellect. Then through the functioning of the mind and the external organ, the intellect assumes the form of the jar (the *buddhi-vṛttis* or the *pramaṇa*). Finally, the consciousness of the self is reflected in this objectified form of the *buddhi* and the object is immediately revealed. This is the perceptual knowledge of the jar. The question that arises here is; who is the knower of this knowledge? According to Advaita epistemology, the knower is the category formed of *sākṣi* and *pramātri-caitanya* (*antaḥkaraṇopahita caitanya* and *antaḥkaraṇāvacchinna caitanya*): this knower is as false as the known. *Sākṣi caitanya* (witnessing consciousness) constitutes the permanent nature of this metaphysically false but empirically real experiencing ego; and due to its presence, the personal identity which is absolutely essential for being a knower, can be accounted for from the point of view of the Advaita-vedānta. In the Sāṁkhya, however, both the knower and the known, are metaphysically real. What is false is the *abheda grahaṇa* (non-discrimination) of the intellect and the puruṣa. Puruṣa—the seer—becomes seemingly associated with *buddhi* through reflection, and due to *avidyā*, it seems to us as if only one principle is operating in the perceptual knowledge. According to dualistic Sāṁkhya, the objective ground is as real as the subjective one, and puruṣa can serve as the subjective ground of knowledge without being dragged down to the position of the *Sākṣī* of the Advaita-vedānta. In the Advaita vedānta a false knower has been formed to match with the false object of the false and phenomenal knowledge, because unless the individual knower is false along with the known, non-dualism of the Advaita-school cannot be logically upheld.

Inference: Inferential knowledge is that knowledge in which the modification of the intellect in the form of the inferred object occurs in the absence of the contact of sense-organ with the object. Here, the middle term is perceived, and the major term is inferentially known through its relation to the middle term.

Śabda : In the case of *śabda*, the intellect assumes the form of the object about which an assertion has been made by a trustworthy person. In all these cases (perception, inference, and verbal testimony) puruṣa is the apparent knower through *aviveka*, and therefore, there is no need for the recognition of any other static consciousness in the form of the *sākṣī-caitanya* of the Advaita type.

Cognition of pleasures, pains etc. : So far as pleasures, pains etc., are concerned, these are the objects of internal perception (according to Sāṁkhya). Mind is the *indriya* that operates in the perception of these objects. Dr. Sita Ram Goswami is wrong in holding that mind is not an *indriya* according to the Sāṁkhya school. In the *Sāṁkhya-kārikā* (27) it has been stated: *ubhayātmakam atra manaḥ saṁkalpakaṁ indriyaṁ ca sādharmyāt*. In the *Sāṁkhya Pravacana Bhāṣya*, too, we come across the following passage.

Indrasya saṁghāteśvarasya karaṇamindriyam tathā cāhaṁ-kārakāryatve sati karaṇatvamindriyatvamiti.

Further, in the *Tattvakaumudi*,[1] Vācaspati Miśra has emphatically asserted that the mind is an *indriya* because it has properties common to *indriya* : 'The property meant is that consisting in its having for its constituent cause, the I-principle abounding in the *sattva* attribute and not in its being a characteristic of Indra (spirit); for this latter property belongs to the will and the I-principle also..... Thus then, being the characteristic of the spirit should be regarded only as an explanation of the derivation of the term *indriya*; it cannot be said to form its connotation.'

It would therefore appear that it is not proper to assert that the mind is not an *indriya* and that pleasures and pains etc. cannot be the objects of internal perception. Cognition of everything, according to Sāṁkhya, is due to the reflection of puruṣa in the intellect. Cognition of pleasures and pains, too, occur in the same process. Even then, pleasures and pains cannot be regarded as *sākṣī-bhāṣya* in the Advaita sense because these are known through mind which is an *indriya*. Mind is a *tattva* different from *buddhi* and *ahaṁkāra*. It is to be classed with the *indriyas*. It is because the mind is an organ that the definition of perception given in the *Sāṁkhyakārikā* (5) (*prativiṣayādhyavasāyo dṛṣṭam*) has been interpreted by Vācaspati Miśra in a manner so as to cover both external and internal perceptions. ('What the term *prativiṣaya* stands for is the *indriya* in relation with the object. *Adhyavasāya* is cognition, the function of the intellect: in fact *adhyavasāya* stands for that excess flow of *sattvaguṇa* which results from the suppression in the intellect of *tamas* due to the contact of the *indriyas* with their respective objects. This is *vṛtti* or 'knowledge.' (*Tattvakaumudī*) Since the mind is admitted as an *indriya*, pleasures, pains etc., are to be regarded as the objects of internal perception.

[1]English translation Ganganath Jha,

Cognition of internal modes: The internal modes, however, cannot be known through other *vṛttis*. These are revealed directly by the reflected consciousness of puruṣa without the help of any other media. So, the internal modes are *sākṣī-bhāsya* in the Sāṁkhya sense : (that is in the sense of *puruṣa-bhāsya*) and not in the sense of Advaita-vedānta.

COMMENTS

Truly speaking, it is the realistic frame-work of the Sāṁkhya that makes the assumption of a *sākṣī-caitanya* superfluous in the Advaita sense. In the Sāṁkhya, no false knower is knowing falsely a false world. *Aviveka* in Sāṁkhya implies misappropriation of something by the puruṣa which does not really belong to it. Phenomenal knowledge or *vṛtti* is real and its substratum—*buddhi*—is also real. So is the puruṣa which is by nature *asaṁga* and unchangeable. The worst mistake (*mahādoṣa*) therefore lies in misappropriation or confused perception. The reflection of puruṣa-*caitanya* in the intellect together with beginningless ignorance is causing the confused perception of the puruṣa due to which intellectual concepts appear as self's own possession. So puruṣa, here, is serving as the static background of the phenomenal knowledge, but this puruṣa is not a *sākṣī* in the Advaita sense as it does not form the part of a false and fictitious ego which is limited in space and time. By describing puruṣa as *sākṣī*, the Sāṁkhya philosophers have not made any 'insane statement'. *Sākṣāt paśyatī iti sākṣī.* Puruṣa, therefore, is *sākṣī* in this sense in which *brahman* too is a *sākṣī* (*sākṣīcetā kevalo nirgunaśca. Sveta Upaniṣad 6-11.*)

SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE

According to Sāṁkhya there are three independent sources through which knowledge is acquired: Perception, Inference and Śubda.

Perception

Perception arises only when there is the presentation of an object on the one hand and operation of one of the sense-organs on the other. Perception always depends upon some sort of sannikarṣa between its object and a particular sense-organ. This fact has been stressed upon by Vācaspati Miśra when he has said : "Viṣayam viṣayam prati

vartate iti prativiṣayam.................

artha sannikṛṣṭamindriyamityarthaḥ".

External perception is caused by the combined operation of the external sense-organs and internal organ whereas internal perception is caused only by the operation of the internal organ. In both the cases, there must be the relation between a sense-organ and its object. Adhyavasāya is definite cognition that arises due to this relation. This cognition is a function of the intellect. When a relation or sannikarṣa happens to take place between an external sense-organ and its specific object, the intellect which is permeated with the consciousness of puruṣa, gets changed into the form of the object. This change of buddhi into the form of the object is what is known as vṛtti. This vṛtti or modification of the intellect in the form of the object caused through the operation of the sense-organ (indriya-prāṇālīkayā) is Pratyakṣa pramāṇa and the reflection of puruṣa in this modification (or buddhi vṛtti) is Pratyakṣa-pramā. (Ato buddhi vṛtti prativimbitam caitanyam pramā) Pramā has also been defined as 'pauruṣeya bodhaḥ' (i.e., adhyavasāya in the form of an apprehension by an experiencing ego (pramātā) which is asandigdhāviparitānadhigata viṣaya).

In the cognition "ghatamahaṁ jānāmi" there is not only the revelation of the jar due to reflection of consciousness in the ghatākārā vṛtti, there is also the appropriation on the part of the experiencing ego of the jar as an object of his knowing process.

There is, however, no inconsistency in defining pramā in both ways. This is because according to Sāṁkhya, the real experiencing agent is the intelligised buddhi in which ahaṁvṛtti arises as an effect and not the puruṣa (that falsely appears as a knower due to sannidhi or reflection and aviveka). There is, therefore, no logical incongruity in defining pramā either as buddhivṛtti through which consciousness is reflected or as the apprehension of the viṣaya (object) by an experiencing agent: because according to Sāṁkhya, there is tādātmya

between pariṇāma (vṛtti) and pariṇāmi (intelligised buddhi) which is the real pramātā. Intelligised buddhi is the substratum of vṛtti as well as of bodhaḥ. When pramātri aspect is to be stressed upon in knowledge, pramā is defined as pauruṣeya bodhaḥ. When the intelligised vṛtti as the effect of pramāṇavyāpāra is to be brought into prominence, pramā is defined as the buddhivṛtti through which consciousness is reflected. As soon as there is reflection of consciousness through vṛtti, there is immediately revelation of vṛtti resulting in the consequent manifestation of the object to the experiencing ego. This manifestation of the object is what is termed knowledge.

In Muktāvali, however, Visvanath has accepted pramā of the Sāṁkhya-school in the sense of caitanya prativimbita buddhi vṛtti.

"*Tasyā evendriya praṇālikaya*

pariṇatirjñānarūpa ghatādinā sambandhaḥ".

In fact, there will be no mistake if we say that buddhi vṛtti permeated with consciousness (citsambadhayuktaḥ) is pramā because it is the effect of buddhi-vyāpāra.

Vyāpāra (as we have seen) is the process by which buddhi (through the help of karaṇas in the shape of sense-organs) assumes the form of the object.

(Yo viṣayākaravṛttirūpo buddhivyāpāro jāyate

se eva vyāpāraḥ pramākaraṇatvāt pramāṇam)

Now, buddhi, being a product of Prakṛti is unconscious in nature. Hence, adhyavasāya, which is a unique disposition of the intellect, is also unconscious in nature; but all the unconscious modifications of buddhi are intelligised and revealed by the reflection of cit in the intellect. Hence, though knowledge as a buddhi-dharma, is unconscious in nature, still objects are revealed in knowledge on account of the light borrowed from puruṣa. Here, too, we can see that it is more logical to define pramā as vṛtti through which consciousness is reflected because it is the vṛtti which can be regarded as unconscious. In the case of 'bodha' or apprehension on the other hand, it is very difficult for us to think that it is unconscious; because the word bodhaḥ generally refers to conscious aspect of knowledge. It is only when we lay emphasis on the caitanyāṁsa of knowledge that we can describe it as pauruṣeya bodhaḥ. Since knowledge is regarded as an unconscious disposition of unconscious buddhi, it is proper to emphasise the vṛttyaṁśa of knowledge (which is its real acetanāṁśa) and say that vṛtti, through which consciousness is reflected (citsam-

bandhaḥ) is the resulting knowledge or pramā.

Mind and the external sense-organs: According to Vijñānbhikṣu, an indriya is the instrument of the soul (the lord of the body). The sense-organ serves as an instrument in producing knowledge and it is also āhamkarika in nature.[1] Regarding the number of organs, two views seem to be mentioned in the kārikā by its author. In two karikas (24 & 25), the number of organs has been mentioned as eleven (5 organs of sensation plus 5 organs of action plus mind): but in kārikā 32, organs have been counted as thirteen. (5 organs of sensation plus 5 organs of action plus 3 internal organs such as mind, ego-sense and the intellect). Naturally, therefore, the position becomes confusing and anomalus. This anomaly has been removed by Vijñānbhikṣu in his *Yogavārttika* (II.18) where he has come forward to give us a satisfactory explanation of such apparent contradiction. In his opinion, buddhi and ahaṁkāra are sukṣma indriyas whereas mind which is an effect of ahaṁkāra is gross in nature. Since, mind and the other ten organs are effects of ahaṁkāra, they are to be counted together as eleven organs. Moreover, buddhi, as we know, is the cause of ahaṁkāra, and ahaṁkāra is the cause of the mind. Since, these three internal categories are related as cause and effect, counting of the mind (managrahaṇa) as an internal organ means counting of ahaṁkāra as well, (ahaṁkāragrahaṇa) and counting of ahaṁkāra as an internal organ means similarly the counting of buddhi. Hence there is no anomaly, if organs are described either as eleven or as thirteen.

According to Vācaspati too (who was earlier than Bhikṣu) the signs of an indrīya are as follows:

(1) Indriya is a characteristic of Indra or soul.

(2) The upādāna of an indriya is ahaṁkāra.[2]

If these be the characteristics of an indrīya, then the number should be counted as eleven because buddhi and ahaṁkāra cannot possess the characteristic of being the effect of ahaṁkāra mentioned above. Of these eleven, five are organs of action, five are external sense-organs and one is internal sense-organ in the form of the mind.

[1] *Sāṁkhyapravacanasūtra:* 2-19. Indrasya saṁghateśvarasya karaṇamindriyam, tathā cāhaṁkāra kāryatvesati Karaṇatvamindriyatvamiti.

[2] Vacaspati Miśra, *Tattvakaumudī*, commentary on, Karika 26. Sāttvikāhaṁkāropādānakatvamindrīyatvam Indrasya—ātmacinhatvādindrīyamucyate.

It seems to us that Īśvarakriṣṇa has included buddhi and ahaṁkāra in the list of karaṇas in karikā 32 mainly due to the fact that in the said kārika, he is just trying to give us an exhaustive account of the different functions of all the tattvas which worldly soul requires for the purpose of enjoying this world through knowledge, feeling and action. The jīva or the individual soul cannot have any experience of the bhogya jagat (the world of enjoyment) unless the I—sense emerges in it through the awakening of ahaṁkāra which is an effect of buddhi. Life of an experiencing self is also maintained by the circulation of vital airs performed by the three internal karaṇas. (According to Gauḍapāda, however, the circulation of vital airs is the function of all thirteen organs).[1] Since purusārtha is the goal for which Prakṛti is undergoing ceaseless changes from time immemorial, it becomes a duty on the part of the śāstrākara to examine carefully all the tattvas which will be operative in leading the soul to its desired goal.

External sense-organs and their functions: Eye, ear, nose, tongue and skin are known as external sense-organs because through the operation of these organs, the individual soul receives information regarding the external world.

The outer parts visible to us are not the real sense-organs.

The sense-organs receive indeterminate impressions of colour, sound, smell, taste and touch from the external world. (Rūpādiviṣayamacetanam ālocanam, tatkaraṇam buddhindriyam=Jñanendriyami tyarthaḥ). Since these indeterminate impressions of colour, sound etc., are received by these organs from the external world, they are known as external sense-organs. The organ that receives rūpa is known as the eye, the organ that hears sound is known as the ear, the organ that receives smell is known as the nose, the organ that receives taste is known as the Tongue.

The external sense-organs can make an individual aware simply of 'This is an object'. (Vastusāmānyenagrihitam) By means of the external sense-organs alone, one is not able to know any qualified object (Vastuviśeṣatvena agrihitam, viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyabhāva rahitam). The object, at that moment, is revealed only as 'idam kincidvastu' and there is no differentiation (aviviktamevabhāti) of jāti, guṇa, sambandha etc. There is also no integration in the form of one qualified object. This awareness is known as 'sammugdham' due to

[1] Gauḍapāda's bhāṣya on *Kārikā*, 32.

its not being the object of right cognition. Sāṁkhya-kārikā has described this awareness as ālocanamātram jñānam. This is the nirvikalpaka stage of knowledge.

(asti hyālocanaṁ jñānaṁ prathamaṁ nirvikalpakaṁ—*Tattva kaumudī*, bhāṣya on kārikā 27).

Savikalpaka and Nirvikalpaka Pratyakṣa : According to Sāṁkhya, therefore, nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka represent two stages of knowledge. This distinction is made there on the basis of the functional differences of the external and internal sense-organs.

The external sense-organs are first to operate in producing perceptual cognition. The awareness that results from their operation is of an indeterminate type. The external sense-organs produce a non-relational apprehension of the object simply as an indefinite only. The simple awareness begins to change into the form of a determinate and qualified object when the mind comes into operation. This is because the mind possesses the power of determining the nature of the object by making such discrimination as 'ayam guṇaḥ': 'iyam kriyā', 'iyatmatra jātiḥ', etc. Both discrimination and assimilation which are involved in determinate perception, are referred to here by the word saṃkalpa. This is the special function of the mind. Hence, determinate perception begins to emerge as soon as mind comes to operate. Further, the functions of the three internal organs and one external organ may be both yugapat and kramaśaḥ in perception. Here, it seems to us that the words 'yugapat' and kramaśaḥ do not refer to actual operations of the sense-organs ; they, rather, stand for two different kinds of subjective feeling of the perceiving mind in respect of the awakening of knowledge due to the operation on the internal and external organs. Sāṁkhya really believes in the successive operations of the different sense-organs. It has been clearly mentioned in the *Sāmkhyakārikā* that the external sense-organ, first, perceives an object indeterminately ; it then brings such indeterminate impression to the mind which presents it to the ego-sense and which, in its turn, presents it to the intellect through which consciousness of the self is manifested. All the organs cannot therefore, be supposed to operate actually at one and the same moment of time in any situation whatsoever. Moreover, had all the organs of knowledge operated simultaneously, there could not have been any discrimination between indeterminate and determinate forms. If two things occur at the same moment, they will not be regarded as different. The use of the word "yugapat" really suggests that in some situations the internal and the external organs operate in such quick succession that the knower has the feeling that he is having the knowledge of the object immediately after his external organ has come into operation. As for example, the recognition of a snake revealed by a flash of lightning and the immediate flight as a result thereof. Here, the gradual arousal of knowledge is not felt as gradual due to very quick succession of the operational processes. There are, however, other situations when the knower feels that his knowledge is gradually passing through indeterminate stage to the determinate one. As an evidence, we can cite the example of indistinct perception in twilight of a tall vertical object. the doubt followed by a recognition of that as a human being, the reference of that to the self and determination to meet and to talk to the man or to turn and walk away from him. Truly speaking : the different organs can operate in different moments only in regard to one and the same object. If all the organs operate at one and the same moment, there will be conflict and confusion and no clear perception of the object as a consequence thereof. Successive or Kramaśaḥ feelings, generally arise in the case of doubtful cognition.

The process of perception, when analysed fully, will be as under :

First moment of perception: Indeterminate impression of the object received by the external sense-organ, 'idamkincidasti.

Second moment of perception: First moment of determinate perception : Discrimination and assimilation by the mind. This is the first moment of determinate perception when there is awareness of the form 'Ayam ghataḥ'.

Third moment of perception: Second moment of determinate perception: Functioning of the ego-sense and emergence of perceptual knowledge in the form 'ghataṁ grahitum śaknomi'.

Fourth moment of perception: Third moment of determinate perception : Functioning of buddhi in the form of adhyavasāya 'Mayaitat kartavyam'.

Thus, in the opinion of the Sāṁkhya, determinate perception begins from the second moment and assumes the form of adhyavasāya at the fourth moment.

The Nyāya system, too, recognizes indeterminate stage as the initial stage of the perceptual process. In the opinion of this school, we cannot have determinate knowledge or viśiṣṭa jñāna without a

prior perception of the simpler elements of jāti, guṇa, ākarā, saṁbandha etc., in a state of separation (dvandva). A prior perception of viśeṣaṇa is absolutely necessary for determinate knowledge of an object.

The Nyāya process of perception when analysed, stands as follows:

First moment of perception : Nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa or non-relational apprehension of viśeṣya, viśeṣaṇa etc.

Second moment of perception and first moment of determinate perception : Determinate perception or relational apprehension.

Third moment of perception and second moment of determinate perception when aham will operate : This is the stage of anuvyavasāya.

Fourth moment of perception and third moment of determinate perception : At this moment, 'hānopādānopekṣā buddhi' arises. This stage represents the full perceptual knowledge of the object, because, here, the sense of the object being desirable or undesirable dawns upon the mind of the perceiver.

Here we should remember that according to Nyāya, determinate knowledge arises after the second moment and in the third and the fourth moments (anuvyavasāya-state and hānopādānopekṣā buddhi stage) this determinate knowledge, already aroused, becomes simply more clear, more rich and full. According to Sāṁkhya, however, determinate knowledge, in true sense of the term, does not arise until buddhi comes into operation at the fourth moment. Adhyavasāya which is the proper form of determinate knowledge is a disposition of buddhi and as such without the operation of the intellect, savikalpaka jñāna cannot arise.

Although in respect of the number of moments needed for the arousal of full determinate knowledge, there seems to be no difference between the Sāṁkhya-school and the Nyāya-school, still in respect of the number of internal organs operating in producing perceptual knowledge there is difference. There is consequent difference in Prakṛyā (process) also.

Difference in respect of the Number of Internal Organs: Buddhi and ahaṁkāra, as separate internal organs, have not been recognized in the Nyāya. According to this system, the co-ordinating function of the buddhi has been ascribed to the soul through the instrumentality of the mind. According to Naiyāyikas, I-consciousness is generated in the soul when it gets associated with the mind-body system.

So egohood as a separate tattva, has not been accepted. Since, mind alone is capable of transforming non-relational awareness to full relational knowledge, no other internal organ is necessary to transform indeterminate impression of an object into determinate knowledge.

Now, Vācaspati Miśra has stated in his bhāṣya on kārikā 27, that indeterminate perception occurs through the functioning of the external sense-organs whereas mind has the power of arranging the sense-data in a definite order and of making the indeterminate sense-data determinate.

Here, therefore, following Vācaspati, one may say that according to Sāṁkhya determinate perception arises fully due to functioning of the mind. There is no need for postulating three stages of determinate perception in accordance with the successive operations of mind, ego-sense and intellect at three different moments.

This view cannot be accepted. According to Sāṁkhya, definite knowledge of an object or adhyavasāya is a dharma of buddhi and buddhi is different from the mind. It is only when buddhi is stimulated by the functioning of the mind and the ego-sense that the tamoguṇa of the intellect is completely overpowered by the overflowing sattvaguṇa and the object is definitely revealed through buddhivṛtti.

It is only at this point that puruṣa appears to have the perceptual knowledge of the object because of reflection acting in co-operation with ignorance. Hence, in the Philosophy of the Sāṁkhya, (as has already been pointed out) the contributions of ahaṁkāra and buddhi towards the formation of determinate perception cannot be ignored. When Vācaspati has stated in his commentary on kārikā 27, that determinate perception is due to the functions of the mind, he has done so because of the fact that he is considering (in the said kārikā) the functions of the eleven gross organs only. Buddhi and ahaṁkāra, being subtle in nature and being of different kinds (tattvāntara) have not been mentioned here.

Difference in the Pratyakṣa Prakriya of Nyāya school and the Sāṁkhya school: Both the schools believe that in perception, there is relation of the sense-organ with the object. Both also believe that sense-organs are prāpyakārī. The word prāpyakārī is, however, used in different senses by the Sāṁkhya and the Nyāya-school. According to Sāṁkhya, all external sense-organs are prāpya prakāśakārī,

because they first get at their objects through vṛttis and then reveal them. The real indriya is the inner faculty which has ahaṁkāra as its upādāna kāraṇa. It is because sense-organs are āhaṁkārikā in nature that they can go out to the object. The stimulation of the external sense-organs produces further stimulation of the mind, ego, and intellect. The external sense-organs (as we have already seen) produce indeterminate impressions which are then successively operated upon by the mind, ego-sense and buddhi. The final result is the determinate knowledge of the object.

The Nyāya-school, on the other hand, uses the word prāpyakārī in a different sense. According to this school, it is only the visual organ which is of the nature of light that goes out and reaches the object. The other organs do not move out to meet the objects. They come in contact with the objects remaining in their own places in the body of a living being. They are called prāpyakārī because they are receiving impressions by coming in direct contact with their respective objects.

Now, when there is a contact between the sense-organ and the object which is called sannikarṣa, the sense-organ establishes a particular relation with its appropriate object according to both the schools. The nature of sannikarṣa, however, is to be differently conceived by these two schools as will be shown in the succeeding section. This difference is due to the fact that Sāṁkhya-school believes in tādātmya between substance and quality, quality and its universal etc., whereas according to Nyāya, substance, quality, universal etc., are entirely different. The relation that unites substance with its quality or the quality with its universal etc., is termed samavāya in the Philosophy of the Nyāya-school.

As soon as there is intercourse between the object and the sense-organ, there is the emergence of the indeterminate perceptual knowledge involving the operation of the sense-organs only. Now, according to Nyāya, determinate perception proper arises as soon as the mind comes into operation. The mind is connected with the soul and as such through mind the soul, too, becomes directly connected with the object. There is no such thing as vṛtti in the Nyāya theory of perception. The embodied soul is the pramātā who knows the object directly.

According to Sāṁkhya, however, the sense-organ receives indeterminate vṛtti from the object and this, they present to the mind, for

discrimination and assimilation. The mind then presents its own cooked up stuff to the ego-sense for further elaboration and the ego-sense, to buddhi. It is only when buddhi comes to make its own contributions to knowledge and assumes the form of the object of knowledge that determinate knowledge proper arises according to Sāṁkhya. Buddhi is the principle that defines, ascertains and recognizes the object as belonging to a particular type and also determines the desirability and undesirability of its attainment on the basis of which a definite conative attitude is adopted by the pramātā who is no other than the cetanāviṣṭa buddhi.[1] Spatial and temporal localisation of the object is also a function of buddhi.[2] Hence, determinate perception proper arises when the intellect works upon the material supplied to it by the other sense-organs.

From the above discussion, it is clear that in the perceptual process of the Nyāya-school, functioning of three internal organs in the forms of mind, ego-sense and intellect is not necessary. The soul can have a direct perceptual knowledge of the object through the functioning of the mind only. Buddhi and ahaṁkāra are not accorded any place in the perceptual mechanism of the Nyāya-school. Knowledge, according to this school, is a non-eternal quality of the ātman. The soul is the substratum of object-knowledge; but this characteristic (jñānādhāratva) does not do any harm to the kūtastha nature of the soul. This is because the Nyāya admits difference between substance and quality.

Quality being different, changes in quality do not affect the unchangeable nature of the soul. There are changes in knowledge due to origination and decay. Knowledge has become non-eternal in nature. This non-eternality, however, does not affect the eternal and immutable nature of the soul.

According to Nyāya, the soul being immutable, cannot go to the

[1]Vacāspati, *Tattvakaumudī*, bhāṣya on kārikā 23, English translation by G. Jha.

"It is well known that when a man has to do anything, what he does is to review the situation: he ponders over it, regards himself as entitled to do it and then makes up his mind, that he should do it and then, does it. Now, 'determination' consists in the notion that this should be done, and it belongs to and forms the characteristic function of Buddhi."

[2]*Sāṁkhyacandrika*, Nārāyanatirtha, commentary on kārikā 23, Adhyavasāyo buddhi riti. Adhyavasāyo mayedam kartavyamityā kāraniścayo .... buddhiparināmo, vasthāvisaṣaḥ.

object although it becomes the pramātā or the knower of the object. Mind is the agent, which, on the one hand gets related to the sense-organ in contact with the object (arthasaṃyukta indriya) and on the other hand, gets related to the soul. Hence, the soul becomes connected with the object through the functioning of the mind and the sense-organ. Further, mind is eternal and not a product according to this school. So, there is no need to assume any other tattva as the samavāyi kāraṇa of the mind. If ātmā, mind, sense-organ and the object remain present and there is relation among them, then knowledge arises immediately without the intervention of any other tattva.

The position of Sāṁkhya is different. Sāṁkhya recognizes tādātmya between substance and quality. So, if the soul is regarded as the substratum of the non-eternal vṛttijñāna (phenomenal knowledge, which will then become a quality of the soul) then this changeable and non-eternal phenomenal knowledge will spoil the non-changeable and eternal nature of the ātman. So, the soul cannot be the pramātā or the substratum of vṛttijñāna. The Sāṁkhya has, therefore, admitted *caitanya prativimbita buddhi* (buddhi through which consciousness is reflected) as the substratum and pramātā of knowledge. Buddhi is the first evolute of Prakṛti and it is essentially sāttvika in nature. So, consciousness can be reflected through buddhi in a full and clear form.

Sattvapradhāna buddhi reaches the object through the sense-organs and assumes the form of the object. There can be no real relation between puruṣa and the object from the point of view of the Sāṁkhya-school. Puruṣa is mere illuminating consciousness. It simply reveals whatever is placed before it. It is buddhi which is close to puruṣa caitanya and not the object. So, buddhi is directly receiving reflection from the self. Hence the object can be revealed only if it can impart its form to buddhi which becomes related to it through the sense-organs. Hence there is the need for buddhivṛtti in the epistemology of the Sāṁkhya-school. It is the vṛtti which is directly revealed. The object is revealed only indirectly through the vṛtti. Vṛtti, therefore, becomes the direct object of knowledge according to Sāṁkhya whereas according to the Nyāya-school, it is the object which is directly revealed in knowledge.

Sannikarṣa: The Nyāyavaiśeṣikas, the Mīmāmsakas, the Vedāntists have admitted different forms of sannikarṣa, to account for the perception of different objects. It is true that in none of the original

Sāṁkhya-texts available uptill now, any mention of different forms of sannikarṣa is to be found. Even then since the sāṁkhya has defined perceptual knowledge as definite cognition received through the sense-organ in contact with the object, the nature of this contact must be examined fully as in this system too, it does not seem to be possible to have perception of the substance, quality, jati etc., by one form of sannikarṣa only. There are some interpreters[1] who have made an attempt to enumerate different forms of sannikarṣa which may be justifiably held from the Sāṁkhya point of view.

Saṃyoga-sannikarṣa : According to Krishnavallavacarya, saṃyoga should be supposed to operate in the perception of the substances like earth, water etc.

Saṃyukta-tādātmya: When we are to perceive the smell of the earth, the form of sannikarsa that produces this perception is saṃyukta-tādātmya. There is saṃyoga between the nose and the earth. Smell, being the quality of the earth is related to the earth by way of identity. Hence, saṃyukta tādātmya is the sannikarsa by means of which smell of the earth is perceived.

Saṃyukta-tadāma-tādātmya : This sannikarṣa is involved in the perception of that aspect of the thing which is in tādātmya relation with that perceived by saṃyukta tādātmya. The universal of the smell of the earth is to be perceived by means of this sannikarṣa. The earth is saṃyukta with the nose, the smell of the earth is in tādātmya relation with the earth and the universal of the smell is again in tādātmya relation with the smell.

Tādātmya relation is used in perceiving pleasures, pains etc., through buddhivṛtti.

Universals of pleasures, pains etc., are to be perceived by tādātma-tādātmya relation.

These are the sannikarṣas expounded in Kiranāvalī tīkā on *Tattva*-kaumudī. Here, we may add that Tādātmya sannikarṣa can also be operative in the perception of sound because sound, being a quality of ākāśa (ether) is in tādātmya relation with the latter (ether). The organ of hearing is pervaded by ether and so there is tādātmya relation between the sound and the organ of hearing.

The universal of sound, on the other hand, can be perceived by tadātma-tādātmya sannikarṣa.

[1]Krishnavallabacarya Swami Narayan, the author of Kiranāvalī tika on *Sāṁkhyatattvakaumudī*.

It is, of course, true that Sāṁkhya does not agree with the Nyāya-vaiśesika in holding that substance, quality, action, jāti etc. are different categories. On the other hand, according to Sāṁkhya-school, quality, action etc., are related to the substance by way of tādātmya relation. So, there is not the acceptance of samavāya in the Nyāya sense in the Sāṁkhya. Samavāya has been admitted by the Nyāya-school as a form of bheda-sambandha (relation of difference) whereas tādātmya of the Sāṁkhya-school is a form of abheda (identity) saṃbandha. That saṁyoga and tādātmya (both singly and in combined form) are capable of serving as sannikarṣa for perceiving the various aspects of an object seems to be the view of the Sāṁkhya.

Here one may pose the following objection:

Since Sāṁkhya has admitted tādātmya or identity between quality and the possessor of quality, between jāti and jātiman, it can, very well be remarked that according to the school, the jar, the quality of the jar, and the universal of the quality of the jar can be directly perceived through contact (Saṃyoga) only. If the jar is the same as its colour and also as the universal of its colour, then one form of sannikarṣa will be capable of working in all cases of perception. What is the use, then of postulating that the colour of the jar is known through the mediation of the jar by saṃyukta tādātmya and that the universal of the colour of the jar is known through the mediation of the jar by the saṃyukta-tadātma-tādātmya? When one form (i.e., a saṃyoga) of sannikarṣa is enough for serving the purpose in all cases, what is the use of increasing its number?

To meet this objection, we may point out that tādātmya does not mean absolute non-difference (sarvatha-abheda). It means identity in difference.

Now, if difference (however little) is admitted between jar and its colour, then the colour of the jar cannot be directly perceived along with the jar by means of saṃyoga.

Further, it is a fact that when buddhi comes in contact with the jar through indriyas, it assumes the form of the jar. Now, jar-form includes the shape of the jar, smell of the jar etc.; still the eye can perceive only the shape of the jar and not its smell or touch. This is because a particular sense-organ is capable of receiving one specific impression only. Even if the sense-organ is in contact with other aspects of the object (which are not its specific viṣayas), still vṛttis of these aspects will not be received by that particular sense-organ. The

eye, for instance is capable of receiving only the rūpa (form) of the object and not anything else. Had saṁyoga been only sannikarṣa for knowing all the aspects of a thing then not only the quality and the universal of quality would have been received directly by the eye along with the shape of the jar, the eye would also have been able to know smell, touch etc., of the jar because of its contact with the jar-form; It is only the ghatākāra that can be received directly by the eye due to its contact with the jar; vṛtti of the colour of the jar (which remains in tādātmya relation with the jar) is of such a nature that it can be received by the eye only in an indirect manner through the mediation of the jar (i.e. by saṃyukta-tādātmya). Otherwise, the eye is not capable of receiving colour of the jar as it is incapable of receiving smell or touch of the jar. Hence, the law of parsimony has not been violated here by the admission of the different forms of sannikarṣa.

Due to the different forms of sense-object relation, different vṛttis or prativimbas arise in the sense-organs. These are then presented to buddhi through ahaṁkāra as a result of which the intelligised buddhi itself, changes into the forms of the object, thereby producing its own vṛttis. Puruṣa. then, falsely owns these buddhivṛttis in the forms of knowledge, pleasures and pains because of the operation of non-discrimination and reflection. Buddhivṛttis are located in the buddhi and not in puruṣa.

Now, here we may point out another important fact which also needs satisfactory explanation. We have already seen that the eye is capable of receiving the colour of an object by saṃyuktatādātmya. Quantity and number are also qualities of the object which are to be received by the eye and touch. So far as the eye is concerned, it will know both quantity and number by saṃyukta tādātmya.

Colour of the jar is received by
saṃyukta-tādātmya
Quantity of the jar (length, breadth etc.) is received by
saṃyukta-tādātmya
Number too is received by
saṃyukta-tādātmya

These however, are not perceived simultaneously at one and the same point of time. Perception is gradual. This is so, because three vṛttis are not aroused simultaneously although sannikarṣa is equally present in respect of colour, quantity and number. Vṛttis are the waves

which are caused by the blowing of wind in the form of udbuddha-vāsanā. The kind of object that the knower is very eager to know is imaged in the vṛtti and the object is revealed to the knower. Udbuddha vasanā is the cause that produces successive perception of colour, quantity and number although sannikarṣa is present in respect of all the three aspects of the object. When the desire to perceive the quantity of the object arises in the mind of the perceiver, there is the corresponding modification of buddhi resulting in the immediate awareness of the quantity. Similar is the case with the perception of number and the colour. Hence, we find that udbuddha vāsanā plays a very important part in savikalpaka perception. It is perhaps due to this fact that buddhists have admitted nirvikalpaka as the only type of valid perception.

Sāṁkhya does not accept anupalabdhi as a separate source for knowing negation or abhāva. Abhāva can be known through perception.[1] Now, if abhāva is to be perceived then it must be perceived through a particular sannikarṣa suitable for its apprehension. On the basis of Vācaspati's commentary on *Sāṁkhyakārikā*, we can say that according to Sāṁkhya-school, abhāva can be perceived by Saṃyukta-tādātmya sannikarṣa. This is because according to this school negation of the jar on the ground (bhūtale ghatābhāva) is a modification of the ground only and not a separate category. (Yato bhūtalasya parināmaviśesādanyaḥ Kaścit ghatābhāva rūpa padārtho nāma nāstyataḥ pratyakṣamiti sambandhaḥ.)

Of course, the word pariṇāma generally refers to kārya pariṇāma only. Here, abhāva is a special kind of pariṇāma which is different from kārya-pariṇāma.

Pariṇāma, according to Sāṁkhya, may be dharma parināma, lakṣaṇa pariṇāma and avasthā pariṇāma. When there is the absence of the jar on the ground, there is only ground as such. This is known as Kaivalya lakṣaṇovastha pariṇāma of the ground because at this point of time, ground exists as ground only (kevalātmatayā). Hence, there will be saṃyoga between the eye and the ground. There is tādātmya between the ground and its Kaivalyāvasthāpariṇama. So this kaivalyāvasthā or abhāvāvasthā of the ground will be perceived by saṃyukta-tādātmya sannikarṣa.

Here, one may legitimately point out that when abhāva of a particular object is perceived, the adhikaraṇa (locus) does not always

[1] *Tattvakaumudī on Kārikā*, Evaṃabhāvo, pi pratyakṣameva.

remain in kaivalyāvasthā or advitīyāvasthā. If there is a piece of cloth on the ground on which jar is absent there is no kaivalyāvasthā of the ground even though the negation of the jar on the ground will be perceived. How is this to be explained?

To solve this, we can say that the Sāṁkhya-school, too, will have to admit that yogyānupalabdhi (non-apprehension of the object which is suitable for apprehension) becomes an important aid in giving rise to the perception of negation. In fact, a suggestion to this effect can be found in Kārikā seven where the author of the *Sāṁkhyakārikā* has stated the circumstances under which non-apprehension of the object does not mean its negation or non-existence. In other words, here, the author is saying that non-apprehension of the object, not suitable for apprehension (ayogyānupalabdhi), does not mean non-existence of the object which by implication asserts that yogyānupalabdhi helps us to apprehend abhāva of the object. When there is a piece of cloth on the ground, the ground is sadvitīya and not advitīya (kevala); even then ghatābhāva will be perceived because of the fact that had the jar been present, it ought to have been perceived. Even the Naiyāyikās who do not admit anupalabdhi as an independent source of knowledge acknowledge the assistance rendered by anupalabdhi in the matter of perception of negation.[1]

Inference

Inferential knowledge is that knowledge in which the modification of the buddhi in the form of the inferred object occurs in the absence of the contact between the external sense-organ and the object. Here, the middle term (liṁga) is perceived and the major term is inferentially apprehended through its relation to the middle term.

In the *Sāṁkhyakārikā*, inference is defined as liṁga-liṁgīpūrvakaṁ which amounts to saying that liṁga-liṁgipūrvakam jñānamanumānam. In other words, according to Sāṁkhya, inference is based on two things:

1. Knowledge of vyāpti (Vyāpya-Vyapaka jnānapūrvakam)
   The knowledge of the hetu as invariably & unconditionally related to the major term.
2. Knowledge of the presence of liṁga as a dharma of the pakṣa

[1] *Bhāṣāparicceda*, Muktavali tīkā Karika 62, Atra abhāvapratyakṣe yogyānupalabdhiḥ kāraṇam . . . . Sā ca pratiyogisattva—prasanjana—prasan-jita—pratiyogikatvarūpā.

(minor term). (Pakṣadharmatā jñānapūrvakaṁ)

Although the word liṁgī has not been repeated in the kārikā, still by the word liṁgī, we are to understand the minor term as well.[1]

Pakṣadharmatājñāna and vyāptijñāna, taken together, lead to the inferential knowledge. There is no need for the third liṁga parāmarśa of the Nyāya-school. According to Sāṁkhya, it is the vṛtti which is to be treated as kāraṇa or pramāṇa because it is through vṛtti that object-knowledge arises.

Of course, vyāptijñāna is generally regarded as the karaṇa : this does not, however, interfere with the Sāṁkhya recognition of vṛtti as the karaṇa. If caitanya-prativimbita-buddhi-vṛtti (buddhi vṛtti through which there is reflection of consciousness) is to be regarded as pramā, then it is logical to admit vṛtti as the karaṇa of valid knowledge. Nevertheless, vyāpti jñāna, too, may be admitted as karaṇa, since vṛtti is due to vyāpti jñāna. It is because vṛtti caused by vyapti jñāna (vyāpti jñānajanyavṛtti) is regarded as a karaṇa, there is no harm in describing vyāpti jñāna as the karaṇa of the inferential knowledge.

In arriving at the inferential knowledge 'Parvato Vahnimān', there is, firstly, the paksadharmatā jñāna (i.e., perception of smoke in the hill) and secondly there is remembering of vyāpti in the form "where there is smoke, there is fire". These two, taken together, lead to the inferential knowledge in the form 'there is fire in the hill'. As soon as vyāpti is remembered, on perceiving the liṁga as a dharma of pakṣa, buddhi assumes the form of fire. This act of modification of buddhi in the form of the object (here the inferred object) is known as vyāpāra and pramā arises as a result of this vyāpāra. Here, knowledge of fire which is nothing but reflection of consciousness (through the modification of buddhi in the form of fire is anumiti-pramā (i.e., vahnyākāra buddhi vṛtti).

The vṛtti of 'the hill with smoke as its dharma' is perceptual or aparokṣa whereas vṛtti in the form of fire is parokṣa. It is because the same consciousness is reflected through both, that there is the knowledge of fire in the hill.

Although there is buddhi vyāpāra in perception, still perception is different from inference as in the case of inference this buddhi vyāpāra is due to vyāpti jñāna. In perception, this buddhi vyāpāra

[1]Vācaspati, *Tattvakaumudī*, Karikā 5, Liṁgī grahaṇam cāvartaniyam. Tena liṁgamasyāstiti pakṣadharmatā jñānamapi darśitaṁ bhavati.

is caused by the relation between the sense-organ and the object. In śabda pramāṇa also, there is buddhi vyāpāra ; but in this case the modification of buddhi in the form of the object is due to vākyārtha jñāna. Hence, śabda pramāṇa is different from both perception and inference. Vijñānabhikṣu has remarked : 'Pratibandhadriśaḥ pratibadhajñānamanumānam' (SPB, 1-100). 'Pratibandha' refers to vyāpti and knowledge of vyāpaka arising from the knowledge of vyāpti is inference.

Nature of Vyapti : Regarding the nature of vyāpti, the knowledge of which is absolutely necessary for anumiti pramā, it has been held by the followers of the Sāṁkhya-school that this vyāpti should be always *anaupādhika* (unconditional) in nature. Conditional vyāpti can never serve as the basis of inference. The middle term or the hetu must have a natural universal relation with the major term; otherwise, the middle term cannot be the indicator of the presence of the major term in the minor term in all cases. In the words of Vācaspati Miśra, we can say "Śamkita—samāropitopādhi nirākaraṇena ca svabhāvapratibaddhaṁ vyāpyaṁ yena pratibaddham tad-vyāpakam."[1]

("The middle term is that where natural concomitance (with the major term) has been duly recognized after all suspected and assumed adventitious accidents have been eliminated: and that with which the middle term is so concomitant is the major term"—*Ganganath Jha*).

Thus, like the followers of the well-known school of logic (i.e., the Nyāya-school) the Sāṁkhya philosophers too, hold that inference is based on the knowledge of the invariable and unconditional relation between the middle term and the major term.

Kinds of inference : Inference is of two kinds :

(i) Vītam (viśeṣena itam=Jnātam)

(ii) Avītam.

Vīta form of anumāna is that form in which vyāpti is principally (mukhena) arrived at by perceiving the universal co-presence of the middle term and the major term. "Yatra-dhūmastatra agniḥ (wherever there is smoke, there is fire) is the vyāpti which is arrived at by perceiving" "yo dhumavān savahnimān yathā mahānasaḥ. When such a vyāpti serves as the basis of an inference the inference is called a vīta form of anumāna; but, here, we should not think that vīta corresponds to kevalānvayi inference only. Vīta also includes that

[1]*Tattvakaumudī*, commentary on Kārikā 5.

form of inference in which vyāpti is arrived at by both anvaya and vyatireka. The word 'mukhena' simply implies that vyāpti in this case, is based mainly (mukhena) on anvaya sahacāra. This does not, however, exclude vyāpti arrived at by both anvaya and vyatireka.[1]

Vīta form of inference is again of two kinds :

Pūrvavat : In this form of inference, the inferred object is qualified by such a universal (fire of the hill qualified by fireness) a specific individual of which has been perceived (dṛṣṭa svalakṣaṇasāmanya viṣaya).

On perceiving smoke in a hill, we infer the presence of the fire in the hill qualified by the universal fireness. The universal 'fireness' is such that a specific instance of it has been perceived in the kitchen.

Sāmānya to dṛṣṭaṁ (adriṣṭa svalakṣaṇa sāmānyaviṣayam)

In this form of inference, the inferred object is qualified by such a universal that no specific instance of it has been perceived.

When we infer the existence of sense-organ as instrument of perception, we take the help of sāmānyatodriṣṭaḥ anumāna. No specific instrument in the form of an indriya qualified by the universal 'indriyatva' has been perceived; but, usually generally, it has been that where there is an action, there is an instrument to do that action. For cutting down a tree, an axe is needed. That is to say that although we have not come across any specific instance of the instrument in the form of indriya, still we have perceived specific instances of actions like cutting, writing etc., brought about by instruments in the forms of axe, pen etc. Now, perceiving, tasting etc., are actions like the actions of cutting, writing etc. Therefore, the actions of perceiving, tasting etc. need instruments and these instruments are the sense-organs. So, the existence of instrument in the form of a sense-organ is established. Here, vyāpti is established between the middle term "kriyā of the form of cutting, writing etc.," and the major term 'instrument' like axe, pen etc., necessary to perform all actions other than psychological actions which generate knowledge; but the inferred object is instrument in the form of sense-organ. This inferred instrument is different in kind from the instrument that becomes the sādhya of the vyāpti. It is because the inferred 'instrument in the form of sense-organs' is such that no specific instance of it has been perceived that sāmānyatodriṣṭaḥ anumāna

[1]Sarabadhini ṭīkā on Kārikā 5. Anvayavyapti prādhānyameva kevalam vītatve prayojakam; na tu tatra vyatirekavyaptyasattvampyabhi pretamityarthaḥ.

differs from Pūrva-vatanumāna in which a specific individual of the inferred object is perceived.

Avītam : Avīta form of anumāna or śeṣavat anumāna is that form which is based on Kevalavyatireki Vyāpti.

As for example :

Prithivi itarebhyo jalādibhyo bhidyate gandhvattat
Yadi tarebhyo na bhidyate na tad gandhavat, Jathā jalam.
Na ceyam Prithivi gandhābhāvavatī
Tasmānna i tarebhedabhāvavatī

Here, since the earth is the only thing that possesses smell, we cannot have anvayi-vyāpti like 'yad gandhavat taditara bhinnam' in the absence of examples. Here, vyatirekivyāpti alone is possible.

Vācaspati Miśra has established the non-difference of the cause & the effect by means of the avīta form of inference in which there is only co-existence of negations (vyatireka sahacāra).

The cloth is non-different from the threads constituting it ; because it subsists in the threads ; no object differing in its essence from another can subsist in it ; as the cow in the horse ; but the cloth subsists in the threads. So- cloth is not different from the threads.

This is how Vācaspati Miśra has described three forms of inference. Gaudapāda, on the other hand, has interpreted pūrvavat, sāmanyatodṛṣṭaḥ and śeṣavat in a manner which is found in the Nyāya Philosophy.

When both cloud and rain have been seen together before and when cloud alone is seen, one infers the coming of rain. This is the example of Pūrvavat anumāna.

The śeṣavat anumāna is that form in which from the effect, the cause is inferred. When one finds the river swollen, one infers that there was rain.

Sāmānyatodṛṣṭaḥ is the form in which the movement of the sun is inferred on seeing changes in the position of the sun. This is because change in the position of an object is generally noticed when there is movement in the object.

Methods of Arriving at Vyāpti : From what has been stated before, it follows that according to Sāṁkhya also, vyāpti can be obtained by three methods.

1. By perceiving mainly such instances in which there is co-presence of the middle term and the major term. (anvayadṛṣṭānta)

2. We have already seen that the expression "anvayamukhena" does not exclude the perception of vyatireki examples. Further, the avīta form of anumāna is a kevalavyatireki inference. So, the Sāṁkhya Philosophers have minimised in no way the importance of the perception of vyatireki instances. There is, therefore, full justification for holding that vyāpti can be obtained by anvaya-vyatireka method also. Perception of both anvaya dṛṣṭānta and vyatireka dṛṣṭānata, thus, constitutes the second method for arriving at vyāpti. (Anvaya-vyatireki method)

3. Kevala vyatireki method is the third method by means of which the vyāpti which forms the basis of avīta form of inference, is obtained.

We have seen that in the opinion of Vācaspati Miśra vyāpti is to be established by removing all suspected and accidental upādhis. Upādhi-nirāsa (removal of upādhis) is the most essential requirement that is to be specially fulfilled when one proceeds to establish the vyāpya-vyapaka sambandha.

Since upādhi-nirāsa is essential for establishing vyāpti according to Sāṁkhya, we can say that the Sāṁkhya is more in favour of applying methods in the manner of Mill's experimental methods than in the manner of his method of Induction per simple enumeration. This is because upādhi-nirāsa can be done in the most satisfactory manner by perceiving anvaya dṛṣṭāntas and vyatireka dṛṣṭāntas in different places and under different circumstances. If we collect different instances from different places and find that in none of them the relation between the two phenomena under consideration is brought about by any third thing, then we can more conclusively say that the relation between the said phenomena is anaupādhika.

It is to bring about such an effective elimination of upādhis that the buddhists have mentioned.

(1) Kārya-kārana relation.

(2) tādātmya relation.

(1) If we can prove that there is cause-effect relation between two things, then there is bound to be niyata sahacāra relation between them. The cause-effect relation is such that the effect cannot exist without the cause, so cause-effect relation can serve as vyāpti because the cause, can serve as the mark for inferring the effect and the effect, too, can serve as a mark for inferring the cause.

(2) When two things co-exist in the same locus (samānādhi karaṇa) then there is tādātmya between the two. There is tādātmya relation between siṁsapā and tree, because both of them co-exist in the same locus "treeness". So, the vyāpti, in the form of "All simsapās are trees" will be an invariable and unconditional one.

Some orthodox systems take the help of tarka and āgama to eliminate doubt (samaśya) which may arise even after the examination of anvaya sahacāra and vyatireka sahacāra has been done. If through a thorough investigation, upādhi or any contrary instance is not discovered, then the relation between vyāpya and vyāpaka will be regarded as niyata, avyabhicarita and anaupādhika. Such a vyāpti will serve as the basis of inference.

It should, however, be remembered that tarka is taken recourse to only when doubt arises even after the observation of sahacāra and non-observation of vyabhicāra between vyāpya and vyāpaka. Where doubt can be removed by some other means, tarka is not needed. Truly speaking, vyāpti sambandha is not established by means of tarka but the vyāpti already arrived at, is strengthened by tarka when it helps us to eliminate upādhis.

Śabda

Śabda, as a source of knowledge, is to be considered after inference. This is because the inexperienced person understands the relation between the word and its meaning by means of inference. It is only when the inexperienced person attains the knowledge of the śabdārtha that he comes to possess what is known as śābdabodha.

Āptavacana refers to vākyārtha-jñāna and āptaśruti refers to right revelation. Revelation stands for the knowledge of a sentence which is produced by the sentence.

Valid assertion, according to sāṁkhya is an independent source of knowledge. It is valid because it originates from the words of the vedas which, being apauruṣeya, is free from all defects which are noticeable in the composition made by human beings. Knowledge, derived from itihāsa and smṛti, which are based on the vedas, should also be regarded as valid.

Gauḍapāda, however, divides this mode of knowing into two sets —ācāryas and śruti (āpta-ācārya brahmā-dayaḥ śrutirvedaḥ āptaśca śrutiśca āptaśrutiḥ).

If Vācaspati's interpretation is accepted, then one may feel difficulty in including in āgama the teachings of Kapila who was a siddha

puruṣa. Vācaspati, himself, has solved this problem. Kapila, according to Vācaspati, did not teach anything original. He simply remembered the revealed texts which he had studied in his previous births. Hence, what he taught was really apauruṣeya and not pauruṣeya. This explanation may seem to us mythical and irrational. Gauḍapāda's interpretation may be considered as logical and apt. If ācāryas can be regarded as āptas, then the teachings of Kapila can very well be regarded as āpatavacan. A little reflection will make us feel that this interpretation cannot be accepted from the point of view of the Sāṁkhya-school. If teachings of ācaryas are to be regarded as a reliable source of knowledge, then the teachings of Gautama as well as of Mahāvira cannot be held as unreliable and faulty. It is, for this reason, that Vācaspati has understood by āptavacana vedic teachings only which are not the results of human efforts. Kapila only remembered what he had learnt in his past lives. Teachings of Kapila are not his original composition. The fact that the vedic truths learnt by Kapila in his past lives were remembered by him in the age in which he was born, could not be regarded as absurd ; psychical research society, today, is trying to explain such rare experiences which are not normal.

Buddhistic philosophers do not admit śabda as a source of knowledge. This view is not justifiable because valid testimony as a source of knowledge is resorted to by all human beings in their day-to-day dealings. If we do not believe in the validity of the utterances of our teachers and experienced persons we shall never be able to learn anything and we shall never be able to reap the benefit of our elder's experiences. It is, of course, true that on many occasions what is learnt from a so-called reliable person turns out false, but this unfortunate fact should not minimise the importance of valid testimony as a source of learning in human-life. Inferences also, are very often, proved to be untrue; still inference is regarded as a source of knowledge by every school of philosophy excepting the Cārvāka school. Just as to make our inference valid, we try to establish a valid vyāpti between the vyāpya and the vyāpaka by eliminating all upādhias, in the same manner to make our śabdajñāna valid, we should try to test the āptatva of the āptas in a very strict and convincing manner. If the āptatva of the āpta puruṣa is proved to be beyond doubt, then the utterances of such a puruṣa can very convincingly be relied upon.

Upamâna

Upamāna has been defined by the Nyāya in the following manner: "Prasiddhasādharmyātsādhyasādhanamupamānaṁ." To be more explicit let us take the oft-quoted assertion, "As the cow, so is the gavaya" (yathā gaustathā gavayaitī). This assertion gives the inexperienced person a knowledge of the resemblance between the cow and the gavaya. It is due to this vākyārtha jñāna that he understands the animal bearing resemblance with the cow as gavaya, although he is seeing the animal for the first time. This assertion, namely, "yathā gaustathā gavaya iti" helps the inexperienced person to understand the relation between the name 'gavaya' and the animal denoted by this name. (Saṃjñā-saṃjñi sambandha). This knowledge of the relation between saṃjñā and saṃjñī is what is called upamitijñāna: the knowledge of the similarity between the cow and the gavaya brought about by the assertion 'yathā gaustathā gavayaiti is the karaṇa of this upamiti jñāna. This is how the Nyāya-school has understood the nature of upamāna as the source of our upamiti jñāna.

According to Sāṁkhya, however, upamāna is not an independent source of knowledge. 'Vākyārtha jñāna' produced by the assertion 'yathā gaustathā gavaya iti' is purely verbal. As soon as the inexperienced person hears this sentence, relevant buddhi vṛtti is immediately formed. It is this buddhi vṛtti which is the pramāṇa and not the assertion, 'as the cow, so is the gavaya.' The knowledge that the term gavaya is denotative of the animal similar to the cow is purely inferential. The inferential process is like this:

Gavaya is a term which is qualified by pravṛttinimitta of the form of gavayatva.

As there is no other vṛtti like lakṣanā etc., the term gavaya is used by the experienced persons only in the case of an animal qualified by gavayatva.

If a term devoid of all other vṛttis, is used in a particular sense only, then that term (here gavaya) becomes the pravṛtti nimittaka of that sense (here gavayatva).

Generally, in inferential knowledge, sāmānya sādhya (major term in the form of universal) is established on the basis of samānya vyāpti.

When on perceiving smoke, fire is inferred, it is the 'universal fire' which is established in a particular place.

In such a case, by means of inference, we can only say that the term gavaya has got some pravṛtti-nimitta but the fact that this pravṛttinimitta is to be had in gavayatva only, cannot be established by means of the type of anumāna mentioned above. Śabda, on the other hand, helps us to know that 'similarily with the cow' is the 'pravṛtti-nimitta' in the case of the term gavaya. That 'gavayatva' is the pravṛtti-nimitta of the term 'gavaya' is not made known to us by śabda.

Perception, by itself, can only reveal to us an animal having resemblance with the cow. It is only when perception is aided by śabda that we come to have a perceptual knowledge of the animal bearing the name of gavaya and also of gavayatva as the pravṛtti-nimitta.

Since perception, inference (in the sense mentioned above) and śabda cannot give us the knowledge of the relation between the term gavaya and the animal that is denoted by the term and is also qualified by gavayatva which is its pravṛtti-nimitta, upamāna has been regarded as an independent source of knowledge by the Nyāya-school.

Now, apart from the type of inference already mentioned, there is also another form of inference by means of which a viśeṣa sādhya (sādhya as a particular) can be established even on the basis of sāmānya vyāpti. Where 'itarabādha' is possible, sādhya established on the basis of vyāpti is a particular one. For example, if in a particular place, coal is known to be the only fuel in the absence of other forms of combustibles, then on seeing smoke, one can very well infer that there is that particular fire which is generated from coal only. This is the type of inference which has been already mentioned in the place where we have explained how the Sāṁkhya attempts to prove inferentially the fact that the term 'gavaya' is used by the experienced persons only in the case of an animal qualified by 'gavayatva.'

Of course, nowhere in the available commentaries of the *Sāṁkhya-kārikā* this type of inference has been mentioned. Even then, there is no harm in supposing that the Sāṁkhya philosophers were cognisant of this form of inference as it is the form of inference which can fulfill the function of upamāna in the most satisfactory manner.

Arthāpatti

Arthāpatti may be defined as 'upapādya jñāna prabhavam upapādaka jñānamarthapattiḥ.' The given fact which cannot be explained

without the supposition of some unperceived fact is known as upapādya: the unperceived fact which is presumed to explain the given fact is known as upapādaka. We cannot explain the absence of a living person in his residence without supposing that he is present elsewhere. The absence of the living man in his residence is what is called upapādya. The presence of the living person elsewhere is, therefore, the upapādaka without the supposition of which upapādya cannot be explained. Here, upapadya jñāna which is the cause of the presumption of upapādaka is the pramāṇa and upapādaka jñāna which results from this pramāṇa is the arthāpatti pramā.

Now, according to Sāṁkhya, arthāpatti can be reduced to a form of inference. Inference can be of this form:

If a living being is absent from home he is present elsewhere.
Living caitra is not at home.
∴ *Living caitra is elsewhere.*

If anybody says that the anvaya vyāpti of the form "whenever a person is not present at home, he is present elsewhere (i.e., universal relation of concomitance between a living man's absence from home and presence elsewhere) cannot be established in the absence of positive instances, to serve as the basis of an anvayi anumāna, then this can be proved by a vyatireki anumāna which has been recognized by the Sāṁkhya school. Inference, in that case, will be as under :

If a living being is present at home, he is not elsewhere
Caitra is absent from home
So Caitra is elsewhere.

Here vyāpti is of the form "where there is no absence from home in the case of living beings, there is no presence elsewhere" for which instances can be collected from living persons who are not absent from home and for that reason are not present elsewhere.

In the opinion of the Sāṁkhya-school, living caitra's non-existence in the house is not contradictory to his existence elsewhere. Non-existence of living caitra in his house does not wipe out his existence. Existence and non-existence are contradictory terms but non-existence in the house and existence in general are not to be regarded as contradictory to each other.

Generally, if any school of Philosophy admits vyatireki anumāna as valid, then it can very well reduce arthāpatti to a form of inference.

Vedānta and the Bhatta-school of Mīmāṁsā do not accept vyatireki anumāna as valid. According to them, negation is to be known

by means of a separate source of knowledge which, they term, as anupalabdhi. Hence both the schools have included arthāpatti in the list of pramāṇas as an independent source.

The Prabhakara-school of Philosophy, however, has admitted arthāpatti as an independent source of knowledge although this school has not recognised an independent status of anupalabdhi pramāṇa. Prabhakara's analysis of arthāpatti is different. Suppose a person possesses prior knowledge of the living condition of Devadatta by some other means : he then perceives that Devadatta who generally remains at home is not in his residence. This arouses a sort of doubt in his mind regarding the living state of Devadatta. The absence of Devadatta, thus, throws the man into a doubtful state of mind in respect of the existence of Devadatta. To remove this doubt he has to imagine that Devadatta is elsewhere. Here, the perceived fact (i.e., absence of Devadatta in the house) is not by itself inexplicable ; this perceived fact gives rise to a doubt regarding his previous knowledge of the living condition of Devadatta. It is for the removal of this doubt that there is the presumption of the unperceived fact.

Arthāpatti, thus, cannot be admitted as a form of anumāna as in no form of inference, an element of doubt is ever present. The perceived middle term never produces doubt in the mind of the perceiver regarding its existence. Hence, arthāpatti has to be made use of as a source of knowledge when such a sort of doubt is to be eliminated.

Here, although Prabhakara's contention is that the doubt in question arises in regard to the living condition of Devadatta only and not in regard to Devadatta's non-existence in the house (which will be the middle term in the inference) still we can point out that there is an element of doubt in respect of Devadatta's existence as well. Unless Devadatta's vahir satta (existence elsewhere) is samsayātmaka (doubtful), there cannot be any doubt regarding his living state. Hence arthāpatti can be reduced to form of inference in which a sandigdha sādhya will be established. The vyāpti will be of this form 'whenever a living person is not present elsewhere, he is not absent from home'. For this, instances can be collected even from the life of the person who is making this generalisation.

The sāṁkhya has not accepted anupalabdhi as the source through which negation can be cognized. This is because abhāva has been accepted by them as an object of perception. We can perceive abhāva through samyukta-tādatmya sannikarṣa. The whole process has already been explained in connection with the exposition of perception as a source of knowledge.

Probability : Probability also is a case of inference. The heavier weight of khāri has been found to be invariably associated with the lighter weights of droṇ etc. It is this invariable relation that helps one to infer the existence of the lighter weights in the heavier weights.

Rumour

Rumour, generally, appears in the form of "such and such things have been said by such and such persons". Here, when the original source is not known, this knowledge is not a valid knowledge. When the original source is found out and is known to be trustworthy, it becomes a case of śabda jñāna.

Validity and Invalidity of Knowledge

Knowledge which is revelation of reality may do its function either in a true manner or in a manner which is false. When reality is revealed truly, knowledge is called Pramā and when this revelation is faulty it is treated as apramā. In the sphere of epistemology, therefore, two important questions arise when we make an approach to reality through knowledge.

These are :

1. How does validity or invalidity arise in knowledge ?
2. How is validity or invalidity of knowledge known to us ?

The View of advaita-vedānta

The advaita-vedānta believes in the intrinsic validity (svataḥ prāmāṇya) and extrinsic invalidity (Parataḥ a prāmāṇya) of knowledge. Knowledge is intrinsically valid and it is also known to be valid by its own intrinsic conditions. Cognition is self-revealed. A particular knowledge reveals not only its existence but also its truth. The same set of conditions from which knowledge arises, also constitutes its validity. Hence, knowledge and also its validity are revealed simultaneously. In actual life, we do find that as soon as there is knowledge, it is accepted as valid, and we proceed to act immediately on the basis of that knowledge. It is, therefore, quite reasonable for us to believe that the truth of a knowledge and the knowledge of the truth of that knowledge are revealed to us by the same conditions which produce knowledge. Just as jñānatva is natural to knowledge,

in the same way prāmāṇya, too, is natural to knowledge when knowledge is vitiated, it is vitiated simply by conditions, external to itself. When conch-shell is perceived as silver, it is the śuktitvaprakāraka avidyā which is causing the illusion. This śuktitvaprakāraka avidyā is an adventitious positive entity (āgantuka bhāva kāraṇa).

Nyāya View

According to Nyāya, both validity and invalidity are externally caused. In perception, contact of the sense-organs with a large number of parts is the generating condition of validity. In the inferential knowledge, "sallinga parāmarśa" is the required condition whereas in śabda, the character of the āpta serves as the generating condition of prāmāṇya. The generating condition of invalidity in perceptual knowledge will, therefore, be the contact of the sense-organs with a smaller number of parts, in inferential knowledge, defective liṁga parāmarśa and in the case of śabda, untrustworthiness of the puruṣa etc.

Sāṁkhya View Analysed

The position of Sāṁkhya is unique among orthodox systems because it has asserted not only the self-validity of knowledge but has also held that invalidity is intrinsic in knowledge. Both validity and invalidity are inherent in knowledge in regard to origination. Both jñāna and ajñāna are inherent in buddhi. Ajñāna is not negation of knowledge but it is confused knowledge due to non-discrimination between two different things. The confusion in perception, is due to improper suppression of tamoguṇa which is an ingredient of knowledge. Sattva, rajas and tamas which are necessary for generation of knowledge, are also the factors which generate validity and invalidity by means of proper and improper suppression of tamoguṇa by the sattvaguṇa.

When the conchshell is truly revealed in knowledge, there is tadvatitat prakāraka vṛtti' in the intellect (i.e., there is sadvastu vṛtti) which is the pramāna and the illumination of this vṛtti by consciousness of the soul is the pramā. Prāmāṇya of this pramā is not generated by any adventitious positive entity. In the case of valid knowledge, there is the arousal of sat indriya and sat buddhi vṛtti due to excessive flow of tamoguṇa. Hence, the knowledge (i.e., revelation of vṛtti) is valid. The supposition of śuktitva prakāraka avidyā is not necessary

to explain the Sāṁkhya-position. This is because in the opinion of the Sāṁkhya, it is the excessive flow of tamoguṇa of the buddhi that functions as ajñāna or avidyā in producing invalidity in knowledge. So, the generating condition of invalidity is inherent in the conditions which are causing knowledge (jñāna karaṇa sāmagrī). Here, one may raise an objection by saying that the excess of tamoguṇa, being the cause of invalidity, cannot be inherent in the generating conditions of knowledge; because the 'excess flow' means that there is something more than the knowledge producing conditions. Hence, this excess flow of tamoguṇa is something outside the generating conditions of knowledge. Aprāmānya should, therefore, be regarded as parataḥ. This objection, too cannot stand. If the excess flow of tamaḥ is to be regarded as a condition external to the generating conditions of knowledge, then the excess flow of sattvaguṇa, needed for producing validity in knowledge, may also be regarded as external to the knowledge producing conditions. In that case, both validity and invalidity are to be regarded as parataḥ in regard to their origination in knowledge.

In the case of invalid knowledge, like the knowledge of silver in a conchshell, the vṛtti of 'this' (idam vṛtti) is pratyakṣa vṛtti and this is also sadvastuvṛtti. The vṛtti in the form of silver (rajatākārā vṛtti) however, originates due to combined operation of rajatavāsanā and non-discrimination (vivekāgraha) between 'conchshell' and 'silver'. Here, two vṛttis are generated simultaneously; but as there is the reflection of the same consciousness though two vṛttis, there is the generation of one cognition in the form "This is silver". Here, the defects are 'rajatavāsanā' and non-discrimination between the conchshell and the silver. These are positive but not adventitious. These are the effects of the excess flow of tamoguṇa. The Sāṁkhya School has admitted tādātmya between the cause and the effect, dharma and dharmī (quality and the possessor of quality). So, vivekāgraha and the desire for the object (which is not present on that occasion) are non-different from the tamoguṇa of knowledge which is a disposition of buddhi. The result is that all the factors necessary for generating invalidity in knowledge are also inherent in the generating conditions of knowledge. Śuktitva prakāraka avidyā of the advaita-vedānta and contact with a small number of parts of the object of perception, defective, liṁgaparāmarśa, untrustworthiness etc., are all conditions external to knowledge-producing conditions. Hence, in the opinion of in the same way prāmāṇya, too, is natural to knowledge. When

the advaita-vedanta and the Nyāya, invalidity in knowledge is externally caused. According to Sāṁkhya, however, both rajatavāsanā and vivekāgraha are inherent in knowledge. Hence, invalidity is svataḥ in regard to its origin.

Regarding the second question (i.e., how validity or invalidity is known) we can say that the natural tendency of man is to accept any and every kind of knowledge as valid as soon as it arises. Hence, in the case of valid knowledge, there is no extra factor (other than the factors needed for the generation of knowledge and its validity) to make its validity known to the knower. The intrinsic conditions which produce a valid cognition, also produce the knowledge of the validity of that cognition.

These in trinsic conditions are as under :

1. Indriya vṛtti due to karaṇa vyāpāra.
2. Buddhi vṛtti.
3. No confused perception of sadasat vṛtti as one, due to excess flow of sattvaguṇa.

When these factors operate, valid vṛtti or valid knowledge is produced and is also immediately known as valid. It is because the validity is known immediately by the same set of conditions that the cognizer proceeds to act as soon as a particular cognition arises in his mind.

Regarding the knowledge of invalidity, however, we cannot say that the factors which are responsible for the generation of the knowledge and its invalidity are also the factors which make its invalidity known to the cognizer. In the case of invalid knowledge the intrinsic conditions which produce knowledge and its invalidity are as follows :

1. Indriya vṛtti due to operation of karaṇas.
2. Buddhi vṛtti of an unreal object along with a real one due to the awakening of a desire for the unreal object.
3. Vivekāgraha of the real and the unreal.

Both vivekāgraha and the desire for the unreal object are the effects of the tamoguna resulting from the improper overpowering of tamoguṇa, by the sattvaguṇa. As such these two factors are non-different from the tamoguṇa which is in excess. Knowledge is always produced when the tamoguṇa of the buddhi is overpowered by the sattvaguṇa. In fact, adhyavasāya or knowledge stands for the proper predomination of the sattvaguṇa in buddhi resulting from the proper suppression of tamas brought about by the operation of the karaṇas. If the suppression of tamas is done in a proper manner, there is excess flow of sattva and the consequent arousal of knowledge and its validity. If the suppression is not done properly, then there is the excess of tamoguṇa and the consequent origination of invalidity in knowledge.

We have already seen that 'excess' cannot be regarded as external to knowledge producing conditions, because in that case both validity and invalidity will become parataḥ.

Further, buddhi is changing from moment to moment and so it is becoming different at every moment. Similar is the case with knowledge. This difference, however, is not treated as a condition external to the knowledge-producing ones.

Now, vivekāgraha is not a negative condition because this has been described as khyāti and avidyā in the yoga-sūtra; it is that which causes "ekamevadarśanam" of two different things. This is not merely *vivekābhava* (negation of discrimination). On the other hand, this is a positive abhedagrahaṇa of two similar things.

Since, vivekāgraha is positive, it has got to be destroyed (the destruction of vivekāgraha results in the apprehension of invalidity of a particular cognition) by some other positive fact. It is only when the annihilating factor comes into operation that aprāmāṇya (invalidity) of a particular cognition is ascertained. Hence, invalidity is known by a condition which is external to the conditions generating knowledge and its invalidity. This external, annihilating and positive condition is the production of unsuccessful effects in the external world by acting on the basis of that knowledge. So the occurrence of 'samvādīpravṛtti pratīkūlatā' is necessary for making invalidity of the cognition known to the cognizer. Origination of unsuccessful results takes place in the external world. The positive annihilating condition is, therefore, neither internal, nor is it included in the generating conditions of knowledge. Hence, we can say that according to Sāṁkhya, aprāmāṇya is svataḥ in regard to origination but parataḥ in regard to its cognition.

It is not proper to say that if invalidity is svataḥ, then there can be no activity at all. Had Sāṁkhya held that invalidity is known by the same set of conditions which generate knowledge and its invalidity, then this objection could have some value. In that case, we could have said that invalidity would, therefore, be known to us simultaneously with knowledge. Since, in our previous discussion, we have tried to prove *parataḥ jñapti* of invalidity there is no diffi-

culty in holding that invalid knowledge too, can give rise to *karma-pravṛtti* (inclination to act). When knowledge originates, the knower is not aware of its invalidity. It is the awareness of invalidity of a particular knowledge that really prevents the knower from acting according to that knowledge. Invalidity is to be known by the external condition in the form of the creation of unsuccessful effects. In other words, invalidity of a cognition becomes known to us only when it is applied in practical life.

So far as available texts of the classical Sāṁkhya are concerned, there is practically no discussion about the validity and the invalidity of knowledge both in respect of origination and apprehension. It was probably Sucarita Misra who for the first time, declared that the Sāṁkhya was in favour of accepting both validity and invalidity as *svatah*. Since then, it has become customary to hold that the Sāṁkhya School believes in intrinsic validity and intrinsic invalidity in knowledge. Whether this '*svatasta*' is in regard to *utpatti* (origination) or in regard to *jñaptī* (apprehension) or in regard to both, has not, however, been clearly discussed by anybody.

In the discussion held so far, we have tried to prove that the Sāṁkhya School believes in *svatoḥ utpatti* and *svataḥ jñaptī* in respect of the validity of cognition, but in respect of invalidity the said school believes in *svataḥ utpatti* and *parataḥ Jñaptivāda*. If anybody is inclined to believe that in respect of apprehension of invalidity also, the Sāṁkhya seems to believe in '*svatasta*' then such a view too, can be logically harmonised with the philosophical position of the Sāṁkhya School.

The Buddhistic School has admitted that *aprāmānya* is *svataḥ* in respect of its apprehension. The philosophers of this school have also tried to show how practical behaviour is to be explained on the recognition of *Svataḥ jñapti* of invalidity in knowledge.

In the opinion of the buddhistic philosophers, *pravṛtti samarthya* is the condition that makes us aware of validity in knowledge. When knowledge is produced in such a manner that it brings about successful activity, then only, it becomes clear to us that this cognition is not invalid. Prior to the actual production of successful activity, validity of a cognition cannot be known. Since validity is known by a posterior condition external to the generating conditions of knowledge, there was no certainty about its *arthakriyā kāritva* at the moment of its production. Hence, it has been held that knowledge, when arises is treated as invalid. *Pramāṇa* is uncontradicted knowledge which possesses '*arthakriyā kāritva* (*pramāṇam avisaṃvādī jñānam arthakriyā sthitiḥ avisaṃvādanam etc., Dharma kirtti, pramāṇa-vārttika*).

The two characteristics, namely, uncontradictedness and *arthakriya karitva*, are to be verified in practice. So long as they are not verified, knowledge is not treated as valid. The condition like *avisaṃbāditva* (which is equivalent to *arthakriyā kāritva*) cannot be included in the generating conditions of knowledge ; because in that case, all knowledge will be *avisaṃbādī* and *arthakriyā kari* and will leave no room for *visaṃbādī* knowledge. So, according to the buddhistic school, validity is extrinsic. When this school says that invalidity is intrinsic, it does not seem to mean anything more than the non-arousal of the certainty about the *avisaṃvādī* and *arthakriyā kārī* nature of a cognition at the very moment of its inception. In other words, at this moment, there is no cognition of the form "This cognition is valid". This lack of certainty about the validity of a cognition does not prevent any man from doing actions on the basis of this knowledge.

The Sāṁkhya position is, however, different. According to this school, validity is *svataḥ* in respect of both origination and apprehension. Hence, it seems to us that if invalidity too is believed to be *svataḥ* in respect of both origination and apprehension, then one and the same cognition may be known as both valid and invalid at the same time which is absurd.

Now, it is our contention that even if we believe in *svataḥ jñapti* in regard to invalidity, the situation will not become so alarming.

Truly speaking *svaprakāśatva* of knowledge means that knowledge does not need the assistance of any other thing to perform its own function (*svavyavahāra*). As soon as there is knowledge, there is revelation of object. Inclination to action or refraining from action (*pravṛtti* and *nivṛtti*) may originate from revelation of the object only. Knowledge of validity or invalidity is not necessary for the arousal of *pravṛtti* and *nivṛtti*. Invalidity, however, (though self-revealed) may not always be revealed due to the presence of some external factors such as distance, dim light, defective organ etc. When invalidity thus, remains non-revealed, there may be *pravṛtti* due to revelation of object. In such a situation production of unsuccessful effects makes the invalidity known to the knower. Such a

thing happens in the case of illusion. When invalidity is known immediately, it is known simultaneously with knowledge. There may be such a case where the perceiver says "The thing before me looks like a piece of silver but it is conch shell." Here, the invalidity of the perception of conch shell as silver is known as soon as there is perception.

Cognition, to be effective, does not need to be known as valid. Non-apprehension of the invalidity of a particular cognition is sufficient for inspiring a man to act on the basis of a particular cognition. *Saṃbādi* or *visaṃbādi pravṛtti* does not form a constitutive condition of validity or of invalidity; nor does it really make validity or invalidity known to the cognizer. The true function of the success or failure of *pravṛtti* is to confirm the knowledge of validity and invalidity of cognition. It is only where self-revealed validity and invalidity remain hidden due to some interfering conditions, that success or failure of actions makes validity or invalidity known, to the knower. If one is seeing a piece of rope from a distance, he may have a knowledge of this form. "It seems, I am seeing a piece of rope lying at that place ; let me see, if it is really so". Here, validity (though *svaprakāśa*) is grasped only vaguely. Thus, immediate revelation of validity or invalidity depends on the non-presence of *doṣas* (*doṣābhava*) as *doṣas* or interfering conditions which arise silently in the process of the cognition of validity and invalidity prevent the revelation of *prāmāṇya* and *aprāmāṇya* in knowledge. Hence, even on admission of both validity and invalidity as *svataḥ*, there will be enough scope for the arousal of doubt, illusion etc., in the philosophy of the Sāṁkhya School. Doubt, in such a case, is to be explained as being due to *pratibandhakas* which prevent the immediate manifestation of the validity of a cognition. Doubtful cognition is that kind of knowledge, the truth of which has not been ascertained. In doubtful knowledge, a particular is *dharmī* revealed truly but its characteristics are not properly ascertained. Regarding the characteristics of the *dharmī*, the mind wavers between the two sets of qualities which are simultaneously revived in memory due to similarity. When we perceive a tall object from a distance but do not perceive the peculiar features of the object correctly we have doubtful perception, such as, "Is it a lightpost or a man"? Here, we are definite about the tall object ; but whether the tallness of the object is associated with the peculiar characteristics of the post or of a human being, is

not revealed due to presence of *doṣas*. Only the tallness of the object is revealed validly and there is the doubt. Where the validity of a knowledge is revealed simultaneously with its origination, there the generating conditions of the buddhivṛtti are not accompanied by the vitiating factors. Hence, *vṛtti* is revealed properly and is also known to be so. If there is any *pratibandhaka* in the process of apprehension, then phenomena like doubt, illusion etc., occur in the sphere of knowledge. Even the objection that if validity and invalidity are both *svataḥ* in respect of apprehension, then no certain knowledge is possible,—may be regarded as a point in favour of *svataḥ jñaptivāda* of both validity and invalidity of knowledge. The buddhistic school believes in the *svataḥ jñapti* of invalidity only. Hence, an objection is raised to the effect that if invalidity of a cognition is immediately known, then there can be no inclination to act on the basis of that knowledge. We do act on the basis of knowledge which is discovered as invalid only afterwards. Sāṁkhya, however, is supposed to believe in the *svataḥ jñapti* of both validity and invalidity of knowledge. So, in this philosophy, there is room for the arousal of doubtful cognition and the doubtful cognition is not unfavourable for the origination of an inclination to act (Doubt never acts as an hindrance to *pravṛtti*).

The *Mīmāmsā* believes in the *svataḥ jñapti* of validity only and so it faces difficulty in explaining the possibility of *nisphala pravṛtti* (unsuccessful efforts).

If the Sāṁkhya view, as stated above, is accepted, then the origination of doubtful cognition will explain satisfactorily the occurrence of both successful and unsuccessful activities.

Further, particular *dharmī* may possess a number of characteristics (*dharmas*). There is no such rule that all the characteristics will always be revealed along with the revelation of the *dharmī*. A jar, for example, possesses so many characteristics in the forms of jarness, substantiality, solidity, smell etc. It is quite possible, that at the time of the manifestation of the jar, all qualities will not be revealed. In the same manner, we can suppose that at the time of revelation of knowledge also, all its characteristics in the forms of *jñātatva*, *pramātva*, *apramātva* etc. may not be revealed simultaneously. Hence, even if we believe that validity and invalidity are *svataḥ*, in respect of apprehension, still it does not follow that they should always be known immediately as soon as there is knowledge.

Meaning of Svatahgrāhyatva in regard to Prāmāṇya and Aprāmāṇya

The *Vedāntaparibhaṣā* has defined *svatahgrahyatva* of *prāmāṇya* (spontaneous apprehension of validity) in the following words :

"*Doṣābhāve sati yāvatsvāsrāyagrāhāka sāmagri-grāhyatvam*" (Spontaneous apprehension is the fact of being grasped by the totality of causes that apprehend the substratum of the validity, provided no defect is present.)

The substratum of validity is *vṛtti jñāna* and the cause of its cognition (*svāsraya grahaka*) is the witnessing consciousness or *sākṣī-caitanya*). When the witnessing consciousness apprehends consciousness manifested in the form of *vṛtti*, it apprehends also the validity of *vṛttijñāna*. According to Sāṁkhya, however, the *svāśraya grāhaka caitanya* is the consciousness in the form of *puruṣa* which is reflected through *buddhivṛtti*. When *puruṣa* is revealing the *bubdhivṛtti* which is the substratum of validity, it is revealing the latter (i.e., validity) as well. Here, deficiency, in the flow of *sattvaguṇa* and the consequent increase in the *tamoguṇa*, will be regarded as *doṣa*. Spontaneous apprehension of validity, therefore, can be defined in the Sāṁkhya in the words which have been used in the vedānta paribhāṣa (i.e., *doṣābhāv sati yāvat svāśrayagrāhaka sāmagrī grāhyatyam*).

According to *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, thec onditions which cause apprehension of knowledge, cause apprehension of the validity of knowledge, as well. Even then, validity is not always spontaneously apprehended, as in the case of doubt. So, the qualifying word, "*doṣabhāve sati*" are to be added to the definition of spontaneous apprehension of validity.

The *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* has admitted *parataḥ jñāpti* of *aprāmāṇya* because according to the said text, the *grāhaka sāmagrī* of knowledge are the conditions only of the apprehension of validity in knowledge. These conditions, however, do not cause the apprehension of invalidity. Invalidity which is extrinsic to knowledge is known through inference. When proceeding to act on a particular cognition, we find that it does not satisfy our practical need, we infer that it is false.

If we hold the view that the Sāṁkhya like the advaita vedānta believes in *parataḥ jñāpti* of knowledge, then the definition of *svataḥgrāhyatva* of validity only will be sufficient. We have, however, seen that *svataḥgrahyatva* of invalidity too, may be logically accepted from the sāṁkhya point of view. If this is so, then we shall have to formulate a definition to define *svataḥgrāhyatva* of invalidity in knowledge. The buddhists believe in *svataḥ aprāmāṇyavāda*, but they have not attempted to define *svatasta* of invalidity.

Definition of Svatahgrāhyatva of Aprāmaṇya from the Sāṁkhya point of view

In the *Nyāyacintāmani svataḥgrāhyatva* of validity has been defined as apprehension of knowledge-apprehending conditions which, are incapable of causing apprehension of invalidity in knowledge. By following this definition of *Nyāyacintāmani*, we can formulate a definition of spontaneous apprehension of invalidity to suit the purpose of the Sāṁkhya School. The definition will be as under :

Spontaneous apprehension of invalidity means apprehension of knowledge-apprehending conditions which are incapable of causing apprehension of validity in knowledge. If 'spontaneous apprehension of validity and invalidity is defined in the manner of *Nyāyacintāmani*, then the fear, that one and the same knowledge may be both valid and invalid at the same time, can be removed easily from our minds. Validity is apprehended by such knowledge-apprehending conditions (*jñāna grāhaka sāmagrī*) which are *agrāhaka* of invalidity: invalidity is, likewise, apprehended by such knowledge-apprehending conditions which are *agrāhaka* of validity. When the knowledge apprehending conditions contain an excess flow of *sattvaguṇa* they become *agrāhaka* of invalidity. When, on the other hand, knowledge-apprehending conditions contain such a quantity of *tamoguṇa* which is just sufficient for hiding the true nature of the object but insufficient for keeping invalidity unrevealed to the perceiver, these conditions become incapable of causing apprehension of validity: they are, however, capable of causing spontaneous apprehension of invalidity. I perceive a piece of rope as a snake but I understand at the same time that my perception of the snake is invalid. The real object is something else the nature of which has not been revealed to me. Thus, when the *grāhaka sāmagrī* of *prāmāṇya* (in the form of the excess flow of *sattvaguṇa*) is not present, there is no apprehension of validity even though there is knowledge : in a similar manner, when the *grāhaka sāmagrī* of invalidity is not present, there is no apprehension of invalidity in knowledge.

While defining the spontaneous apprehension of validity, the vedānta paribhaṣa has used the qualifying words. "*dosabhāva*" in the

place of the qualifying statement "absence of the apprehending condition of invalidity" (*aprāmāṇya grāhakābhāva*. According to the author of the Vedānta Paribhaṣa, *dosābhāva* is not adjective. It is negative and as such, it does not contribute anything from outside towards the validity of knowledge. *Doṣa*, on the other hand, is treated as an adjective and as additional factor due to the presence of which, the *advaita* believes in the *orataḥ jñapti* of invalidity. According to the Sāṁkhya philosophy both *doṣa* and *doṣābhāva* may be treated as adjectives. These are, however, nothing but excess of *tamoguṇa* and excess of *sattvaguṇa* in knowledge. These are, therefore, not regarded as additional factors.

Further, the author of the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* holds that invalidity which is the nature of '*tadabhāvavati*,' cannot be received directly by the *vṛtti* of buddhi; because *buddhivṛtti* is capable of catching directly the image of that thing only which has a form. Hence, invalidity is to be known through inference.

According to Sāṁkhya, *abhāva* can be perceived directly by means of *saṃyuktatādātmya sannikarṣa*. That there is no harm in admitting perceptual knowledge of *abhāva* by visual organ has been explained fully in the *Nyāyamañjarī*. It is only in the case of *bhāvavastu* that the visual organ cannot perceive a thing without being related to it. This rule does not apply in the case of *abhāvavastu* where even though there is no *prāpyakāri saṃbandha*, still the visual organ is capable of apprehending negation directly. We should however, remember that the perception of negation is relative to the perception of its substratum which should be within the range of vision. So, if *abhāva* can be regarded as an object of perception, then invalidity which is of the nature of '*tadabhāvavati*' can be perceived spontaneously.

Chapter 2

Metaphysics

Sāṁkhya Approach is based on an Analysis of Human Experience

The Sāṁkhya system is admitted on all hands as one of the oldest systems of thought, because the seeds from which the Classical Sāṁkhya sprung up as a well-knit system are strewn over a vast field of philosophic writings of ancient India. The earliest available systematic exposition of the Classical Sāṁkhya is found in the *Sāṁkhya kārika* of Īśvara Krishna; Gaudapāda's commentary on *Sāṁkhyakārikā*, Vācaspati Misra's *Tattvakāumudī*, Aniruddha's *Vṛtti* and *Sāṁkhyapravacanabhāṣya* of Vijñānabhikṣu are some of the well-known posterior texts on the Sāṁkhya Philosophy.

Life in this world (as all of us know) is a ceaseless flow of experience. It is, therefore, expected that a good Philosophy which seeks to explain the significance of human life in relation to the whole universe, should establish its claim to general acceptance by showing that it has formulated its theory on the basis of a thorough analysis of experience.

A philosopher, who is a lover and interpreter of life, is unable to turn his eyes away from the living experiences of every moment; our reason must fall back upon experience for collecting its own data. If reason wanders away from experience, it will create a system of dead thoughts, devoid of any touch of life and reality.

A thorough analysis of human experience is also the starting point of the Sāṁkhya Philosophy. Experience is the felt result of the operation of the subtle *tattva* which is ordinarily imperceptible. Hence, if the *tattva* is to be known, it can be known through a thorough analysis of experience. Just as a chemist finds out the chemical ingredients by means of analysis of the joint effects produced, by the combined operation of different chemical substances, in the same manner, a philosopher discovers the underlying principles of experience. by means of a thorough analysis of experience. In fact, this process of analysis by means of which the subtle root principles and their essential natures and characteristic effects become manifested,

has been deemed essential in all the philosophical systems of India. The *advaita-vedānta* analyses experience and discovers that the mutable principle involved in experience is false and non-existent from the metaphysical point of view. The discovery of Sāṁkhya is, however, different. In the opinion of the Sāṁkhya School, the two fundamental principles, lying at the root of experience, are real. *Puruṣa* and *triguṇātmikā Prakṛti* are not mythical and airy but they are at the very root of the possibility of knowledge or experience. Experience is not possible unless there are objects of experience, body, organs, ego-sense, mind etc., which will constitute the instruments and objects of experience. These are also not enough to bring about experience. Experience presupposes consciousness; unless there is some principle of consciousness, mere unconscious instruments and objects are incapable of producing experience. So, the fundamental principles and categories of Sāṁkhya were not dogmatically postulated; but they were discovered and accepted after proper analytical study of experience.

THEORY OF THE GUṆAS

The most distinguishing characteristic of the Sāṁkhya-system is its guṇa theory, which holds that all mental and material objects of this phenomenal world, are the combinations in different proportions of the three ultimate reals which are technically known as *triguṇa*. The conception of these *guṇas* arose in the minds of these philosophers, undoubtedly as a result of their analysis of our phenomenal consciousness and its objects.

All objects of the world, whether simple or complex, have in them pure being or *sattā* (existence) as their ultimate basis and essential stuff. This existence constitutes the intelligibility of an object. Only an existent object can be related to knowledge and can become intelligible to us. A sky-flower, for example, being devoid of *sattā* can never be intelligible to anybody. Consciousness is revelation; and if we are to become conscious of something, then that thing must have *sattā* or intelligibility by virtue of which it can be revealed as being related to its object. When this chair becomes an object of consiciousness as its object. When this chair becomes an object of my consciousness or thought, it becomes so only because it possesses intelligibility which is nothing but its capacity of becoming revealed as soon as it comes in contact with consciousness. This capacity lies in the very being of the object and can very well be identified with the

being or the *sattā* of the object.

Each fact of experience is a being or *sattā* and this being or existence constitutes its intelligibility. This intelligibility or existence, therefore, is the ultimate factor in an object of experience and it is called *sattvaguṇa* by the Sāṁkhya philosophers.

Now, the object of experience also possesses certain characteristics like resistance, impenetrability, shape and form, which are, in fact, due to the presence of massiveness in objects. It is because an object is massive in nature that it can assume shape and can also resist its complete destruction through change allowing only the change of form. Mass or *tamoguṇa*, therefore, is another element present in the object besides its *sattvaguṇa* or intelligibility. The object undergoes changes. It changes from form to form. There is no monotonous lingering of the same character in any object. This change or movement is due to the presence of another principle which is called *rajoguṇa*. Thus, *sattva* (existence or intelligence stuff), *rajas* and *tamas* (mutability and mass) are the three *guṇas* which are responsible for all sorts of experience of a *puruṣa*. These are objective, ultimate and the irreducible elements of experience.

Due to the presence of the *sattva* element,
  an object exists and is intelligible.
Due to the presence of the *raja* element,
  the object undergoes changes.
Due to the presence of the *tamas*,
  the object assumes shape and resists
  its utter destruction through changes.

These *guṇas* are not the so-called qualities of the *vaiśeṣika* system because they, themselves, possess the characteristics of lightness, movement and heaviness.[1] One quality cannot be thought of as possessing other qualities. These *guṇas*, of course, become seemingly associated with and dissociated from the *puruṣa*,[2] still they cannot be regarded as qualities of the *puruṣa* since qualities actually and constantly inhere in the substance. So, these *guṇas* are substances (*Dravyas*). All objects of the world, both physical and mental, are the results of the different permutations and combinations of these three ultimate reals. Our thoughts and ideas, which seem to possess a character different from that of the physical world, are not, in fact, outside the realm of these three *guṇas*. These are as much the effects

[1] *The Sāṁkhyakārikā*, verse 13. [2] *Sāṁkhyapravacanabhaṣya*, 1, 61.

or the modifications of the ultimate reals as the so-called physical things. The only difference lies in the fact that in the mental sphere, the element of *sattva* predominates, whereas in the sphere of the physical universe, *tamoguṇa* becomes the dominating element. *Tamoguṇa* is present in all our ideas of objects, otherwise, these mental products could not assume the forms of their objects in order to make possible the experience of an individual. In fact, in every *citta-vṛtti*, the indistinguishable union of the *guṇas* is detectable. (*Buddhi vṛtti* becomes manifested, it assumes the form of its object, and this needs movement). Our phenomenal consciousness as well as its objects are due to the functioning of these three *guṇas* which are the sole productive forces of this universe.

Our experience, however does not possess a cognitive aspect only, it has also a feeling aspect which is more primitive and more pervasive than the cognitive one. While analysing the *guṇa* concept, Prof. S.N. Dasgupta has shown that feeling formulates the marginal line between thought and matter, the animate and the inanimate. From feeling complexes, we can easily descend to matter complexes and from matter complexes, we can go upto feeling complexes very smoothly. That is why there is always the likelihood of mistaking a feeling complex for a matter complex and vice versa. Sāṁkhya Philosophy also does not recognize any rigid distinction between thought and matter. Both matter and thought are constituted of the same feeling-substances which form the neutral borderline between them. The *guṇas* are also these feeling substances. Since the whole external world is made up of these elements, each object of cognition possesses the capacity of producing three different feelings in the minds of human beings, i.e., pleasure, pain and delusion or indifference. So, from the point of view of knowledge, these three *guṇas* are known as sattva, rajas and tamas, but from the point of view of feeling, they appear as pleasure, pain and delusion.[1] A lovely woman, for instance, excites the feeling of pleasure in the beloved person, the feeling of pain in the co-wife and the feeling of delusion in the disappointed person. This, she can do, simply because she is objectively pleasurable, painful and delusive. In other words, *sattva, rajas* and *tamas*, which on the plane of consciousness appear as intelligence-stuff, energy and mass and on the plane of feeling, as pleasure, pain and delusion, have themselves been transformed to create that lovely

[1]*Sāṁkhyapravacanabhaṣya*, 1, 127; *Sāṁkhyakārikā*, 12.

woman. The lovely woman is not merely the assemblage of ideas in some mind as is held by the idealistic philosophers, nor is she absolutely different from thoughts or feelings, as is ordinarily held by the realistic philosophers. Thought and thing, matter and the so-called intellectual processes do not lie in two absolutely distinct regions; and, therefore, the establishment of any kind of direct action and interaction between them, is not at all difficult. Thus, the correspondence between the inner world and the outer world has been satisfactorily explained by the Sāṁkhya philosophers on the hypothesis that they represent two allied lines of development from a common source, (i.e., the three *guṇas*.). These reals, thus, on their supposition, are neither mental nor physical and in this respect, they remind us of the neutral entities of Bertrand Russell. Like those neutral stuff, the *guṇas* also get arranged in different relations. When arranged in one way, they appear as mental and when arranged in a different way, they appear as physical or material.

Now, these reals are called *guṇas* because they act as ropes for binding *puruṣa* and also because they are subordinated to the *puruṣa* whose interest they serve.

These *guṇas* are infinite in number but they have been brought under three types in accordance with their three different characteristics.[1] When we speak of *sattvaguṇa*, we do not mean one substance only; rather we refer to an infinite number of subtle substances possessing the common characteristics of self-shiningness and luminosity. Similar is the case with *rajas* and *tamas*.

These *guṇas*, when they act together for the production of objects, exert mutual influence upon one another, and by so doing, they bring into existence new qualities and new substances. An object is called *sāttvika*, *rājasika* and *tāmasa* in so far as it represents the predominance of *sattva*, *rajas* and tamas; but even when *sattvaguṇa* predominates, *rajas* and *tamas* remain in conjunction with it, although in a subdued form. As soon as the influence of *sattva* weakens, due to some causes, the *sahakāri guṇas* at once become active and more prominent. In each act of production, these three guṇas become operative, although all of them cannot maintain the same *status quo* at the same time. In revelation, it is not *sattva* alone that is active, but *sattva* as dominating *rajas* and *tamas*.

The *guṇas*, no doubt, possess different characteristics; but while

[1]*Yogavarttika*, chapter, 11-18.

they act, there is co-operation or commingling like that of oil-wick and flame.[1] If these three are not arranged in proper subordination and superordination, there will be terrible conflict resulting in chaos and confusion. Their proper manipulation, however, will bring about creation of new things and new varieties, just as the proper manipulation of wind, bile and phlegm contributes to the substance of the physical body.

When light is produced, it is produced for the enjoyment of some conscious being, and not for the benefit of oil, wick and flame. Similar is the case with the conjunction of these *guṇas*. The creativity of these reals is not an end in itself; on the contrary, it serves as the only means for the attainment of *puruṣa's* end. Enjoyment and liberation are the *puruṣārthas* and the *guṇa* stuff creates this ceaseless flow of modifications and complexities for his enjoyment and liberation. All products are, therefore, *upkaraṇas* for *puruṣa's* experience; but the *guṇas*, while creating the realm of experience, do not get mixed up with *puruṣa* like salt and water. Rather, they serve the *bhoga* purpose of *puruṣa* by mere *sannidhi* or proximity.[2] Of course, this *sannidhi* does not mean nearness in space; rather it means that *puruṣa bodha* and *guṇa bodha* form indistinguishable parts of the same idea and are cognized as identical through mistake. *Buddhi* or intellect is *sāttvika prakāśa* whereas *puruṣa* is revealing consciousness. Due to ignorance, these two are not discriminated. All *vṛttyātmaka* changes of the intellect are, therefore, falsely attributed to *puruṣa* although the latter is immutable in nature. Suppose two glass cases are hung on the opposite walls and suppose one of them contains a picture; now, if a man does not know that one of them is empty, he will perceive pictures in both the cases. Here, due to ignorance and reflection, the picture of the one glass case will create the confused perception of a picture in the other glass case which is, in reality, empty. Similar confusion arises when an individual thinks of himself as the knower and the enjoyer of the worldly objects due to non-discrimination between his buddhi and pure consciousness.

The example of 'oil and wick' has made it clear that mere oil cannot produce light, mere wick also fails to illuminate a room. It is only when oil co-operates with wick and flame that there can be such a thing as light. Similarly, neither the *buddhivṛtti* alone nor the pure consciousness alone can produce phenomenal knowledge or

[1] *Sāṁkhyakārikā*, 13 (2). [2] *Tattvavaisaradi*, 11-18.

object-knowledge. It is only when the two get related due to *sannidhi* that there is the illumination of *buddhivṛtti* or the knowledge of an object.

The *guṇas* and the *puruṣas* are, thus, the main principles accepted in the philosophy of the Sāṁkhya. Both the categories are equally eternal, but while the *puruṣas* are pure and inactive principles of consciousness, the *guṇas* are the unconscious, ever-changing dynamic energy of the universe. They ceaselessly undergo changes, but changes take place in these ultimate constituents in two ways which are known as *sarūpa pariṇāma* and *virūpa pariṇāma*; *sarūpa pariṇāma* exists in the state of equilibrium of the three *guṇas* when they exert equal influences without creating any commotion. This state of equilibrium is absolutely indeterminate, undifferentiated and indefinite and it is called *Prakṛti*. The word *Pariṇāma* always implies change or modification which is of the form of action (*Kriyātmaka*). Activity belongs to *rajoguṇa*. Hence in *sarūpa pariṇāma* too, *sattva* and *tamas* must be related to *rajas* so as to be able to undergo homogeneous modification (i.e., modification in which one *guṇa* will not overpower the other). *Rajas* possesses *kriyaśakti* by nature; but this *kriyāśakti* of *rajas* becomes excessive when there is a disturbance in the *Prakṛti-state* due to *purusārtha saṃyoga*. In the equilibriated state, there is no excess in the activity of the *rajoguṇa*. The natural activity of *rajas* becomes excessive in the *vaisamyāvasthā* as a result of which there are excessive modifications in *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. The result of such excess in the activities of the *guṇas* is the production of new categories. (*Tattvāntara pariṇāma* or *virūpa pariṇāma* means the process of forming unequal aggregation of the *guṇas* through their excessive interaction and interdependence). Hence, when the *virūpa pariṇāma* takes place, the *guṇas* begin to manifest their various characteristics and the phenomenal products come into being.

This is the dynamism of the Sāṁkhya physics and this aspect is as real and as obvious as the aspect of permanence. All sorts of movements and changes are so very real and forceful that they can be denied by no means. This fact of becoming should be accepted in every system of philosophy to avoid one-sidedness and narrow perspective. *Guṇas*, in the state of equilibrium and the *puruṣa* are the minimum noumenal realities which form the mutable and immutable pre-suppositional principles of the Sāṁkhya view. The

entire universe of diversity and change is produced out of these *guṇas* in association with the *puruṣa* or pure consciousness. The world we live in, is not a static world; it is out-and-out dynamic. Perpetual changes, vibrating currents of life and constant movements, are the keynotes of this phenomenal show. The world that we see, feel and work upon does not remain steady and unchanging. On the contrary, it changes and changes every moment because of its inner push and inner mobility which are due to the palpitating nature of the three *guṇas*. The *guṇas* explain clearly both the sameness and diversity, affinity, and difference which are so obvious and unignorable in the physical world. Sameness of objects is due to sameness of the ultimate stuff (i.e., the three reals,) but diversity is due to the different types of relatedness of these elements. Cause and effect, substance and attribute are identical from the point of view of the stuff, but from the point of view of forms and names, they are different.

These guṇas also form the realistic setting of the Sāṁkhya School. Knowledge and its objects belong to the realm of *guṇas* which are totally independent of the *puruṣa*. An idealistic system holds that in the acquisition of knowledge, consciousness contributes every item and that the object of knowledge is convertible into consciousness. The classical Sāṁkhya, however, holds that the stuff of which the object of knowledge is composed, is radically distinct from consciousness and is also independent of it. The whole world, therefore, rests on a principle which is as eternal and independent as the spiritual principle. Thus, according to Sāṁkhya, both matter and spirit are equally real, although matter, being an obstacle in the path of liberation, is of inferior value. The *puruṣa* can realise its true nature only when it turns away from the pain-producing Nature. Pain, according to Sāṁkhya, is real but the connection of *puruṣa* with the painful experience is false. In the opinion of the *advaita vedānta*, however, pain is false, Sāṁkara has admitted transcendental reality of consciousness only. The unconscious *upādhi* in the form of *Mayā* is transcendentally false. Hence, Sāṁkara-philosophy has assumed the form of an absolute idealism or *advaita caitanyavāda.*

Objections Considered

It has been objected that the three *guṇas* of the Sāṁkhya School are not substances but qualities; because they are always experienced

as the characteristics of lightness, movement, heaviness etc., belonging to fire, water, earth etc. They are never experienced as substances like clay, gold etc. They are also accepted in all other scriptural texts as qualities.[1] Further, the Sāṁkhya has accepted one cause of the world. If three *guṇas* are recognized and each *guṇa* is, again accepted as infinite in number, then the theory of one ultimate cause becomes a myth.

Secondly, Sāṁkhya holds that the three *guṇas* are the universal elements of all objects. But if we reflect carefully, we find that these *guṇas* are not the real elements constituting the substances of all objects. These three *guṇas* really represent three stages of modification which a thing undergoes in order to assume a particular form. "When a thing is by nature subject to modification, then it must have a stage from which modification should start and it must offer some amount of resistance to modification. This implies its inertia which is called *tamas*. Secondly, the process of modification implies its stage of activity or change which is called *rajas*. Thirdly, the stage at which it arrives as a result of its modification is the stage of self-manifestation or *sattva*. In whatever condition, a body may be, whether mental or material, it is always subject to change and it must have these three movements. The discovery of the three in all objects would simply signify the discovery of the fact that all things of the world are changing. These three *guṇas*, being, really three movements of the process of modification, to regard them as constituents would amount to substantiation of abstract features".

Further, according to Sāṁkhya, the *guṇās* are innumerable in number. Here a question may be posed: are they atomic or all-pervading or *madhyama parimāṇa* in size?

If the *guṇas* are regarded as atomic, then the effects which are not atomic, will be different from the cause in nature and this will go against the Sāṁkhya theory of *Satkāryavāda*. So, the *guṇas* cannot be atomic because the effects are not atomic and the Sāṁkhya believes that the effects are identical with the cause in nature. The *guṇas* cannot be middle-sized (*madhyama parimāṇa*) because middle-sized things are products and are non-eternal. The *guṇas* are eternal. The *guṇas* cannot also be all-pervading. If the *guṇas* are all-pervading then there will be no change in them.

[1] *Śribhāṣya.*

Lastly, if all causal substances are all-pervading, why should the effects be limited in nature?

Objections Met

These objections, raised against the *guṇa* theory of the Sāṁkhya School, are not difficult and unanswerable. A little reflection on the original position of the Sāṁkhya School will help us to solve the riddles.

So far as the first objection is concerned, we can say that Rāmānuja is not logically justified in raising it against the Sāṁkhya theory of the *guṇas* It is true that Sāṁkhya has used a single word (*Prakṛti*) to denote the 'equilibriated' state of the three *guṇas* and it is also true that *Prakṛti* has been admitted as the root cause of the world. Now, although *Prakṛti* is a single word, still according to Sāṁkhya, it is *nānātmakā* in nature. It possesses the potency of creating the multifarious universe. Sāṁkara too, has regarded *Prākṛti* or *Māyā* as a principle of multiplicity and difference (*vaicitryātmikā*). So *Prakṛti* is the root-cause of the world. Brahman cannot be the primary material cause of the world because Brahman is one and does not contain in itself the potency of difference. Again, one substance may possess different qualities but this fact cannot be regarded as a justification for admitting the substance itself as many. The body possesses many characteristics such as height, weight, complexion etc., but still the body is regarded as one. Hence, there is no harm in admitting *Prakṛti* as one although it possesses multifarious capacities. Further, according to Sāṁkhya, there is *tādātmya* between substance and quality and "manyness" cannot be introduced in a place where *abheda* or non-difference is accepted. Moreover, the Sāṁkhya School has not used the word '*guṇa*' in the Nyāya-vaiseṣika sense. Rāmānuja, himself, has not accepted the Nyāya definition of quality. According to Nyāya, that which is admitted as a quality, can never be admitted again as a substance; but according to Rāmānuja, knowledge is both a quality and a substance. The classical Sāṁkhya, however, holds that if the substance and the quality are admitted as distinct and different, then there will be violation of the law of parsimony (*gaurabadoṣa*) because every bit of experience can be explained satisfactorily by admitting non-difference between substance and quality. Since, there is *abheda* (non-difference) between substance and quality, luminosity, movement and heaviness are not merely qualities, they are also substances. If light is different from the lamp, then the non-difference between the cause and the effect will be destroyed. So, luminosity or movement is not a mere quality. If luminosity is a quality, then its cause also is a quality (because the cause is non-different from the effect). Sāṁkhya has described the unconscious material-stuff as *guṇa* simply because of the fact that the unconscious *upādāna* is of no use unless it is related to consciousness. Hence consciousness is regarded as primary and the unconscious material stuff as the secondary (i.e., *guṇa* in the sense of gauṇa) in the process of creation.

So far as the second objection is concerned, we can say that there is no inconsistency from the Sāṁkhya point of view if anybody holds that these three *guñas* are the three states of modification. This, however, does not imply that the three *guṇas* cannot be regarded as substances. A state is always a state of a substance and according to Sāṁkhya, there is non-difference between the state and the possessor of state. (i.e., *avasthā* and *avasthāvan*). Moreover, even if we regard the three guṇas as three different states through which an object passes when it changes from one form to another, we would be careful not to allow any time-interval between one state and the other. There is no succession in the changing guṇas. The succession occurs in *vṛtti* only. If this successive nature of *vṛtti* is ascribed also to the nature of the thing, then there will be a hopeless blunder which will create only confusion of thought.

In reply to the third objection we can say that it is Vijñānabhikṣu who has admitted the all-pervading nature of the *guṇas* and also their innumerable number.[1] He has done this because otherwise, there will be difficulty in holding that creation is taking place everywhere. The Nyāya system too, has admitted a number of things as all-pervading. The souls are all-pervading, God is all-pervading. Space and time are all-pervading and *ākaśa* is also all-pervading. Even then, there is no difficulty in the generation of motion necessary for creation. According to the Nyāya School, it is only an object, endowed with the quality of touch, that occupies space. As all these things, mentioned above, are devoid of touch, they do not occupy space and do not resist movement. In the Sāṁkhya system too, the three *guṇās* possess the quality of touch in a very subtle form (so subtle that it cannot even be felt as the quality of touch different from other qualities). Hence,

[1]*Yogavarttika*, chapter, 11-18; *Sāṁkhyapravacanabhāṣya*, 1-127.

the three guṇas too, do not occupy space in such a manner as to resist movement.

Lastly, the difficulty in regard to the explanation of middle-sized effects arising from the all-pervading cause at the beginning of creation (*ādisṛṣṭi*) is not peculiar to the Sāṁkhya system. In the case of the advaita vedānta too, Māyā, the changeable material stuff of the universe, is all-pervading besides the all-pervading Brahman. Hence, the question of the production of limited effects from the all-pervading cause at the very beginning of creation arises in this system also. Of course, the supporter of the advaita vedānta may say that *Māyā* is *mithyā* but the *Prakṛti* of the Sāṁkhya School is real. The objection regarding the production of limited effects from the all-pervading cause however, does not create any special difficulty for the Sāṁkhya School. *Prakṛti* is not only real but it also possesses the potency of creating effects which are *vilakṣaṇa* in nature. Truly speaking, this objection is one which can be raised against any system that believes in *satkāryavāda*.

Prakṛti and the Disturbance of the Prakṛti State

Previously, it has been stated that the three guṇas of the Sāṁkhya School constitute the ground forces from which the diverse transformations and changes of this world have come into being, and that the movement, within these *guṇas* either holds these three in a state of equipoise or breaks up their equilibrium just to make them change and develop in the form of this manifold universe. Now, when the *guṇas* are held in a state of equilibrium, and there is no manifestation of any characteristic or modifications, it is called the state of *Prakṛti*, *avyakta* or *pradhāna*.[1] This state of equipoise is absolutely indeterminate, undifferentiated and homogeneous and it exists only as the possible source of energy of the whole world. Just as a forest is nothing but an assemblage of different species of trees, in the same way, *Prakṛti* is nothing but an assemblage of the three ultimate reals, held in a state of *avyakta* or non-manifestation.[2] So, although with the appearance and disappearance of individual objects, guṇas too seem to appear and disappear, yet, in fact, *guṇas* never get merged into something else, since they, themselves, are the *Prakṛti* and there is no other entity that can be admitted as their cause or ground. Again, if *Prakṛti* is the root-cause of this world, it should be regard-

[1]*Sāṁkhyapravacanabhāṣya*, 1-61. [2]*Yogavarttika*, chapter, 11-18.

ed as an uncaused principle; otherwise, there will be the fallacy of infinite regress.

The world process always reveals itself as an unending series of causes and effects and when by following the long line of causation, we arrive at the concept of the first or primary cause, we find that this ground principle is to be supposed as eternal, uncaused and beyond the region of this phenomenal existence. This is the *Prakṛti* of the Sāṁkhya system. Since, this *Prakṛti* is the uncaused first cause of this vast and multifarious universe, it is unlimited, all-pervasive and infinite.[1] *Sāṁkhyakārikā* describes *Prakṛti* as *ahetumat, nityām, vyāpi, niṣkriyam, ekam, anāśritam, aliṁgam, niravayavam, svatantram, avyakatam, triguṇam, aviveki, viṣaya, sāmānyam, acetanam and prasavadharmi*.[2]

In other words, *Prakṛti* is uncaused, it is eternal and all-pervading; it is immobile only in the sense that in the *avyakta state*, there is no manifestation of products like mahat, *ahaṁkāra* etc.[3] Motion and changes take place also in this equilibriated state. Further, *Prakṛti* is one and is nothing but the unity of the three *guṇas* in a state of potentiality and incoherence. It supports all, being the cause of all and is not supported by anything else. It is *aliṁga* for it does not serve as the middle term to prove the existence of any other category. *Prakṛti* is also partless, since in this state, the production of different evolutes, does not commence. It is independent, non-manifested and unconscious, and is also the objective ground of all cognitions. Again, as such, it is not limited to individual consciousness, but enters into the knowledge of all.

The most important characteristic of *Prakṛti* is that it is out-and-out productive (being an assemblage of the three palpitating reals). Primal Nature is ever undergoing changes into forms and categories, thereby creating this phenomenal existence. Being is not the only irreducible ultimate of knowledge or experience as is held by the *vedānta* philosophers. Movement or becoming is also another inconvertible principle of experience and this principle is *Prakṛti* or *triguṇa*. Nature has two movements : forward (*anuloma*) and backward (*pratiloma*). In its forward movement *Prakṛti* becomes the generating agent of all *sargas:* while in the backward movement, it retraces the stages through which it has developed.

[1]*Sāṁkhyapravacanabhaṣya*, 1-76. [2]*Sāṁkhyakārikā*, 10-11.
[3]*Yogavarttika*, 11-18.

Sāṁkhya also gives us rational justification for postulating an *avyakta Prakṛti* as the inexhaustive source of the manifest world. "Because of the finite nature of specific objects, because of homogeneity, because of evolution being due to the efficiency of the cause, because of separation between cause and its product and because of the merging of the whole world of effects, there is the unmanifest as the cause".[1] Whatever is finite is itself caused and all categories including *mahat* are limited and finite. Hence, *mahat* too, is produced by that which has the uncaused potentiality of *mahat*, that is to say, by the *Pradhāna* or *Prakṛti*. Further, all objects of the world manifest a common nature in the sense that each of them is capable of producing pleasure, pain and indifference. This is because of the fact that they are all made of some such substance which is capable of producing these three different feelings. Such a substance is *Prakṛti*. Again, the Sāṁkhya theory of *satkāryavāda* holds that the effect is already existent in the cause, and that in every case of causation, we have not the production of some new characteristics, but the uncovering of something already in existence. Hence, a cause can produce that effect only for which it possesses efficiency or potency. All categories, therefore, from *mahat* down to five gross elements, must exist in the state of the unmanifest or *Prakṛti* before their creation. The effect emerges from the cause and also merges into it at the time of its so-called destruction. The unevolved or the *avyakta*, therefore, must be supposed to exist as the great merging ground of the whole world of experience.

Now, *Prakṛti*, in the unevolved state is the equipoise of the three *guṇas* and it evolves the material world out of itself when there is a disturbance in the *guṇa* equilibrium. The question, therefore, arises: what is it that causes the disturbance of the equilibrium? The Sāṁkhya answer is that it is the *puruṣārtha saṃyoga* of *Prakṛti* with the inactive consciousness, the purpose of which is served by the evolution of Nature. Nature is, no doubt, unconscious and unintelligent, still there is some inherent teleology (unconscious) in the *guṇas* as a result of which they produce this world. The inherent teleology means nothing but the disposition of unknowingly serving the purposes of enjoyment and liberation of puruṣa. The movement of *Prakṛti*, for the production of the world, is, thus, in a manner, controlled and

[1] *Sāṁkhyakārikā*, 15, 16.

influenced by the transcendental *puruṣa*. Hence, this blind teleological force of Nature is also said to be due to the transcendental influence of the spiritual principle. "Just as the unintelligent milk flows from the udders of the cow for the nourishment of the calf, so it is the function of the unconscious *Pradhāṇa* to liberate the souls from the sorrows and sufferings of this world".[1] This unconscious teleology is, thus, an important hypothesis on the ground of which the Sāṁkhya School seeks to explain the creation of this well-ordered universe by an unconscious *Prakṛti* even in the absence of any active guidance from *puruṣa*.

This natural change of the *guṇas* in the form of this systematized universe also benefits *Prakṛti* to a very great extent. In other words, mutual help or mutual benefit forms the basis of this need for disturbance and evolution. The verse 21 of the *Sāṁkhyakārikā* runs thus: "For the sake of *Puruṣa's* perception of *Prakṛti* and for his release, a union of the two takes place, which resembles a union of the lame and the blind. By that union, evolution or creation of the world is effected.[2] The *Yogasūtra* of Patanjali says: "The union between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* takes place for the sake of knowing the essential nature of *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*."[3]

Thus, it is clear and evident that the real object of disturbance in the *guṇa* equilibrium and the creation of the universe is twofold. (1) *Prakṛti* becomes the *precept* of the *Puruṣa* and (2) the *Puruṣa* attains release from the torments and tortures of life on perceiving its own distinction from Nature.

Being disturbed and dislocated from its state of equipoise by *puruṣārtha*, *Prakṛti* creates this manifold world of pleasures and pains; but this world of joys and griefs, happiness and misery gets merged into the *pralaya* state of Nature, when the actions of the *guṇas* become disintegrated forming again the state of equilibrium. The inherent teleology of the *guṇas* again, at the right moment, breaks up this equilibriated state of *Prakṛti* and gives start to a fresh process of creation. Thus creation and dissolution are the two functions undertaken by nature to serve the purpose of the spiritual principle.

[1] *Sāṁkhyakārikā*, 57.
[2] *Sāṁkhyakārika*, 21.
[3] *Yogasūtra*, Sādhanapāda, 23.

Objections Considered

The Sāṁkhya conception of *Prakṛti* as the independent and unconscious material stuff of the universe has invited criticism from many quarters. Śaṃkara, for example, has said that since Sāṁkhya has admitted independent existence of two principles (one unconscious and the other indifferent) and has not admitted a third spiritual principle, there can never be any *saṃyoga* or *saṃyogabhaṣa* between the two. Hence, there can never be any creation of the world.

Prof. C.D. Sharma has supported this statement of Śaṃkara and has said that an unconscious and independent *Prakṛti* can, at least, create a mechanical and purposeless universe. A meaningful creation, we can never expect to result from the movement of an unconscious material stuff.

Śaṃkara has also criticised the use of the spontaneous flow of milk from the udders of the cow to explain the Sāṁkhya hypothesis of unconscious teleology. The cow is a conscious animal and there is the motherly love of the cow for her calf that acts as an inspiring agent. *Prakṛti* of the Sāṁkhya School does not possess these characteristics of the cow.

The example of unconscious grass changing automatically in the form of milk too, is not a suitable illustration to explain the inherent unconscious teleology of *Prakṛti*. Grass changes into milk only when eaten by a milch cow and not when it is eaten by a bull.

The example of the lame and the blind, working together for mutual benefit, is also not a satisfactory one. Both the lame and the blind are conscious and they are, therefore, capable of making a plan which will be beneficial to both. *Prakṛti*, however, is unconscious and *puruṣa* is indifferent. So, these two principles can never come together to form a plan by which both of them will be benefited.

Nor can we say that *puruṣa*, like a magnet, disturbs *Prakṛti*, by means of mere *sannidhi*. *Sannidhi* is eternal and there will always be disturbance in the *Prakṛti* resulting in creation of the world-forming categories. Hence, there will never be any *Prakṛti* state of the *guṇas* or the state of dissolution.

Moreover, *Prakṛti* is creating the universe and *puruṣa* is enjoying it. That is to say, *puruṣa* is reaping the fruits of the activities performed by Nature. This goes against the law of *karma*.

Objections Met

These objections are not very serious. A little reflection on the fundamental position of Sāṁkhya will make us conscious of the unsound nature of these objections.

So far as the first objection is concerned, we can say that the relation which is suitable for creation, exists between *puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* from beginningless time. So the question, how did these two independent principles enter into a relation suitable for creating the universe,—does not arise at all. Just as Brahman is related to *Māyā* from beginningless time, in the same manner, there is *anādī sriṣṭyopayogi sambandha* (beginningless relation suitable for creation) between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*. No question regarding the why, how or when of this relation can be raised legitimately. According to Sāṁkhya, *vivekāgraha* of *puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* is beginningless just as in *advaita vedānta*, *Māyā* or *avidya* is beginningless. In the *jīvan-mukta* state too, the relation between *buddhi* and *puruṣa* is not destroyed. *Buddhi* remains in that state as a *tattva*; but the self, in the state of *jīvan-mukti*, has realised its distinction from the intellect and so it becomes non-attached to *buddhi*. *Vivekāgraha* is the real creative force of *Prakṛti*. The mere relation between two all-pervading *tattvas* (*Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*) is not the real moving force behind creation. Since *vivekāgraha* is beginningless, creation too is beginningless. Hence, there is no difficulty in understanding the emergence of the world from Nature even in the absence of a third uniting principle in the form of God. If anybody points out any difficulty in the Sāṁkhya, in regard to this fact, then he may be asked to find out how this difficulty is solved in the *advaita-vedānta*.

With regard to the second objection, we may say that according to *advaita-vedānta* also, *Māyā* is unconscious. Even then *Māyā* is capable of producing a meaningful world. How is this possible? Brahman is eternal and immutable consciousness and is also eternally satisfied. Brahman has no need to be fulfilled through creation; still there is the creation of this purposeful universe.

Further, enjoyment which is the purpose of *Puruṣa* and which is fulfilled through creation, means simply the manifestation of the *viṣayā-karā-vṛttis* of the intellect through reflection. According to other schools, the object, when it is manifested, is also accepted either as beneficial (*iṣṭa*) or as harmful (*aniṣṭ*). In the Sāṁkhya, however, the *puruṣa*, in its neutral nature, simply manifests the objects. Now,

the disinterested attitude, which is referred to by the word *udāsīna*, is also a *vṛtti* of the intellect. *Āsakti* or attachment is a *kliṣṭavṛtti* whereas *anāsakti* or detachment is an *akliṣṭavṛtti* of the intellect. This disinterested attitude is not negative in nature. It is a special state of the *buddhi* which arises as a result of concentrated and continued spiritual *sādhanā*. The *niruddhāvasthā* of the *citta* is not of the form of *abhāva* according to the *yoga* philosophy. It is something positive. The *udāsinā* state (in which there is no *āsaktivṛtti*) is a state of *buddhi* similar to the niruddha state in which all *cittavṛttis* are stopped.

In answer to the third objection, we can say that *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*, being all-pervading, are always related. *Prakṛti*, which is the cause of the world is a *cetanaviṣṭā Prakṛti* (*Prakṛti*, permeated with consciousness). Further, as long as there is *vivekāgraha* there is no distinction between *puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*. Hence, there is no separation between the conscious principle and the unconscious principle. *Cetanāviṣṭā Prakṛti* is a mixed category in which *aviveka* is working as a creative force. Just as there is intelligence-part (*caitanyāṁśa*) and body-part (*sarīrāṁśa*) in a cow, in the same manner there is intelligence part and *acetana* part in non-discriminated and intelligised *Prakṛti*. Hence, there can be teleological evolution from Nature. Hence, the example of the flow of unconscious milk from the udders of the cow is not an unsound one.

The example of the co-operation of the blind man and the lame man is also not unsuitable from the point of view of the Sāṁkhya philosophy. Here, the author of the *Sāṁkhyakārikā* has simply tried to prove that *Puruṣa*, by itself or Nature by itself, is incapable of producing this world,—a creation which is beneficial to both of them. The lame man cannot come out of the forest independently, nor can the blind man, by himself perform this function. It is only when the two act together, that they can reach their goal. Pure consciousness is immutable and as such is incapable of producing anything by itself. Pure *Prakṛti* is unconscious and as such is incapable of creating independently this meaningful world. Two must unite. *Prakṛti* must be vitalised by consciousness so as to be able to evolve this multi-coloured world.

Even the example of the magnet does not create any difficulty for the Sāṁkhya School. Creation is not due to mere *sannidhi*. In addition to *sannidhi*, there must be *aviveka*. It is only when *aviveka* acts as a creative force, that there is disturbance in the *guṇa* equilibrium. There is also the consequent creation of the categories.

Lastly, the *bhoktritva* of *Puruṣa* and the *kartritva* of the intellect do not create any problem for the Sāṁkhya philosophy. The sense in which the word *bhoktritva* is used in the Sāṁkhya-philosophy, is not in conflict with the doctrine of *Karma*. The word 'enjoyment,' used in relation to *puruṣa*, refers simply to the connection which *jīva puruṣa* happens to have with the *buddhivṛttis* through reflection. This type of enjoyment is wholly different from the enjoyment of the fruits of actions in the forms of pleasures and pains. Hence, this sort of enjoyment by *puruṣa* is not prohibited by the law of *Karma*. Moreever, in practical life, we do, very often, come across instances in which the fruits of actions of one person are found to be reaped by another due to false identification. The son commits crimes and is punished; the affectionate father suffers pains on that account. Here, the sufferings of the father are due to his false identification of himself with the son and this identification is expressed in the form of love and affection for children. In the case of *avivekī puruṣa* also, there is '*ekameva darśanam*' due to *aviveka*. Hence, the pleasures and the pains which really belong to *buddhi* are mistakenly appropriated by the *avivekī jiva puruṣa* due to *ekameva darśanam* caused by ignorance.

Objections, raised by Venkatanath

Venkatanath has raised some objections against the arguments used by the Sāṁkhya School to prove the existence of *Prakṛti* (by inference).

In his opinion, the first argument "*Bhedānām parimāṇit*" can serve as a middle term to prove the existence of an unlimited cause only; it cannot prove the existence of an *avyakta Prakṛti*.[1] This argument is based on the supposition that the cause must be greater in quantity than the effect. This, however, is not always true. A big piece of cloth can be produced from a small bundle of threads. A huge tree is always produced from a cause which is very insignificant in quantity.

The argument "*Samanvayāt*" is also invalid. The qualities which are inherent in certain things may not always be their causal factors. (*Na hi yat yeṣu-anugatam tatteṣām kāraṇamiti* niyamaḥ; sarvartha siddhi). The qualities of whiteness, cowness etc., inhere in a large

[1] *Tatvamuktakalapa* with Anandayini tika, published by Oriental Research Institute, Mysore, p. 112.

number of objects but they are never regarded as the causes of those things and beings. In the case of earthen jars, cups etc., the quality of earthiness which is transmitted to them, is not their cause. This quality inheres in the effect. The causal substance is never inherent in the effect. The followers of the Sāṁkhya School cannot, further, hold that the cause and the effect are of the same material stuff as they are of the same form. In that case, the cause can never be distinguished from the effect.[1] Further, if the three guṇas are regarded as the cause of the world since they are present in all objects, then the Sāṁkhya will not be able to establish the existence of a single cause in the form of *avyakta Prakṛti*. Even in *sāmyāvasthā*, the three *guṇas* cannot be regarded as one because they in that state also, produce their different types of effects.

The third argument "*śaktitaḥ pravṛtteśca*" too, is no good. The word "*śakti*" implies the energy form of the effect. The oil, in the form of energy, remains in the oilseed. Oilseed is the substratum of the oil. If *avyakta* implies energy, then like oil-energy, it, too, must have a substratum, as otherwise the example of oil and oilseed will be an unsuitable one. If the *avyakta* needs a substratum, then there will be more principles than what has actually been accepted by the Sāṁkhya.

Lastly, the argument "*Kāraṇa-kārya-vibhāgādavibhāgāditi*" is also faulty. The *vibhāgāvibhāgahetu* establishes both the efficient and the material cause of the world; the sāṁkhya definition of cause, however, covers the material cause only.

Solution

So far as these objections (raised by Venkatanath) are concerned, we can meet them in the following manner:

The first argument does not seek to prove the existence of *Prakṛti* on the basis of the principle that the cause must be greater in quantity than the effect as is supposed by Venkatanath. Here, the principle postulated is "whatever is limited (*Parimita*) is an effect. The root-cause, therefore, must be unlimited (*aparimita*) as otherwise we shall have to suppose a further cause of the root-cause (becoming an effect, due to limitation) which is absurd. This unlimited root-

[1]*Tattvamuktakalapa* with Sarvarthasiddhi, Oriental Research Institute, Mysore, p. 126.

cause is called *Prakṛti* because the word stands for the material stuff of which anything is composed.

The second argument (*samanvayāt*) again, refers to the fact that the effect is always connected with the cause (*kāranānvita*). It is also of the nature of cause (*Kāranātmaka*). It is due to this fact that qualities of a causal substance are found in all the effects generated from it. The quality of being woodenness is found in all things made of wood. Since, the qualities of pleasure, pain and indifference, are found in all objects of the world, they are to be regarded as the qualities of the substance which is the cause of the world. The substance which is capable of producing pleasure, pain and indifference, is no other than the *triguṇātmikā prakṛti*. We should also remember that according to Sāṁkhya, the qualities of whiteness, cowness etc., are not different from their respective substances. The Sāṁkhya has admitted *tādātmya* between the substance and the quality. White threads do, in fact, constitute the cause of the white cloth. To meet the third objection, we can also point out that the Sāṁkhya has not admitted any difference between power (*śakti*) and the possessor of power (*śaktimān*) and hence there is no need for a substratum of *avyakta*. *Śakti* is not something new. It is what is called *pariṇāma*. It is due to the presence of *pariṇāmaśakti* in the causal substance that the latter shows a tendency towards manifestation in the form of the effect. Just as there is oil-seed possessing oil energy in the same manner there is some changeable substance possessing the capacity of changing in the form of the world. This modifiable substance which possesses changing capacity (*pariṇāmaśākti*) is regarded as *avyakta* in the Sāṁkhya.

The *vibhāgāvibhaga* hetu, too establishes *Prakṛti* as the material cause of the world. Truly speaking, there is no *avibhāga* between the efficient cause and the effect. The word '*avibhāga*' really exists in the case of the *ādhāra-ādheya* relation and the *ādhāra-adheya* relation exists only between the material cause and the effect. *Pārthivāṁśa** of a piece of wood is not the cause of fire. It is the *tejo* part of the wood which is the *upādāna kāraṇa* of fire. It is because the *pārthivāṁśa* is associated with the *tejo* part of the wood that whenever there is fire in a piece of wood, the *pārthivāṁśā* is seen to be related inseparably to fire. Even then there is no *ādhār-ādheya* relation be-

*(Earth-portion)

tween the fire and the pārthivāṁśa of the piece of wood and so there is no *avibhaga* between the two.

PURUṢA

If all the movements of *Prakṛti* are for the experiences and liberation of *Puruṣa*, then the consideration of *Puruṣa's* nature and its relation to *Prakṛti* becomes an important problem for the Sāṁkhya Philosophy.

Prakṛti stands for the unconscious dynamic principle that undergoes changes and transformations for the creation of the empirical world. Although the contents of consciousness always change and become different, 'consciousness' as the principle of illumination and revelation remains always the same. So, there are not merely changes and transformations in the universe of ours; there is also the permanent principle of consciousness which manifests all these passing phenomena of the phenomenal world. This eternal principle of consciousness is the *puruṣa* in the Sāṁkhya analysis of the world. An unconscious principle alone cannot produce a universe which seems to be full of meaning and purpose. Hence, at the root of the world, we should admit the existence of spirit (like *puruṣa*) which, somehow, influences the unconscious principle in its process of creation or evolution. Moreover, *Prakṛti*, being unconscious, the contents of experience cannot be synthesised and organized into one meaningful object, by its efforts. The principle of unity that can account for the relatedness of the different bits of experience and also for that reason can give meaning to the contents of experience, must be spiritual in nature and this spiritual principle is the *puruṣa*. Thus, for the creation of this cosmic universe and also for effecting a meaningful knowledge of its objects (epistemological necessity), a spiritual principle is as necessary as the principle of objectivity and change. *Puruṣa* or spirit is pure consciousness and as such it is changeless and infinite. It is the transcendental principle and, therefore, its nature, *per se*, is non-apprehensible by experience. It, however, appears as the *apriori* principle in all forms of human knowledge. In other words, *puruṣa* is the logical pre-supposition of all knowledge. Beneath the forms of knowledge, there is some principle which is changeless but which reveals all mental states and processes by its own power of illumination. *Puruṣa* is this principle of consciousness distinct from the ideas and images of knowledge. This

principle of consciousness is always pure and its nature is intelligence and non-activity. The *Sāṁkhyakārikā* describes *puruṣa* as *atriguṇa, vivekī, cetana, aprasavadharmī, kevalī, draṣṭā, akartā* etc. and all these characteristics reveal that *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* are diametrically opposite; while the essence of *prakṛti* is change, the essence of *puruṣa* is changelessness. Both are, however, equally, free and fundamental and both lie at the root of the world and its experience.

The existence of *puruṣa* is also proved by certain arguments in the *Sāṁkhyakārikā* which may be summarised as follows :

Spirit exists as distinct from matter since (a) collocation serves the purpose of something other than themselves ; (b) since the other must be the reverse of what is composed of the three constituents; (c) since, there must be control of the collo cations; (d) since, there must be an enjoyer ; and (e) since, there is activity for the purpose of release from three-fold misery.[1]

The first four arguments seek to prove the existence of the soul on the ground that as the controller and enjoyer of the world of composite things, some intelligent being must be recognized to exist and that this intelligent being must not be of the nature of pleasure, pain and indifference. The world-process, therefore, is not moving and developing aimlessly, there is the eternal principle of pure intelligence which though inactive, yet through reflection, co-ordinates, synthesises and gives meaning to all our worldly experiences. These arguments, therefore, may be regarded as telological in the sense that they refer to the spirit as the central purpose of this world of change and mutation. The last argument is based on the scripture which promises release from misery and prescribes activity to that end. Nature or *Prakṛti* is unconscious and therefore, the release, striven for, must relate to a principle other than *Prakṛti*. This can be accepted as a form of ontological argument for proving the existence of soul or *Puruṣa*. Thus, both by telology and ontology, *Sāṁkhya* has sought to prove the existence of *Puruṣa* which is an eternal principle besides *Prakṛti*.

Professor D.D. Vadekar, in his learned article under the title 'The Sāṁkhya arguments for the Puruṣa'[2] has taken great pains to show that the *Sāṁkhya* arguments, employed in the seventh karika, fail to prove the existence of the pure *Sāṁkhya puruṣa*, the nature of which

[1] *The Sāṁkhyakārikā*, 17.
[2] published in *Philosophical Quarterly*, January 1960.

has been described (in the nineteenth kārikā) as indifferent and neutral. Here, the first point that should strike us at once is that this seventeenth kārikā has been employed to prove the existence only of *puruṣa* and not its indifference and neutrality. This *puruṣa* is the one that has been caught in the snare of *Prakṛti* through reflection. Hence, there is no difficulty in supposing that this *puruṣa* is a purposeful being and that its purpose is being fulfilled through the activity of the three *guṇas*. Hence, one may pose a question ; if this *puruṣa* is a bound *puruṣa*, then how are we to prove the existence of an indifferent and neutral self ? If we think over the metaphysical significance of this argument deeply and carefully, we shall be able to discover that this argument can be employed to prove the existence of the pure *puruṣa* as well. The real meaning of the first argument is that the existence of the unconscious matter becomes meaningful only when it is associated with consciousness. Matter, by itself, is of no use unless it is revealed by consciousness. In the absence of its revelation by spirit, it is as good as non-existent. *Prakṛti* is pure potentiality and such a pure potentiality, devoid of any actual character, is of no advantage to anyone. *Prakṛti* assumes a definite character through its connection with spirit and so, in and through the whole process of its manifestation, the meaning of *Prakṛti* is being continuously revealed through its connection with *Puruṣa*. *Prakṛti* looks upwards to *Puruṣa* and finds in it its true meaning. Consciousness as mere revelation is always pure, indifferent and non-agent. The word *saṁghāt* (collocation) refers to unconscious matter and the word *parārthatvāt* implies that without the existence of consciousness, matter is blind and meaningless.

Even if we understand by saṁghāta, the objects of enjoyment like bed, mat etc. and hold that the existence of these objects prove the existence of a *bhoktṛ puruṣa* only, then also there will be no contradiction in holding that *puruṣa* in its pure form, is indifferent and neutral. This is because, if we analyse *bhoktritva* metaphysically, we find that *bhoktritva* ultimately implies nothing but the illuminating consciousness that constitutes the nature of the pure *puruṣa*. Such a pure consciousness is always indifferent and neutral.

The examples of bed, mat etc. are given here, only to show that these things cannot have any meaning unless they are related to some conscious being. These examples are not meant to suggest that a *puruṣa* too, enjoys the products of *Prakṛti* in a manner similar to

what we find ordinarily in the case of the enjoyment of such objects by human beings.

Further, there is no such rule that there can be no enjoyment unless there is a desire for it. There may be an experience when there is no desire for it. The prisoners undergo jail experiences against their will.

The second argument too seeks to prove the existence of *jīva puruṣa*. It is only in such a *puruṣa* that *viveka* in the sense of intellectual understanding of the distinction between spirit and matter can arise. Such *viveka* is a *vṛtti* of the intellect. So, it is only a *puruṣa* endowed with *buddhi* that can become the possessor of *viveka-jñāna*. Just as the purely unconscious *Prakṛti* is incapable of having such *viveka*, in the same manner, a pure *puruṣa*, dissociated from *buddhi*, is not in a position to have *viveka-jñāna*. *Vṛttyātmaka-viveka* belongs to *buddhi* only. The *viveka*, that belongs to *puruṣa* is only *Prakāsātmaka viveka*, which implies simply the manifestation of two principles as different, and does not refer to an intellectual understanding and evaluation of the distinction. Hence, prakāśātmaka viveka is not in contradiction with the indifference and neutrality of puruṣa. Just as there is no distinction between *caitanya* and *cetana* in the Philosophy of Sāṁkhya, so also there is no distinction between *viveka* and *vivekin*. *Vṛttyātmaka viveka* belongs to *puruṣa* only when it is associated with *buddhi*. Even then, such intellectual modifications are owned by *puruṣa* through reflection only. Therefore *vṛttyātmaka viveka* is a seeming attribute of *puruṣa* and a real attribute of *buddhi*. There is, therefore, no contradiction in describing *puruṣa* both as *vivekin* (from the point of view of *Prakāśa*) and indifferent.

The subjectivity of *Puruṣa* again refers simply to its power of receiving the reflection of *buddhi vṛtti* that has assumed the form of an object. In other words, *puruṣa* is a subject on account of the fact that it reveals naturally any object that happens to lie in its proximity. This *viṣayasambandha* however, does not signify that *puruṣa* is not indifferent; on the other hand, every body will admit that consciousness as mere revelation of objects, cannot be regarded as anything but neutral. The objects of the world are getting manifested by the light of the sun; but nobody will admit that in respect of the objects which are manifested by the sun's rays, the attitude of the sun is anything but neutral. *Triguṇadi viparyayāt* means that *puruṣa* is indifferent from the three guṇas which form the stuff of all the objects of

enjoyment. In the bound condition also, the self refers to pure consciousness only and not to *buddhi*, even though it is the most powerful *jaḍaprakāśa*. All the objects of the world are manifested by the intelligised *buddhi*, and all attributes like agency, enjoyment of worldly experiences, purposefulness, the motive of evolution etc. belong only to the intellect and not to the pure *puruṣa*.

Here, we must remember that according to the Sāṁkhya, the true *jīva* is not the *prativimbha puruṣa* which is destroyed in the state of emancipation. *Jiva* is *puruṣa*, the consciousness of which is reflected in a particular *buddhi*. Hence the arguments which establish the existence of the *jīva* also establish the existence of pure *puruṣa*. Any attribute like subjective, discriminative etc. belongs to *puruṣa* from the point of view of *Prakāśa* only. Consciousness in the sense of pure *prakāśa* is always indifferent, non-agent and neutral.

In regard to the third argument, Prof. Vadekar says "This argument, most evidently proves, if it proves anything, the agency of the *puruṣa*, rather than its non-agency."

This argument simply seeks to prove that *puruṣa* is intelligising *Prakṛti* by its mere sannidhi so as to make Nature fit for the creation of this world. *Puruṣa* is not, therefore becoming an agent : *puruṣa* is the principle of consciousness that vitalizes *Prakṛti* by its mere existence (sattā). Brahman too, is the adhiṣṭhāna of Māyā : but nobody imputes agency to Brahman on that account.

The fourth argument seeks to prove the bhoktribhāva of the *puruṣa* that has already been connected with Nature through reflection. Enjoyment in the ordinary sense, is not possible in the case of pure matter; nor is it possible in the case of pure consciousness. It is only the seemingly unified category of spirit and matter that becomes the enjoyer of worldly experiences. So, the *puruṣa* that emerges from this argument (when taken by itself) in its pure and unconnected form, must be admitted as neutral and indifferent, since pure consciousness can never be the subject of any kind of experience. More over, Vacaspati has explained the bhoktribhāva of *puruṣa* in the sense of drastṛibhāva whereas Vijñāna bhikṣu has interpreted bhoktribhāva in the sense of enjoyment through reflection.

Further, enjoyment and indifference are not really two contradictory terms. They can go together. A jivanmukta *puruṣa* is indifferent to pleasures and pains ; still, he has to go through pains and sufferings, as long as his prārabdha karma is not wholly worked out.

The last argument seeks to prove the existence of *puruṣa* on the basis of the observed facts of the world. In this world, we find that the whole of creation is marching towards freedom which seems to be its supreme goal. Pure unconscious matter can never have the goal of freedom which belongs to the soul. So, we are led to believe that there must be bound souls which are to be made free in and through this process of world creation. In other words, the world is marching towards the freedom of these souls. All desires and strivings belong to *prakṛti*. The pure self is not an agent. The winding up of the colourful net of *prakṛti* is done by *prakṛti* itself and not by *puruṣa*. Bondage means a false unification of consciousness with matter and liberation means its dissociation. Unless, there is Pravṛtti (striving) in Nature there will be no change and mutation, and consequently, the distinction of a static *prakṛti* from a static *puruṣa* cannot be fully realised. So, the argument that the strivings of Nature are for the purpose of emancipation (*kaivalyārtham pravṛttiśca*) is quite logical from the dualistic standpoint of the Sāṁkhya physics.

Thus, all the arguments given in the seventeenth kārikā do prove what they actually intend to prove (viz., the existence of *puruṣa* as consciousness and illumination.)

Multiplicity of Selves

Now, the self or *puruṣa* according to Sāṁkhya is not one; rather there is the multiplicity of *puruṣas* and all of them are infinite, unchangeable, all-pervasive and eternal. The plurality of spirits follows from 'the distributive nature of the incidence of birth and death and of the endowment of the instruments of cognition and action, from bodies engaged in action, not all at the same time and also from differences in (the proportion of) the three constituents (in different entities like sages, ordinary mortals and beasts)[1]. In the absence of such a plurality of souls, birth and death should be one for the whole universe. If one person be blind and deaf, all others should be blind and deaf : but this does not happen in the world. We perceive that people are born and die at different times and are differently constituted. How can we then say that there is only one *puruṣa* and not many? Vikṣu holds that oneness of spirit advocated by the śruti, the vedānta etc. refers to the homogeneous nature of the *puruṣas* and not to their numerical unity.[2]

[1]*The Sāṁkhyakārikā*, 18. [2]*Sāṁkhyapravacanabhāṣya*, 1.154.

We cannot say that there is one spirit only and that this one spirit appears as many due to the imposition of different upādhis* on it. In the case of space, limited by a chair the chair can be removed and the portion of space can be saved from limitation by such a removal of its upādhi. Even then there is the possibility that this same portion of space may, again, be limited by the imposition of some other thing on it. So, if one spirit is recognized, bondage and liberation, limitation and freedom will become absurd and meaningless.

Gauḍapāda, however, has made an attempt to prove that the self in the Sāṁkhya philosophy, too, should be treated as one. It is a fact that in the *Sāṁkhyakārikā* the singular number has been used in respect of *puruṣa* : "*Tadviparitaśtathā capumān*" (Kārikā 1) ; "*Puruṣasya darsanārtham*" (Kārikā 21). While commenting on Karikā 11, Gauḍapāda has said, "*Anekam vyaktamekamavyaktam tathā ca pumānapyekaḥ*". While describing the points of similarities between *vyakta* and *avyakta*, Iśvara Krishna has said : *Sakriyamanekamāsritam limgam* (Kārikā 10).

Gauḍapāda has joined *anekam* of (Kārikā 10) with *vyakta* contrasting *vyakta* with *avyakta* and *puruṣa*. Thus, in the opinion of Gauḍapāda, *puruṣa* is to be regarded as one.

Now, if we think of the realistic position of the Sāṁkhya School, we sincerely feel that non-dualistic *Ātmavāda* cannot be the keynote of this philosophical system. Sāṁkhya admits real differences in the experiences and pains of different *jīvas*. Difference is a felt experience and hence it must be admitted as real. The difference between spirit and matter, the difference between one material object and another and the difference between one individual soul and another are all real facts. Hence, these real facts must exist in all levels of experience. *The advaita-vedānta* believes in the falsity of difference and so all sorts of difference vanish in the air in the *advaita* state of *mukti*. Now, if we make an attempt to interpret the Sāṁkhya with *advaita* inclinations, then we are bound to meet with logical contradiction and irregularity at every step. For *advaita, jīvabhāva*, or *jīvatva* produced by *buddhi, ahaṁkāra* etc. is false. It is purely imaginary while the only reality is the undivided consciousness or Brahman. According to Sāṁkhya however *buddhi, ahaṁkāra* etc. are not false. They are as real as consciousness. What is false is the relation of these with *puruṣa*. Since *buddhi, ahamkāra, vāsanā, saṁskāra* etc. are all real, the differences created by all these causes in the empirical lives of the different individual souls are also real. Differences, which are noticed in the different reflections of different *buddhis* are all real. Since the images or *pratibimbas* are different the *bimbas* also must be different. Real distinction in effects can be produced by really distinct causes. In the empirical sphere, we find real difference among individuals and this difference must, therefore, exist in the transcendental sphere as well. There are different *buddhis*, different *pratibimbas* or reflections and different *bimbas or puruṣas*. When a *puruṣa* is finally liberated, the reflection is destroyed and so *puruṣa* becomes fully dissociated from its buddhi which then gets merged in *Prakṛti*. Diversity and multiplicity in creation are real and these can be satisfactorily explained by assuming the existence of the different *avivekas* of the different *puruṣas*. Created objects are many and the selves that reveal these objects in different ways are also many. If we hold that consciousness is one and it falsely appears as many due to unreal investments (*upādhis*) then we shall not be able to do justice to the essentially realistic and the dualistic position of the Sāṁkhya. Real difference in the *upādhis* can never be caused by mere difference in the limiting adjuncts. A man may put on different dresses at different times ; but this difference in his dresses will not cause any real difference in him. In the opinion of the Sāṁkhya, difference in all its forms, is eternal. So, if difference is created by the non-eternal *upādhi*, then, with the destruction of the *upādhi*, difference, too, will vanish ; and if difference is destroyed, the realistic and the dualistic position of the Sāṁkhya cannot be maintained.

*Upādhis—Limiting adjuncts.

The use of the singular number (in Kārikā 11 and Kārikā 21) is not unjustifiable from the Sāṁkhya point of view. It should be remembered that the realistic Sāṁkhya has admitted multiplicity in respect of *puruṣa* owing to its admission of the reality of the individual *buddhis* but in its opinion, one *puruṣa* only is revealing itself to a particular *buddhi* to which it is related from beginningless time owing to *aviveka*. So, a particular *buddhi* is getting the impression of a single principle of consciousness and not of many. Each *puruṣa*, the real seer, becomes associated with a particular *buddhi* through reflection ; and due to this seeming union, the experiences of the intelligised *buddhi* are falsely owned by the *puruṣa* through ignorance. The subjective ground is, thus, as real as the objective one.

Objections Considered

The Sāṁkhya theory of multiplicity of selves has been unsympathetically criticised by many critics.

It has been pointed out by some critics that qualitative identity cannot go with numerical plurality. If all selves are of the same nature, there can never be many selves, since, there will be nothing to distinguish one *puruṣa* from another.

Another objection is that according to the Sāṁkhya, there is no difference among the selves in point of proximity to *prakṛti*, due to which sorrows and sufferings happen to them. So, it follows that when one self is afflicted with sorrow, all the other selves will be equally afflicted.

Lastly, there is misunderstanding regarding the bhoktribhāva of *puruṣa*. The critics raise the objection : how can an indifferent *puruṣa* be an enjoyer ? Moreover, activity belongs to *buddhi* and enjoyment to *puruṣa*. This overthrows the moral law of *karma*.

Objections Met

If we reflect on the first objection carefully, we find that this objection cannot be logically justified. Truly speaking, it is possible for us to have numerical plurality even without qualitative difference. In fact, qualitative identity loses its meaning unless there is numerical plurality, unless, there are at least two, there is no sense in asserting the existence of 'qualitative identity'. The expression, 'qualitative identity' can never be used if there is only one substance. This point has also been emphasised in the *Muktābalītīkā*, of the *Bhāṣāpariccheda*.

The second objection, too, can be set aside very easily. Here, we should remember that a self is not afflicted with sorrows and miseries due to *sannidhi* alone. Pleasures and pains occur to a *puruṣa* on account of its *karmavāsanā* which remains stored up in the *buddhi* with which it is associated from beginningless time. Enjoyment, therefore, is different for selves. *Aviveka* creates a seeming association of attachment and identification between spirit and matter, and it is due to this sort of contact that a self goes through the experiences of pleasures and pains. When this *karmavāsanā* or *aviveka* of a particular self is destroyed, that self is liberated. If we consider the Sāṁkhya philosophy from this point of view, there will be no contradiction or irrationality in respect of the nature of pure *puruṣa*

and its multiplicity.

BHOKTRIBHAVA

The problem of *bhoktribhāva* of *puruṣa* is, however, a very subtle one and it is to be understood by a careful philosophical thinking. *Bhoktritva*, in the case of *jīva puruṣa*, cannot mean enjoyment of worldly pleasures and pains which are the results of actions, because there is no *vṛtti* in consciousness. In this case therefore, the word 'enjoyment' means simply the manifestation of the *visayākārāvṛttis* of the intellect and also owning these *vṛttis* on account of ignorance. Due to *sannidhi*, a reflection of consciousness is caught in the *buddhi* by virtue of which all *buddhivṛttis* get apparently changed into consciousness ; and this apparent change in the character of *vṛttis* gives rise to a sense of false identity between *puruṣa* and *buddhi*. It is due to this feeling of false unity that the *buddhivṛttis* are understood by the *aviveki puruṣa* as parts and parcels of its own nature. It is this false appropriation that has been described as *bhoktribhāva* of *puruṣa*.[1] When *bhoktritva* is understood in this sense, there cannot be any logical inconsistency in ascribing *bhoktritva* to *puruṣa* although real *vṛttis* in the forms of pleasures and pains belong to buddhi which is the actual acting principle. Hence, the immutable nature of *puruṣa* remains unimpaired in the philosophy of the Sāṁkhya-school.

Perception of the visible world is not possible in the case of pure *puruṣa* ; nor is it possible in the case of pure matter. It is only the seemingly unified category of spirit and matter (*jīva puruṣa*) that can be the perceiver of the visible world through modification of the intellect.

Further elucidation of the bhoktribhāva of puruṣa

Puruṣa is to be known through inference. The world is an object of enjoyment and as such it has got to be enjoyed by a spiritual principle. (*Bhogyena bhokturanumānam*). *Prakṛti* being unconscious ; cannot be the *bhoktā* and so *puruṣa*, the seer, is also the enjoyer of the world. What then is the meaning of *Bhoktritva* of *puruṣa* ?

Here I propose to consider critically the interpretations offered by Vācaspati Miśra and Vijñānabhikṣu in regard to the *Bhoktribhāva* of *Puruṣa* mentioned explicitly in the fourth argument of the seven-

[1] *Tattvavaisaradi.*

teenth Kārikā of the *Sāṁkhyakārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa.

The philosophy of Sāṁkhya is not merely a dualistic system : it is also a rationalistic and realistic metaphysics, because it mainly depends on logical analysis and argumentation at every step. Being an orthodox system, it believes in the authority of the Vedas. But it has not made any attempt to justify any of its views by appealing to the revealed texts.

The Sāṁkhya arguments for the existence of *puruṣa* are based on Logic and Reason and they are quite in harmony with the dualistic and realistic position of the classical Sāṁkhya.

Critics have expressed doubt about the applicability of the fourth argument to prove the existence of *puruṣa*. It is argued that if *puruṣa* is by nature neutral and indifferent to all worldly happenings, then how can we ascribe *bhoktribhāva* to *puruṣa* ? Both Vācaspati and Vijñānabhikṣu have tried to solve this riddle in a manner which will not be incompatible with the unaffected nature of *puruṣa*.

We should remember that the seventeenth kārikā has been employed by the author of *Sāṁkhyakārikā* to prove only the existence of *puruṣa* and not its indifference and neutrality. This *puruṣa* is one that has been caught in the snare of *prakṛti*. It is a subject that reveals naturally any object that happens to be in its proximity. [This *viṣaya-sambandha*, however does not prove that *puruṣa* is not indifferent. On the contrary it is admitted that consciousness as a revealing principle only (*Prakāśātmaka Caitanya*) cannot but be neutral]. Perception of the visible world is not possible in the case of pure matter : nor is it possible in the case of pure Spirit. It is only the seemingly unified category of Spirit and matter (*Jīva-puruṣa*) that can be the perceiver of the *Dṛśya* through modifications of the intellect.

Accordingly, to Vācaspati *bhoktribhāva* of such a *jīva-puruṣa* refers to its capacity of perceiving the world in a manner as if the latter has been imaged in its own *vṛttis*. In *Tattvavaiśāradi*, Vācaspati has introduced his unique conception of *cicchāyā* with a view to explaining the *bhoga* or bondage of *puruṣa*. Whether this *cicchāyā* refers to a unique relation or to simple reflection of *cit* in *buddhi* has not been clearly indicated. For the purpose of this paper, we shall however, be using the term '*cicchāyā*' to signify the reflection of consciousness in *buddhi*, although in practical life we do admit a distinction between *chāyā* and *pratibimba*. In the opinion of Vācaspati Miśra, due to *sannidhāna*, a reflection of consciousness is caught in the *buddhi* by virtue of which all *buddhi-vṛttis* get apparently changed into consciousness ; and this apparent change in the character of *vṛttis* gives rise to a sense of false identity between *puruṣa* and *buddhi*. It is on account of this feeling of false unity that the *buddhi-vṛttis* are understood by the *avivekī puruṣa* as part and parcel of its own nature. It is this false appropriation that has been described as the *bhoktribhāva* of *puruṣa*.[1] Since the consciousness of *puruṣa* is the cause of manifestation of the modifications of *buddhi* in the waking state, it seems as if *puruṣa* is non-different from the intellect and there is only one principle, not two. This fact has been mentioned by Pañcaśikhāchārya in his famous sūtra *Ekameva darśanam, khyātireva darśanam*. Although *puruṣa-caitanya* is radically different from the intellect, the two are fused together intimately so as to give rise to a false sense of oneness which hides the real truth.

While explaining *sannidhāna*, Vācaspati has said that this does not mean any form of spatial or temporal contact between *puruṣa* and *buddhi*. Rather it implies a special kind of capability or *yogyatā* on the part of *puruṣa* to enlighten the states and the processes of *buddhi*, as a result of which, in the state of ignorance, a false sense of ownership arises in the spirit. Hence the spirit appears as the *pramātā bhoktā* etc.[2]

Vācaspati's view has been criticised by Vijñānabhikṣu on the ground that mere *cicchāyā* in *buddhi* is not potent enough to account for the world-sense of the real *puruṣa*. If *buddhi* is only intelligised by the single reflection of consciousness in it and there is not the double reflection of the buddhivṛttis in spirit, then, truly speaking, there can only be a relation between the image of *puruṣa* and *buddhi* and not between *buddhi* and real *puruṣa*. In such circumstances, intelligised *buddhi* plays the part of both the revealer and the revealed and as such this theory commits the fallacy of accepting one and the same category as both *kartā* and *karma*. Further, if *yogyatā* is believed to constitute the nature of *puruṣa*, it will continue even in the state of emancipation and, therefore, *puruṣa's* experience will never come to an end. Consequently, emancipation will become meaningless. Hence, Vijñānabhikṣu gives us his theory of double reflection which explains the *bhoktribhāva* of *jīva-puruṣa* in a better

[1] *Tattvavaisaradi*, chapter 1-4.
[2] *Tattvavaisaradi*, 1-4, 11-24.

cal elements, can be radiated outside both by the object and the sense-organ. *Prāpyakāritā* of the sense-organ, therefore, really signifies that the inherent *tanmātras* of the sense-organ meet the inherent *tanmātras* of the object. The inner sense-faculty is carried to the object through the *tanmātras* in a continuous process and is modified in the form of the object. The whole of this process may be regarded as *vṛtti* and as such we may also hold logically that *vṛtti* connects the senses with their objects.

The *vṛtti* is neither a part nor a quality of the senses. It is not a quality because the quality of an object is static in nature. If *vṛtti* is regarded as a quality, then it will be incapable of connecting an *indriya* with its object and will thus fail to serve its purpose. *Vṛtti* is also not a part of the sense-organ. If it is a part and if this part is supposed to go out to the object then there will be a gap between the *mūlasthāna* of the *indriya* and the object. The process will not be a continuous one and hence there will be no knowledge due to dissociation of the *mūlasthana* of the *indriya* from the object. Hence Bhikṣu has said: *'visphulingavad vibhaktāmśe rūpādi-vadguṇaśca na vṛttiḥ'*. We may however regard *vṛtti* as a substance because it is the modification of a substance (*indriya*). If we stretch a piece of rubber then the stretched portion (which is a modification of the original piece) will be called 'rubber' and not anything else. Similarly *vṛtti* is a modification by which *indriya* reaches the object and since *indriya* is a substance *vṛtti* also may be regarded as a substance. Of course, Bhikṣu has said: *Vṛttir dravya eveti niyamo nāsti*' because *vṛtti* means *vyāpara* i.e. function or *kriyā*. Even if we hold that *vṛtti* is a function or *kriyā*, then also there is no harm in calling *vṛtti* a substance. This is because *kriyā* is always *dravyāsrita* and whenever there is *kriyā*, there is *dravya* also. Moreover the Sāṁkhya does not admit distinction and difference between *kriya* and *kriyāvān*.

The gross atoms cannot be developed into any other order of existence and so, according to the view of the Sāṁkhya, the evolution of the world stops at this point. Evolution really means *tattvāntara-pariṇāma*, and as this does not take place after the evolution of the gross atoms, these *paramāṇus* constitute the last stadium in the evolutionary flow of nature. These gross elements, however, undergo ceaseless changes but these changes are either *dharma pariṇāmā* or *lakṣaṇa pariṇama* or *avasthā pariṇāma*. Objects always change their qualities or appearances as is generally noticed in the case of a lump

of clay, changing into the form of a pot. This is called *dharma pariṇāma*. Again, all the changes may be viewed as existing in an object as sublatent, actual and latent which may be termed as past, present and future. So, the appearance of a thing may be apprehended from the point of view of the three stages, the unmanifested, the manifested and the previously manifested. An object will come into being, it comes into being and it is no more,—these are the three stages which the object passes through, and these changes constitute the *lakṣaṇa pariṇāma* of the thing. Then the thing passes through the stages of old and new and this constitutes its *avasthapariṇāma*. These three forms of changes are all that can be seen in the present form of transformation, and so the evolution of newer and newer stadia is no longer found in this world.

The most important point regarding the evolution of the Sāṁkhya-system is that although the ultimate evolving agent is regarded as an unconscious principle, it does not give us any mechanical interpretation of the evolutionary process. The Sāṁkhya philosophy asserts that all these changes or modification take place because of the teleology inherent in Nature. To be of service to the *puruṣa* is the central purpose in Nature and this goal guides the whole course of the process of evolution through its different stages.

Further, according to the Sāṁkhya theory, there is no distinction between power and the possessor of power. So, Nature and all its evolutes are both *dravya* and *śakti* (substantive entity and power). *Mahat*, *ahaṃkāra* and *tanmātra* are all substantive entities and are not as such distinct from their 'respective' powers of transformation into the succeeding categories. Each of them is a substance and is also a potential power which finds actual modification in the succeeding product. Thus, *mahat* is intelligence-stuff but it is also the potential egohood that springs forth from it. All *viśeṣas* and *aviśeṣas* are, thus, actualisation of the latent powers, embodied in Nature—the ultimate source of inexhaustive potency and dynamism.

Time and space, too, are not independent of *prakṛti*; they are dependent on the *ākāśa* and its *upadhis* in the form of finite objects. Limited space and limited time arise from the *ākāśa* and its upādhis in the form of finite objects. Limited space and limited time arise from *akāśā* when it becomes limited and determined by the adjuncts, but the eternal time and the eternal space are the same as Nature.[1]

[1] *Sāṁkhyapravacanabhāṣya*, II, p. 12.

The minutest part of a limited time is called a moment and the minutest part of an object, an atom. The time that will be needed by an atom for changing its own point of space is measured as one moment. All objects and conditions of the world are constantly undergoing changes and the changes generate in our intellect, a sense of sequence of events which we perceive as time. Each unit of change is measured as one moment. Collocation of these moments gives rise to our concepts of hour, day, month, year etc. This act of measuring time and stating the evolutionary process in a temporal fashion is wholly a function of our *buddhi*. Hence, in *Yogasūtra*, succession and collocation of moments have been described as *buddhinirmāna*.

Modern physics also refers to this subjective nature of the measurable time and it describes time as the fourth dimension of space. The subjective nature of Time has been beautifully illustrated by Einstein in his humorous exposition of the relativity principle to a non-scientist friend. His statement amounted to that if one was in company of some fine girls, an hour would seem like being just a minute; on the other hand if one happened to be sitting on a stove, a minute would appear like an hour.

From the above discussion on evolution, it is clear that all objects of the world, without a single exception, are the creations of the three moving reals and consequently, at every moment every object of the universe is undergoing modification or change. The potential is, thus, becoming the actual in course of such transformation and movement, and the actual also is constantly becoming the sublatent. This transition or passage, from the potential to the actual, is what is known as the causal transformation and, therefore, for grasping more clearly the nature of the evolutionary changes, a consideration of the Sāṁkhya theory of causation becomes urgent and unavoidable.

The Sāṁkhya Theory of Causation

The Sāṁkhya theory of causation is based primarily on the principle that whatever is non-existent cannot be brought into existence and whatever is existent cannot be made totally non-existent. The corollary, that follows logically from this, may be stated thus: the effect that is produced from the cause is not totally dissimilar to it, as no intercourse is possible between two absolutely distinct entities. Of course, these two tenets are not so fully and clearly stated in the Sāṁkhya philosophy, yet the whole trend of

discussion on the problem of causation suggests these two principles as its basic implications. The details of the theory are logically woven from these two, although the Sāṁkhya philosophers were not conscious of this fact. What this theory of causation has sought to prove is not the existence of the effect as such, but the existence of the effect in the cause prior to its production. The verse nine of the *Sāṁkhyakārikā* runs thus "the effect exists (even prior to the operation of the cause) since what is non-existent cannot be brought into existence by the operation of the cause; sincet here is recourse of the appropriate material cause, since there is no production of all by all, since the potent cause effects only that of which it is capable and since the effect is non-different from the cause."[1]

The first argument states precisely that the non-existent can never be brought into existence. Blue can never be turned into yellow even by the combined efforts of a thousand artists. It is also a matter of our daily experience that one who wishes to produce a particular effect, seeks the appropriate material cause. For example, if any body intends to produce butter he chooses milk as its *upādāna karaṇa* and not water. Again, if the effect were non-existent in the cause prior to its production then anything could come out of anything which really does not happen in this world. Moreover, a cause can produce that effect only for which it possesses potency and power. Milk produces curd, because it is capable of producing that particular effect. Lastly, the relation between the cause and the effect is a relation of identity in difference and not of mere difference without identity. Thus the cloth does not differ essentially from the threads—its cause. They are different in form but identical in essence. So, the relation between the two is spoken of here as the relation of identity in difference. The effect emerges from the energy of the cause and is, therefore, of the same substance. Having taken into account all these points, regarding the relation of cause and effect, the Sāṁkhya-school holds that the effect is pre-existent in the cause. Before actual production, the effect exists in the *guṇa* collocation in the form of potential energy, on account of certain obstacles which prevent its actualisation; but as soon as the barriers are removed, the energy gets a free passage and produces the necessary transformation known as the effect. Thus, conservation and transformation of matter and energy from one form to another

[1]Kārika 9.

seems to be the basis of the Sāṁkhya theory of causation. The effect is only the cause transformed and modified in a new fashion. Like causes always produce like effects, leaving no place for miracle and supernatural forces. The Sāṁkhya theory of causation has, in this respect, some similarity with the Aristotelian view of causation, as Aristotle also used to believe in the maxim: "Something can never come out of nothing." Causation is nothing but transition from the potential being to the actual being. Hegel, too, has defined causation as a passage from the implicit. to the explicit. Cause and effect are, indeed, the potential and the actual forms of the same matter and energy.

Vācaspati Miśra has given some arguments to prove the *tādātmya* relation between the cause and the effect. Cloth is not different from the threads because there is neither conjunction nor separation between them. Both conjunction and separation are found to take place in objects which are different from one another. There is conjunction between the well and the bucket and there is also separation between the Himalaya and the Vindhya. In the case of cloth and thread, there is neither conjunction nor separation. There is only *tādātmya* between the two.

Further, the cloth does not contain in itself anything which makes its weight different from that of the bundle of threads. An object differing in essence from another always possesses a different weight. Cloth is not, therefore, different from the threads.

Now, since the cause and the effect are the undeveloped and the developed states of one and the same substance, all production is development and all destruction is disappearance into the cause. There is no such thing as utter destruction or annihilation.

But when we say that the effect exists in the cause before its creation, we must not suppose that it exists as such in the *upādāna* or the material from which it will be subsequently derived. It pre-exists in the cause only in the form of power or *śakti* and not in the form of full-fledged effect. Therefore, the effect, in its potential form or causal form, cannot serve the same purpose that can be served by it in its actual form. When the existing force, that obstructs the manifestation, is removed, the conserved power or energy receives a natural flow and appears in a new shape and new form (i.e. the effect).

Now, in an act of production, we generally make a distinction between the efficient cause and the material cause. While the material cause enters into the effect, the efficient cause exercises influences from outside for the removal of the impediments. Milk is the material cause of the butter and the churning machine that removes all obstacles barring the manifestation of the said effect, is the efficient cause. There are some barriers, however, which cannot be removed in the ordinary manner and these act as the regulating forces for directing the course of the evolutionary flow through the definite channels. These are space, time, form and causality. We cannot expect a human baby to be born of a cow simply because of the resistance offered by 'form' against such manifestation. If these "*niyāmakas*" (regulating forces) were not in operation, then the current of evolution could flow in any and every direction.

This theory of causation, offered by the Sāṁkhya-school, is termed as *Satkāryavāda* and *pariṇāmavāda* as it states that the effect pre-exists in the cause. *Pariṇāmavāda* is that form of *satkāryavāda* according to which the cause and the effect belong to the same level of reality (samasattāka). Oil pre-exists in the oilseeds before production and it is also an actual transformation of its causal form. This law of causation is at the root of the Sāṁkhya conception of evolution.

Creation (sṛṣṭi) is nothing but the process of transforming the implicit in to the explicit form. Ahaṁkara remains in an implicit form in the *mahat* and the *mahat* in *Prakṛti*. When the barriers are removed, and the *guṇas* are thrown out of balance, *Prakṛti* changes into the form of the great principle, the great principle in the *ahaṃkāra* and so on and so forth.

The three *guṇas* are capable of producing unlimited diversities by means of their unequal aggregations. The respective proportions of the three *guṇas* in a particular combination is, however, determined by merits and demerits (accumulated as effects of the past deeds of the individual souls.) If the merits of an individual soul become very powerful, then the constituent elements of his mind-body system begin to change in quantity. Such a change is brought about by the removal of the obstacle in the form of *adharma* or demerit. When merit and demerit remain equally powerful, the individual soul is encased in a human body; but when merit becomes more powerful than the demerit, then the three *guṇas*, constituting the body-mind system of an individual soul change in such a manner that the individual comes to have a divine body (*devaśarīra*). Thus, it is clear that *Prakṛti* possesses power to produce immense diversities. Diversities

are implicit in *prakṛti* which is *anekātmikā* in character. But since creation is regulated by *dharma* and *adharma* which are also the disposition of *prakṛti*, all diversities are not always manifested everywhere.

Now, although this law of causation reveals to us a continuous process of becoming, yet at the very root of it, something eternal is clearly admitted: and this eternal principle, though essentially mutative, is still the underlying support of all changes and mutations. Becoming is the becoming of some dynamic force and so the changes here are not hanging in the air or nothingness. Change is merely the change of form and not the production of something new. The Sāṁkhya theory of causation is, thus, different from the Nyaya-vaiśeṣika theory of *asatkāryavādā* according to which the effect is a new creation. It does not pre-exist in the cause prior to its production.

This is because according to the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika if the effect is existent (in the effect form) in its cause before production, the *Karaka vyāpara*, becomes absolutely useless. Further, if the followers of the Saṁkhya-school say that the jar which is the effect does not pre-exist in the cause in the jar-form but in the form of the lump of clay, then also there is no sense in saying that the Jar exists in its cause prior to its production; because there is then nothing but the lump of clay. It is only by the operation of the causal factors that the jar comes into being afterwards.

To say that the effect, first of all, exists in the form of energy and is manifested afterwards by *Kāraka vyāpāra* is also not proper.

What is the meaning of manifestation? Does it mean that the effect comes into existence in the form of the effect, or in the form of samsthāna (arrangement of parts) or in the form of *Pratīti* or awareness?

If by manifestation, one has to adhere to the meaning of the first alternative, then he has to admit that what was non-existent before has, now, become existent. This is nothing but the theory of *asatkārya*. If the Saṁkhya-school still says that the *jar* existed before production, then the causal operation becomes meaningless.

If any body interprets the word manifestation in the sense of the second alternative, then it means nothing but avayava sanniveśa. The Nyāya-school believes in *avayavas* and in the *paramāṇus*.

Pratīti or awareness cannot be the sense of 'manifestation' because the causal operation that produces *pratīti* is performed by the sense-

organs whereas the causal operation that produces manifestation of the *jar* is performed by the stick, wheel etc.

Moreover, when the *jar* is destroyed there is the non-existence of the *jar* in the potter's wheel. Hence the principle "*Nāsato Vidyate bhāvo, nā bhāvo Vidyatesataḥ*" is not acceptable.

Even if we admit the prior existence of the *jar* in the lump of clay in the form of energy, then also there will be difficulty. The question will arise : what is energy or power ? If this power is different from the nature of the *jar* (*ghata svarūpa*) then we shall have to admit that the *jar* can not exist in a form which is other than its real nature.

If the power is the same as the form of the *jar*, then also the Jar cannot exist in the lump of clay prior to its production because nobody perceives the Jar in the clay before it is produced.

Power or śakti really means (i) being possessed of suitability
(ii) being of the form of cause
(iii) being in proximity of the assisting factors.

Power is also of two forms :

Avasthita śakti and *āgantuka śakti.*

That which exists only in the cause is to be called *avasthita śakti.* That which exists in the assisting factors is to be called āgantuka *śakti.* The effect is the result of the combined action of both the powers. The effect itself cannot be called power because in that case the effect will be produced from the effect. One jar cannot be produced from another Jar.

Suitability or fitness constitutes the form of the lump of clay (i.e. the cause) and so in the empirical world we behold the operation of the upādāna *kāraṇa* niyama due to which a particular kind of effect can be produced only from a particular kind of cause. There is no need for admitting the theory of satkārya.*

Now, if we consider carefully the philosophical positions of the Sāṁkhya and the Nyāya School, we shall be able to find out logical grounds for these different theories of causation advocated by them.

Both Sāṁkhya and the Nyāya believe in the real transformation of the cause into the form of the effect and according to both the schools, the cause and the effect belong to the same level of reality. The effect is as real as the cause. The Sāṁkhya, however, believes avasthā *pariṇamā* whereas the *Naiyāyikas* believe in *dravyapariṇāma*. Accord-

**Nyāyamañjarī.*

ing to the Sāṁkhya, the causal substance is one and the effects are the so many states of one and the same substance rising and dying out continuously through the operation of the efficient causes and the regulating forces (*niyāmaka*). There is *tādatmya* between the states and the possessor of the states. The states or the avasthās can, therefore, exist in the causal substance in the form of potency before actual production. The *Naiyāyikas*, on the other hand, admit both cause and the effect as substances which are different and distinct from one another. Hence, one substance cannot exist in another substance prior to its production.

Objections met

If we reflect carefully upon the objections raised by the author of *Nyāyamañjarī*, we find that they are not really very serious.

The *Naiyāyikas* have admitted the existence of '*avasthita śakti*' in the *upādāna kāraṇa*. The *avasthita śakti* has been described as *kārya śakti* by the Sāṁkhya-school. According to Sāṁkhya, *āgantuka śakti* of the *Naiyāyikas* simply removes the obstacles or *pratibandhakas* due to the presence of which the effect remains non-manifested.

The *Naiyāyikas* have not felt the necessity for admitting the existence of power or energy in the material cause to preserve *upādāna-niyama;* but they have admitted the existence of something like *yogyatā*, *avasthita śakti* or *prāgabhāva* to uphold the existence of *upādāna-niyama* in the empirical world. So, they have to admit that there is something in the *upādāna* due to the presence of which a particular material cause is capable of producing only a particular kind of effects. The difference of opinion arises only in regard to the nature of this 'something.'

The author of the *Nyāyamañjarī* has raised questions in regard to the presence of *kārya śakti* in the causal substance. Similar alternative questions can be raised regarding the *avasthita śakti* of the *Naiyāyikas* also. We can raise such questions: Is *avasthita śakti* of the form of the effect? or, is it of the form of the cause? The defects pointed out by the *Nyāya* in regard to the *kāryaśakti* of the Sāṁkhya will, then, creep into their own theory of causation.

The *Naiyayikas* make a distinction between the *Samavāyī* and the *asamavāyī* cause. Such a distinction is not necessary in the Sāṁkhya philosophy because both are covered by the *upādān kāraṇaa*. (This is because Sāṁkhya does not admit any distinction between *guṇa* and

guṇī). Now, the differentiating characteristic which the *Naiyāyikas* will make use of to distinguish the *samavāyī kāraṇa* from the *asamavāyī karāṇa*, will be accepted as the *kārya śakti* of the *upādāna* by the Sāṁkhya school.

According to the Nyāya school, the relation of *samavāya* is needed for the *samavāyī kāraṇa*. The relation of *samavāya* is a relation of inseparableness (*ayuta-siddha*). *Ayutasiddhatva* means that the effect is not found in any other substratum save the appropriate *samavāyī kāraṇa*. Now, the specific characteristic (*viśeṣatā*) which will be needed to describe this *ayuta-siddha* nature of the relation of *samavāya* between the cause and the effect, will be accepted as *upādāna śakti* by the followers of the Sāṁkhya school.

While the Sāṁkhya has made use of the *tādātmya* relation, the Nyāya has admitted the relation of *samavāya* between the cause and the effect. *Tāḍātmya*, in the Nyāya, means '*sarvathā abheda*' but not so in the Sāṁkhya. Nor is the Sāṁkhya conception of *tādātmya* (*Prakṛti savarūpaṁ virupam ca*) identical with the Nyaya conception of the relation of Samavāya. While holding a discussion on the Sāṁkhya and the Nyāya view of causation, we should remember the difference that exists between the Nyāya conception and the Sāṁkhya conception in respect of *tādātmya* samavāya etc. If the words are interpreted in the senses in which they are actually used in different systems, then much of fighting and controversy over the issue of causality will surely disappear.

Objections, raised by Venkatanath

Venkatanath too, has criticised the Sāṁkhya view that the cause is that wherein the effect already exists in an unmanifested form. In the opinion of Venkatanath, causation is production. It is not the manifestation of what is already existent in an implicit form.

Production and manifestation are two different words having different meanings. Production always implies origination of a single effect by the whole of a *karaka*, whereas in the case of manifestation, the manifesting agent can reveal many things existing in the same place and perceivable by the same sense with the help of other existing factors. (*Tattvamuktā kalapa*) A lamp, for example, can manifest many other things besides a *Jar*. If the Sāṁkhya says that the manifestation of a specific object can be effected only by a special manifesting agent with regard to a particular sense-organ and at a parti-

cular place where the manifesting agent exists, then this also is not tenable; because the Sāṁkhya has to prove, first, that only the potential energy is manifested in the form of the effect and that no new thing is thereby produced.

The supporters of the Sāṁkhya view may urge that instances available in our daily life invariably prove that causation means manifestation of what is latent in the cause. The lump of clay can manifest a Jar simply because the Jar is an implicit state in the causal stuff. There is no instance in which a non-existent thing comes into being as a result of the causal operation. Venkatanath, however, says that this contention of the Sāṁkhya school is true only in respect of the absolutely non-existent object. It is only a sky flower that can never be brought into being by the operation of the causal agent. No effect, produced from a cause, is non-existent in this absolute sense. An effect becomes existent or non-existent only in relation to time. None can dispute the fact that the pre-existence of the effect in the cause takes away from the causal operation all its importance and necessity for existence. Moreover, if a thing is *prāksat*, it cannot at the same time be *kriyamāṇ*.

The Sāṁkhya view of the *satkāryavāda* contradicts our perceptual experience. Had the effect been already existent in the cause, we could have perceived it. But the effect is perceived only when it is produced. The cause is really the unconditional and invariable antecedent of the effect and this definition is quite competent to explain the production of an effect which was previously non-existent in the cause.

Again, according to *Sāṁkhya*, the relation of constant compresence (nityaprāpti) implies that there is the relation of upādāna and upādeya between the cause and the effect. This argument too, is not sound. There is *nityaprāpti* between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* but there is no *upādāna-upādeyā* relation between them. The follower of the Sāṁkhya philosophy may say that it is not nityāprāpti alone that proves causation: this nityaprāpti ought to be a case of *ubhayaprāpti* as well. This will not save Sāṁkhya because in the *Sāṁkhyakārikā*, the union of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* has been compared with that of a blind man and a lame man which is a case of ubhayaprāpti.

The Sāṁkhya describes the cause as the potential effect. This description, however, is applicable only to the material cause and not to the efficient cause and other assisting factors, although they, too, contribute a good deal towards the production of the effect. If the *Sāṁkhya* holds that the efficient cause too, possesses the potency of producing the effect, then the *Sāṁkhya* will have to admit that the world exists in a potential state in the *puruṣa* as well (which is absurd from the *Sāṁkhya* point of view).

The Sāṁkhya cannot hold that the *upādeya* is always different from the *upādāna* as this system has not stated clearly what should be the real function of the material cause. The effect cannot be regarded as a mere modification of the material cause (*tadvikāratva*) because in that case there will be perfect identity between the cause and the effect as the Sāṁkhya has not admitted any distinction between '*avasthāvān*' and '*avasthā*.' Again, *upādeyatva* of the *upādāna* cannot mean *tajjanyatvạ* (i.e. due to the operation of the material cause) because the effect will then be non-different from the efficient cause as well. *Upādeyatva* cannot be tatsambandhitva either; because if there is perfect identity between the cause and the effect, then there cannot be any question of relation as relation always relates two relata together.

The Sāṁkhya view that the relation of identity is to be inferred in all cases where relation of contact is non-existent, is also inadmissible. The relation of contact exists in those cases where both the terms denote substances. If one of the objects related is not a substance, then there cannot be any *saṁyoga*. The denial of *saṁyoga*, however, does not establish the existence of the relation of non-difference. The effect, which is not a different substance, is a state of the cause and as such is distinct from the cause. They are related together by the relation of *aprithaksiddhi*. There is neither *saṁyoga* nor *tadātmya*.

Objections met

The difference between the Sāṁkhya view and the view of Venkatanath arises because of the fact that the latter has used the word *sat* in a different sense. According to Venkatanath '*sat*' is that which exists at any time. If it is non-existent with reference to the present time, it may be existent in future. If it is existent in regard to the present moment, it may become non-existent in future. According to Sāṁkhya, however, a *sat* object must be eternally existent. It can only swing between potentiality and actuality, manifestation and non-manifestation. It can never be totally destroyed. Since the effect

is *sat*, it is always existent. Venkatanath, however, holds that the effect is a state of the cause. When this state is produced, it is existent in the cause, and when it is destroyed or is not produced, it is non-existent. Sāṁkhya has used the word *sat* to mean eternal existence involving no time reference, whereas Venkatanath seems to have used the word *sat* to mean existence in time only and not in the sense of eternity which is not punctuated by time. Hence, in his opinion, a causal substance can be described as (sadasadātmaka). It is *sadātmaka* in respect of that characteristic which exists in a specific time and *asadātmaka* in respect of its past and future states. Vijñanabhikṣu in his *Vijñānāmṛtabhāṣya*, has admitted the *sadasadātmaka* nature of the cause in the practical sphere. A causal substance is *sadātmaka* in respect of the existent state; but in respect of the past state which is no more and the future state which is yet to be, the causal substance is *asadātmaka*.

Further, the Sāṁkhya philosophy has concentrated its attention on the explication of the material cause; because its main task is to establish Prakṛti as the material cause of the whole world. Venkatanath, on the other hand, has given equal importance both to the material cause and the efficient cause and has considered them together under the conception of causation. He has described causation in such a manner as to include the efficient cause as well. The efficient cause works on the material stuff from outside only and the effect is not produced out of the potency of the material cause. The purpose of the Sāṁkhya is to prove that there is no production of an entirely new thing out of Prakṛti; there is just the manifestation of what is already potentially existing in Nature. So, the Sāṁkhya has not taken the trouble of including it into its definition of the material cause. All the arguments of the *Sāṁkhyakārika* have been directed to prove simply the truth that the material cause always possesses the potency of bringing into existence certain specific effects which are its own states.[1]

Non-causality of Puruṣa

The Sāṁkhya philosophy has never admitted causality of *puruṣa*. *Puruṣa* is neither the material cause nor the efficient cause of the

[1]A detailed discussion on the topic of Venkatanath's refutation of the Sāṁkhya conception of causation is to be found in my book ***A Critical Study of the Philosophy of Rāmānuja.***

world. The *upaniṣads* have emphatically declared that *puruṣa* is by nature immutable and non-attached (*asaṁga*). Admission of the non-causal nature of *puruṣa* alone will keep intact the unchangeability and non-attachment of the spiritual principle.

Further, in the opinion of the Sāṁkhya school, the cause can never be apariṇāmī. In order to produce the effect, the cause must either change its nature or it must exert active influence to bring about the effect. The cause will, therefore, cease to be immutable. The Nyāya-vaiśeṣika has ascribed efficient causality to God and in the opinion of this school, the efficient causality does not impair the immutable nature of God. This is because there is distinction and difference between power and the possessor of power according to the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika school. Efficient causality of God is, thus, real and not false. Rāmānuja school, too, has admitted the real causality of God who is both the efficient and material cause of the world: but God is not the changeable material cause. He is called *upādāna kāraṇa* because He is the substratum of the material cause. Śaṃkara, however, has not admitted causality as real. Perhaps, he realised, that it would not be possible for him to preserve the immutability of Brahman by such acceptance. This is because the *advaita vedānta* admits identity between the power and the possessor of power. Hence, God, in Śaṃkara's philosophy has made His appearance as the false creator of a false world. The fact that Śaṃkara has preserved the immutable nature of Brahman by denying all causality to it, may be viewed as an effect of the influence of the Sāṁkhya philosophy which was the first one in the fold of orthodox systems to declare that immutability and causality could not belong to one and the same tattva.

Chapter 3

Ethics

The Sāṁkhya Conception of Śubha and Aśubha (Good and Evil)

The most important feature of the Sāṁkhya ethics is its emphasis on moral considerations which, in its opinion, should spring from ontological necessity. It particularly lays stress on the fact that in our moral life we should be guided by the principle : 'Whatever is real is good or '*śubha*'. This means that the conception of *śubha* must be identified with metaphysical reality; otherwise, morality can never be of unquestionable authority. If moral consideration arises from social needs only, then morality becomes relative and conditional. Whatever is *śubha* or good for the society now may not be so for it after a hundred years. Moreover, duties arising from social needs are of empirical import only, and are therefore helpful only in social relations.

According to the Sāṁkhya, *apavarga* or liberation arising from discriminative knowledge of Puruṣa and Prakṛti (seemingly unified through ignorance) is the real good or *śubha*. It is this *apavarga* that is to be aimed at by man as the *summum bonum* of this life. *Aśubha* or evil is thus anything that keeps a man away from the path of liberation. Both good and evil are metaphysical in the sense that they are the offshoots of Prakṛti, the metaphysically real material cause of the whole universe.

According to the Sāṁkhya, experience is the joint effect of two subtle principles. If we wish to find out which of these two is responsible for the threefold miseries of life, we shall have to analyse experience thoroughly to detect the subtle principles lying at the root. These subtle principles should, therefore, be discriminated through analysis: and this discrimination will enable the experiencer to understand his own contribution to experience and also his own essential nature, as a result of which he will be able to differentiate himself (as the experiencer) from his experience as well as from the object. This discrimination, effected through analysis, is therefore *śubha*, since it enables the individual to dissociate himself from

foreign elements which are by nature painful. In fact, this process of analysis, by means of which the subtle root principles and their essential natures and characteristic effects become manifested, has been deemed essential in all the philosophical systems of India. The Advaita Vedānta analyses human experience and declares that the changeable causal principle involved in experience is false and, from the transcendental point of view, non-existent or *tuccha*. The Sāṁkhya, however, analyses experience and finds out that the two fundamental principles lying at the root of the world-experience are real and are also of value in their respective spheres. Both can therefore be given due recognition without doing violence to the Vedic tradition. Analysis of experience, thus, becomes a moral obligation in the empirical life of every individual soul. *Aviveka*, which is the creative force of Prakṛti, is both epistemological and moral. It is the ignorance both of the true and the good. In the sphere of knowledge, *aviveka* implies ignorance of the true, whereas in the realm of morality it is nothing but ignorance of the good. Both good and evil are the necessary outcome of evolution of Nature on the psychical plane, because *buddhi* possesses knowledge and ignorance, detachment and attachment, virtue and vice, lordly powers and absence of lordly powers, as its inherent disposition. Hence, in the *Yogasūtra* bhāṣya (I. 12), it has been remarked : '*Vahati kalyāṇāya vahati pāpāya ca*'—(The stream of mind flows towards good and flows towards evil.) Truly speaking Prākṛtic evolution is a struggle against and a conquest of error in the sphere of knowledge and of evil in the sphere of morality. Worldly life of man is thus a life of constant struggle against error and evil so as to be able to reach the realm of truth and good. The bound life is a life in which *sattva-guṇa* remains in a subdued state, with the result that all moral disorders and disabilities which are *aśubha* or evil raise their heads and offer resistance in the path of spiritual progress. Moral life is the life in which all these disabilities are gradually subjugated by the ever increasing influence of the *sattva-guṇa*. Since *sattva-guṇa*, which is of the nature of illumination, is more akin to spirit, purification of the *sattva-guṇa* results automatically in the realization of the *Ātma-svarūpa*. The bound souls are therefore striving ceaselessly to reach the highest goal of Self-realization, which is the culminating point of the evolutionary flow of *Prakṛti*.

The true nature of the soul can be realized through *adhyātma-yoga*.

It is through yogic discipline alone that the *buddhi* becomes *sāttvika* in nature, and the *sāttvika buddhi* is the only mirror that reveals the true form of Ātman. One has therefore to go beyond *Prakṛti* with the help of *Prakṛti.* When moral disorders and disabilities arise in the intellect of an individual, he remains closely tight to *Prakṛti* and takes pleasure only in worldly enjoyments. These disabilities, however, do not constitute the sole fate of a bound individual. In and through his various births in various wombs, he enjoys *Prakṛti* to his heart's content. Gradually, he realizes that *Prakṛti* is of inferior value in comparison with *Puruṣa.* This is the stage of the emergence of the *sāttvika buddhi.* Liberation is just one step beyond. Since both bondage and liberation are brought about by *Prakṛti,* the author of the *Sāṁkhyakārika* (62) has declared emphatically :

Tasmān na badhyate'ddhā na
mucyate nā'pi saṃsarati kaścit :
Saṃsarati badhyate mucyate ca
nānāśrayā Prakṛtiḥ—

'Of a certainty, therefore, not any spirit is bound or liberated, nor does any migrate ; it is primal Nature, abiding in manifold forms, that is bound, is liberated and migrates.'

Thus, according to the Sāṁkhya, the ethical life, which is real and not false, remains confined to the sphere of empirical existence, i.e. to the sphere of *Prakṛti,* where the tragic confusion between spirit and matter exists owing to error and evil. As soon as such errors and evils are removed by spiritual culture, which results in the subjugation of *rajas* and *tamas,* the *sāttvika buddhi* becomes luminous enough to reveal the true nature of the Self, which then shines forth as distinct and different from *buddhi.* These errors and evils (*aśubhas*) that cause hindrance to liberation are termed *viparyayas, aśaktis* and *tuṣtis,* whereas *siddhis,* which fall under the category of *śubha,* are described as effective means to liberation.

VIPARYAYAS

Viparyaya or erroneous knowledge is of five varieties. These are : *tamas, moha, mahāmoha, tāmisra,* and *andha-tāmisra, Tamas,* again, is of eight kinds ; *mahāmoha* is of ten kinds : and each of the remaining two, i.e. *tāmisra* and *andha tāmisra* is of eighteen kinds. *Tamas* refers to false knowledge, owing to which the individual soul identifies itself with one or another of the following *tattvas,* viz.

Prakṛti, mahattatva ahaṃkāra, and the five *tanmātras.* In Yoga Darśana, *tamas* appears in the form of *avidyā,* which causes confusion between spirit and matter. *Tamas,* thus, is not mere negation of knowledge of the Self, but a positive *abhedagrahaṇa* of two radically distinct things. Śaṃkara, too, has admitted the positive character of *avidyā,* and, in this respect, there seems to be some similarity between the *avidyā* of Śaṃkara and the *tamas* of the Sāṁkhya philosophy. Even then, the difference between the two is very prominent and pressing. *Avidyā* of Śaṃkara is positive and also not positive in nature (*bhāvābhāva-vilakṣaṇa*). It is positive in the sense that it is different from negation of knowledge. It is also not positive, because it is not an occurrence in the realm of reality. According to the Sāṁkhya, however, the *abhedagrahaṅa* or *ekamevadarśana* is positive both in the sense that it is different from *jñānābhāva* and in the sense that this *viparyaya* is a real offshoot of *Prakṛti,* occurring in a real world.

Further, *avidyā* in Śaṃkara Vedānta is the *a priori* root, whereas in the Sāṁkhya the root cause is *Prakṛti* and not *tamas* or *avidyā.* Intellect or *buddhi* emerges from *Prakṛti,* and it is from the intellect that *tamas* emerges and causes *ekamevadarśana* of *Puruṣa* and *buddhivṛtti.** In the opinion of the Sāṁkhya, non-discrimination (*aviveka*) of *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* is not a category different from *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* in the manner in which *avidyā* of the Advaita Vedānta is different from Brahman. Hence, the *mūla aviveka* of the Sāṁkhya school may be regarded either as negation of discrimination or as *vāsanā* of false knowledge (*mithyā-jñāna*).

Moha is of eight kinds, and is characterized by love for eight attainments such as *animā, laghimā,* etc. If an aspirant, after attaining *aṣṭasiddhis,* thinks that he has become a *siddha puruṣa* (a perfect soul), then he is said to suffer from *moha* or delusion. *Moha,* thus, corresponds to *asmitā,* of the Yoga philosophy. This *asmitā,* when it emerges in the intellect, brings about the downfall of the aspirant from the higher stage.

Mahāmoha stands for attachment to objects of sense. The objects of sense are five in number. Each object of enjoyment, again, may be either divine or human (*alaukika* or *laukika*). There are thus ten objects of enjoyment; consequently, *mahāmoha,* too, is of ten varieties. *Mahāmoha* corresponds to the affliction *rāga* of the Yoga

**Puruṣa* and *buddhivṛtti* are apprehended as one.

philosophy.

Tāmisra is of eighteen kinds corresponding to eighteen objects of enjoyment, namely, the five *tanmātras*, the five *mahābhūtas*, and the *aṣṭasiddhis* already mentioned. These objects of enjoyment are impermanent. If an individual is deprived of any one of them, he dislikes it and gives vent to his unwholesome feeling. This is *tāmisra*, or what in the Yoga philosophy is known as the affliction *dveṣa* of the mind.

Andha-tāmisra is also of eighteen varieties, and relates to the same objects as *tāmisra*. This particular *viparyaya* stands for the fear of being deprived of these eighteen objects of enjoyment by death or some external agencies. This corresponds to the affliction *abhiniveśa* of the Yoga philosophy.

Of these five, *tamas* or *avidyā* is the generator of the other four forms of *viparyayas*. It is due to *abhedagrhhaṇa** of spirit and matter resulting in the formation of what in the *Advaita Vedanta* is known as *cidacidgranthi*, that the delusive feeling of being a powerful ego who is out to enjoy the objects of sense arises in due course. Vācaspati Miśra has remarked thus in his *Tattvakaumudī*[1]: 'Egotism and the rest partake of the nature of error; though, as a matter of fact, they are the products of error.' In fact, one may raise an objection here by saying that from amidst that five *viparyayas* mentioned in the *Sāṁkhyakārikā*, we can compare *avidyā* alone to false knowledge since false knowledge means false identification in knowledge of two distinct and different principles. *Tamas* or *avidyā* is thus cognitive in nature, and it alone can be termed as *viparyaya*. Egotism or *asmitā* is more of the nature of feeling than of cognition, since it is identifiable with the feeling of vanity. Feeling of attachment, feeling of aversion, fear of loss by death or some internal power are affections and not cognitions. Why should these be described as *viparyayas* or illusions? To defend the Sāṁkhya, it can be said that, according to this school, *buddhi* is the principle that produces both cognition and feeling, as a result of which the feeling aspect of experience often remains indistinguishable from the cognitive aspect (*Sukha-duhkhānubhavo hi bhogaḥ, sa ca buddhau, buddhiśca puṛuṣarūpa iva iti—Sāṁkhyatattvakaumudī*, 37). The whole structure of the Sāṁkhya philosophy is based on the theory of the three *gunas*. The operational relation between the three *gunas* is such that an activity

*Apprehension as one.
[1]Translated by G. Jha

of *sattva* is always accompanied by a feeling of pleasure, the activity of *rajas* by a feeling of pain, and the activity of *tamas* by a feeling of dullness and delusion. So, knowledge resulting from the function of the *guṇas* is always of the form of pleasure, pain, or delusion, the form being determined by the nature of the object of knowledge. So, from the Sāṁkhya point of view, there is no logical or psychological mistake in including *moha, mahāmoha, tāmisra*, and *andhatāmisra* in the list of illusions or *viparyayas*. These are the feeling aspects of non-discriminative knowledge, caused by the *abhedagrahaṇa* of the *Puruṣa* and *buddhi*. *Avidyā* or *tamas* is truly the false knowledge (*viparyaya*); *moha* or *asmitā, mahāmoha* or *rāga*, etc. are the feelings arising from this false knowledge and, as such, they are regarded as products of *avidyā* by Vācaspati Miśra. As the Sāṁkhya recognizes *tādātmya* between the cause and the effect, which are the different states of the same causal substance, it can legitimately describe the products of false knowledge as false knowledge. It is for this reason that *avidyā* has been described as 'five-jointed by Vārṣagaṇya.

Organic Injuries (Indriya-vadha)

Now, *viparyayas* are not the only impediments which the aspirant has got to overcome in the path of his liberation. Man is endowed with eleven organs so that, by using these organs, he can know the world, can act on the world, and can churn out of the world the cream of happiness.

The external sense-organs are the channels through which information regarding external objects reaches the intellect, the main cognitive-affective-conative instrument of the individual soul. Hence, defects in the organs will cause failure of the intellect, which will automatically result in confused knowledge and perverted feeling and action. Such organic injuries are deafness, insensibility to touch, blindness, numbness of tongue, insensibility of the olfactory nerves, dumbness, paralysis of hands, lameness, impotency, intestinal paralysis, idiocy, etc., consequent on the failure of the several sense-organs. These are the eleven forms of disability. These disabilities affect intellect indirectly through the organs, but the intellect has its own disabilities also. These are seventeen in number (nine *atuṣṭis* and eight *asiddhis: 'Buddheh saptadaśavadhā, tuṣṭi-siddhānāṁ viparyayāt.*'

Nine Tuṣṭis and their Viparyayas

Acquisition of knowledge is not a very easy task. Even if one does not suffer theoretically from false knowledge or does not possess any kind of organic disability, he may suffer from sloth and indolence, owing to which he fails to proceed actively in search of further truth. By reading the Sāṁkhya philosophy, he understands that the spirit is different from nature, but he may be ill advised by his preceptor that realization of this discriminative knowledge comes as a matter of course. Being thus advised and being indolent by nature, the aspirant may think that since liberation is sure to come by natural process, there is no use making efforts. It is only a question of time or good luck or little spiritual practice. So he remains satisfied and does not make any further efforts for gaining spiritual realization. This type of intellectual indolence is manifested in four forms of *ādhyātmika tuṣṭi*, viz., *prakṛti*, *upādāna*, *kāla*, and *bhāgya*.

Tuṣṭi in the form of *prakṛti*: Prakṛti is sure to bring about liberation by her own efforts.

Atuṣṭi in the form of *Prakṛti*: Prakṛti is not capable of bringing about liberation.

Tuṣṭi in the form of *upādāna*: *Vairāgya* is a disposition of *buddhi*, and so, if one embraces *sannyāsa*, he is sure to gain liberation. So, there is no need for meditation etc.

Atuṣṭi in the form of reverse of *upādāna*: Intellectual purification by cultivation of *vairāgya* can never bring about liberation.

Tuṣṭi in the form of *kāla*: Even if one has recourse to the path of renunciation, he can attain *mokṣa* only when the time is ripe for it. There is no need for under-going the troubles of renunciation before time.

Atuṣṭi in the form of *akāla* : There is no time when the *buddhi* can bring about liberation.

Tuṣṭi in the form of *bhāgya* : This refers to the feeling of satisfaction that arises from the following: 'Discriminative wisdom proceeds neither from nature nor from any other means, nor does it depend solely upon time, but it comes only by luck.'

Atuṣṭi in the form of the reverse of *bhāgya* : Luck can never give us liberation.

Besides these internal *tuṣṭis*, there are five kinds of external *tuṣṭis*. These are based on the five objects of sense-enjoyment. "The external forms are five, arising from abstinence from sound, odour, etc.

These belong to those who practise *vairāgya*, but nevertheless regard nature, intellect, ego-sense, etc. as the spirit. These forms are called external, because they presuppose the existence of spirit without knowing what it is and appertain to what is not spirit. The objects of sense being five, the abstinence from these must also be fivefold. These five abstinences are due to the perception of defects in the process of sense-enjoyment, involving as it does the trouble of earning, saving, wasting, pleasures and killing."

To acquire wealth, one has to take recourse to some sort of service, and service is always a source of pain to the servant. Contentment that results from the abstinence from the objects of sense owing to consideration of the painful nature of work is called *pāra*.

If wealth is acquired, then also it brings with it further trouble of saving it from the hands of the thieves etc. *Tuṣṭi* owing to abstinence arising from the consideration of such troubles is called *supāra*.

Again, one may acquire wealth and keep it in safe custody. Then also there arises the fear of its being spent up. *Tuṣṭi* owing to abstinence arising from this consideration is called *pārāpāra*.

Further, when one becomes interested in sense objects, one's desires for pleasure increase ; the very possibility that these desires may not be satisfied brings about the abstinence that leads to the contentment called *anuttamāmbha*.

Lastly, there is the idea that there can be no enjoyment of things without the cruel process of killing animals. *Truṣṭi* owing to the abstinence arising from the realization of the cruelty of this process is called *uttamāmbha*.

Viparyayas of these *tuṣṭis*, in the form of abstinence from sense-enjoyment, will mean indulgence in sense-enjoyment without realizing the defects inherent in them.

The reverses of the nine forms of *tuṣṭi* mentioned are admitted by all as impediments to true knowledge. Vācaspati Miśra has, however, stated that these nine forms of *tuṣṭi*, too, are impediments to true knowledge. But J.N. Mukherjee, the learned author of the book entitled *Sāṁkhya or the Theory of Reality*,[1] has asserted boldly that *tuṣṭis* have been absolutely misinterpreted by Vācaspati Miśra.' '*Tuṣṭis* are not disabilities, but means to power.' The reason for his holding this view is the use of the word '*viparyayāt*' in the *Sāṁkhya-kārikā* (49). The last line of the said *kārikā* runs as follows :

[1] op. cit., p. 87.

Saptadaśavadhā buddher-viparyayāt tuṣṭi-siddhīnam.'

According to J.N. Mukherjee, the word '*viparyayāt*' is to be interpreted in relation to both *tuṣṭi* and *siddhi*, and so the meaning will be that the disabilities of the intellect will be caused by the reverses of both *tuṣṭi* and *siddhi*. Hence, in his opinion, *tuṣṭis* are powers and not disabilities born of indolence and sloth.

'*Tuṣṭi* is the sense of power born of the firm conviction that everything, the whole machinery of the universe, will submit to the demands of rational and moral meaning. Nature, conditions, opportunities, and even destiny will follow the determined Puruṣa like a tame dog.... Even error and evil are bound to provide nourishing conditions.'

I agree with J.N. Mukherjee in holding that *tuṣṭis* are helpful for liberation, but I differ from him in believing that they are helpful only up to a certain limit. Like virtue, *tuṣṭis*, which were *vṛttis* of the intellect, are also to be given up by an aspirant, if he seeks to reach the supra-intellectual stage. It is due to this fact that Vācaspati Miśra has described *tuṣṭis*, too, as impediments; no aspirant can reach the final luminous stage if he is not wholly free from these intellectual dispositions. These are, therefore, *pratibandhakas* like virtues. It is true that in the *Sāṁkhyakārikā*, *viparyayas* of *tuṣṭis* (i.e. *atuṣṭis*) are specially mentioned as *aśakti*. This is because *atuṣṭi* is not a negative term according to the Sāṁkhya. *Atuṣṭi* does not merely imply the absence of *tuṣṭi*. It is something positive and very harmful in nature. An *atuṣṭi* always hampers spiritual progress and never comes to any help of the aspirant. The *viparyaya* of the *prakṛti* form of *tuṣṭi* (i.e. Prakṛti as *moksadā*) is not merely the absence of knowledge regarding the power of Prakṛti to bring about liberation; but this is a definite knowledge of Prakṛti as *amoksadā* (i.e. Prakrti as incapable of bringing about liberation.) Hence, *atuṣṭis* are real *aśaktis*, as they always create difficulties and illusions which prevent a soul from undertaking any work favourable for liberation. *Tuṣṭis* are, however, inspiring to a certain extent. This is because *tuṣṭis* do not occur when the Jiva Puruṣa remains in a state of complete *aviveka*. It is only when one aspires for liberation and is told that liberation is attained on the realization of the distinction between Puruṣa and Prakṛti and that this realization comes to everyone in the natural course, that he can be satisfied. In other words, he will have that form of contentment which is known as *prakṛti*. In the same manner, the contentment in the forms of *upādāna*, *kāla*, *bhāgya*, etc.

will arise in the mind of the aspirant when he will not be properly advised. So, these *tuṣṭis* presuppose intellectual advancement to a certain extent, although their emergence is harmful for real progress. *Atuṣṭis* on the other hand, always imply intellectual backwardness and disability, which are as harmful as the defects in the organs. So, in the *Sāṁkhyakārikā* (49), *atuṣṭis* (or *viparyayas* of *tuṣṭis*) and *asiddhis* (or *viparyayas* of *siddhis*) are specially mentioned as *buddhi-badhā*, along with the injuries of the eleven organs :

Ekādaśendriyavadhā saha
buddhibādhairaśaktiruddiṣṭā;
Saptadaśavadhā buddher-viparyayāt
tuṣṭi-siddhīnām.

Tuṣṭis which are on a different plane are counted as *aśaktis*, but their *viparyayas* are included in the group of twenty-eight *aśaktis*, mentioned in the *Sāṁkhyakārikā* (49). *Viparyayas* of *siddhis*, too, are included in the list of *aśaktis* and *tuṣṭis* and *siddhi* are mentioned together as '*viparyayāt tuṣṭi-siddhīnām*'. *Siddhis* are always helpful for liberation, and since *tuṣṭis* are mentioned along with *siddhis*, one may be induced to think that *tuṣṭis* (like *siddhis*) are direct means to liberation and that they are to be adhered to till the end. It is with a view to removing such a false impression from the mind of the reader that Vācaspati Miśra has remarked that 'success (*siddhi*) is the most desired by all, and error, disability, and contentment are impediments to success'. *Sāṁkhyakārikā* (51) has also been understood by him as lending support to his previous view. The *Kārikā* says: The eight forms of success are : (1) reasoning; (2) oral instruction: (3) study; (4-6) threefold suppression of pain; (7) acquisition of friends: (8) and purity. 'The three before mentioned are checks to success.' The last line, 'the three before mentioned are checks to success', refers to 'error, disability, and contentment'. And these act as curbs on the various forms of success, because they retard their progress; the success being likened to so many elephants whose movement is curbed by the goad (*aṅkuśa*) and thus being opposed to 'success', the latter three are ever to be abandoned'. (*Tattvakaumudī*).

Svāmī Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha has expressed a similar view in his commentary on the *Sāṁkhyakārikā*: '*Āsāmupādeyatvaṁ viparyayāśakti-tuṣṭīnāṁ tu heyatvaṁ jñāpayiṣyannāha siddheḥ pūrvo'ṅkuśastrividha*

iti' etc.

The same view is found in the Gauḍapadabhāṣya of the *Sāṁkhya-kārikā*: '*Siddheḥ pūrvā yā viparyayāśaktituṣṭayasta eva siddherankuśa-stadbhedādeva trividhaḥ, yathā hasti gṛhitāṅkuśena vaśī bhavati evaṁ viparyayāśaktituṣṭibhirgṛhīto loko'jñānamāpnoti, tasmādetāḥ parityajya siddhiḥ sevyā, siddhestattvajñānamutpadyate tasmānmokṣa iti.*'[1]

Siddhis

Siddhis are eight in number. They are: (1) *ūha*; (2) *śabda*; (3) *adhyayana*; (4-6) conquest of the three *bandhas*; (7) *suhṛtprāpti*; and (8) *dāna*.

Adhyana: This consists in reading properly the philosophical texts with the help of the teacher. This is called *tāra*.

Śabda: This means receiving oral instructions from the teacher and also understanding fully the meaning of such instructions. This success is called *sutāra*.

Uha: This consists in establishing truth by removing all doubts and objections with regard to it. This success is called *tārātāra*.

Threefold suppression of pain: Three kinds of pain are to be suppressed. These three suppressions of pain are called *pramoda, muditā*, and *modamāna*.

Suhṛtprāpti: One should not only establish truth by the right process of reasoning, but should also discuss it with his fellow students with a view to winning their agreement. This success is called *ramyaka*.

Dāna: Vācaspati Miśra has interpreted *dāna* as purity. By purity is meant 'the process of placing discriminative wisdom on a clear basis, after having destroyed all doubts and mistaken notions minded with different kinds of cravings or desires. This purity is not obtainable without the refinement arising from a long, careful, and uninterrupted course of practice; hence, the word *dāna* (purity) includes (as a means to success) this practice also.' This is called *sadāmuditā*.

All the *siddhis* lead an aspirant to liberation, whereas reverses of these act as impediments.

[1]Error, disability and contentment, which have been mentioned before, are checks to success. Just as an elephant is kept under control with the help of the goad, in the same manner, a person, who is under the influence of error, disability and contentment, remains in ignorance. So in order to attain liberation he should try to avoid them.

Conclusion

In the empirical life, *buddhī* is the supreme *jaḍaprakāśa* that guides a man through all stresses and strains of life. It is the intellect that is producing both *jñānavṛtti* and *ajñānavṛtti*, *dhārmikavṛtti* and *adhārmikavṛtti*, in the mental sphere of an individual, as a result of which his life is becoming a constant struggle between knowledge and ignorance, virtue and vice, *sattva* and *tamas*. The seeds of bondage as well as of liberation are rooted in the intellect, and it is the duty of a bound soul to help the seed of liberation grow and bear fruits after rejecting the seed of bondage.

Hence comes the *karma-yoga* of the Sāṁkhya philosophy. The Sāṁkhya believes in the inviolable law of Karma that creates and sustains the empirical existence of man and his worldly affairs. Truly speaking, the law of Karma is a law of psycho-biological development of living beings; growth, development, and psychological progress of life in different spheres of existence are fully controlled and determined by this law. Our actions are the dynamic manifestations of our psychological dispositions and physical energy. The kind of action that a man chooses to perform is limited and determined by his own psychical make-up; character or personality of this life is the result of psychic dispositions of the previous life, and there is thus a continuous psychical inheritance. What a man thinks, feels, and wills is therefore of very great importance for himself as well as for the whole cosmos. It is by his own thoughts, feelings, and emotions that an individual determines his own nature, existence, and environment in this life as well as in the next. Man is liberated only when he attains discriminative knowledge and gets out of the sphere where the law of Karma operates. Purification of intellect or the psychical apparatus is therefore regarded in the Sāṁkhya as the most essential step towards attainment of peace and perfection.

Of course, to a casual observer it may appear that the classical Sāṁkhya is incapable of giving full satisfaction to the conative nature of man as, in the opinion of this school, the real doer of action is the unconscious intellect and not the inherently conscious Self. If the individual soul is not the real agent at least in the empirical life, he will never feel inspired to lead a good and active life; there is thus no scope for freedom of will, which is the basic problem of morality.

In reply to this, it may be pointed out that although the soul is

always *asaṁga*, still there is ample scope for free will and morality in the classical Sāṁkhya. It is true that cognition, conation, etc. are dispositions of *buddhi*, and never really belong to Puruṣa even in the empirical life. But these dispositions are not the dispositions of a purely unconscious *buddhi*; these dispositions arise in *buddhi* only when it is permeated with consciousness (i.e. only when the *buddhi* is intelligized). Moral life belongs to bound souls only. Now, owing to the emergence of *aśakti* in the form of *tamas* in the bound soul, the latter feels as if it is identical with the intelligized *buddhi* and that there are not two principles but one (*ekameva-darśana*). Consequently, the bound soul falsely regards *vṛttis* of *buddhi* in the forms of knowledge, desires, and action as its own. Liberation really means two things; (1) not to have the feeling of 'myness' in relation to all desires seeking materialization in the form of actions: (2) not to be ignorant of the real source of these desires. So long as the bound soul lives in the world of 'as if' (*iva*), he never feels that these desires are not his own desires. Moral discipline is necessary to make him realize what he has forgotten (i.e. to make him realize that the soul is *asaṁga* and that all desires belong to *buddhi*, which is distinct and different from that soul). Now, so long as the *jiva* does not realize that these desires are the modifications of the *buddhi*, he feels as if he is free in willing and acting according to his will. So he thinks himself responsible for his actions, makes a distinction between *śubha karma* and *aśubha karma*, and undergoes experiences of pleasures and pains resulting from actions falsely owned by him through ignorance. Moral responsibility does not require that individual soul must have freedom of will in the metaphysical or real sense. Even a false belief of freedom of will may inspire a human being to practise moral rules, since they do not know that their belief is false. The rope-snake causes fear in the mind of the perceiver, as a result of which the perceiver runs away from it. Moral responsibility is due to false identification of the soul and the intelligized *buddhi*, and it is because of this moral responsibility that there is scope for moral purification, that there is the enjoyment of pleasures and pains according to *karma*, that there are births and rebirths, and so on. Moral purification is necessary for removing false identification of the soul with the intelligized *buddhi*, and this can be done by leading an honest life and performing *niskāma karma*. That the soul can destroy desires and can perform disinterested

action is a fact of experience, and this removal of desires is possible, because these are foreign to the Self. The soul in its pure form is eternally free. Its freedom is unchecked. The soul is different from *buddhi*, and so it is devoid of *vṛttis* and desires. Hence, the question of freedom of will does not arise in the case of an emancipated soul. Freedom of will and moral practices are necessary as means to liberation. When liberation is attained, the means cease to have any significance.

According to Advaita Vedānta also desires belong to *buddhi* and not to consciousness. According to Nyāya, however, desires arise in the embodied soul; but there also, moral practice is necessary so long as there is *śarīrābhimāna*. This *śarīrābhimāna* is due to erroneous knowledge. According to Rāmānuja also, the freedom of will, which is the basis of morality, is *prākṛtika* (natural), and is therefore *heya* from the point of view of the soul. Thus, we can say that the freedom of will does not have any place in the metaphysical or transcendental sphere from the point of view of all orthodox systems of Indian philosophy. But it has a place in the empirical sphere as a means to the highest end in all the systems, including the Sāṁkhya.

Liberation

Our life, on earth constantly swings like a pendulum between pleasures and pains, happiness and misery. Even if it is possible for a man to shun all other pains and pleasures, it is impossible for him to resist decay and death. Of course, all men earnestly strive to remove every kind of misery and pain, but so long as we remain on the empirical level only, we cannot enjoy unmixed and pure pleasure or happiness. This is the most important truth regarding our life on earth. So, if a man is to rise above the level of sorrowful existence he must, first of all, realise that all worldly pleasures lead to sorrow and that no worldly means can remove forever the sufferings of this empirical life. The Sāṁkhya system has started with an analysis of three kinds of misery that generally destroy the pleasures of life. These are the adhyātmika pain, adhibhautika pain, and adhidaivika pain. The first kind is caused by the disorders of the mind-body system. It includes under it fever, anger, greed, fear etc. The second is produced by external agents like other men, beasts, natural force etc. The third kind is produced by supernatural causes e.g., the pains inflicted by ghost and demons etc.

All these evils of life cannot be removed forever either by science or by religious practices and other known means. The performance of sacrifices according to vedic rites, may remove pain for a short period but as these actions involve the sacrifices of animals, they must ultimately produce pain and no pleasures. But this sort of relief, too, is very short-lived, as there will be recurrence of such mental and physical ailments. The knowledge of science and performance of religious sacrifices, cannot, therefore, lead to the final annihilation of sufferings and pains, though these ordinary means have a limited value in making life at least tolerably happy on this earth. Hence, the question arises, "how are we to attain absolute freedom from all pain and suffering?" The Sāṁkhya says that all our misery is due to ignorance. *Buddhi* and *puruṣa* are distinct and different, but through ignorance a seeming unity between the two is wrongly established (*ekamevadarśanam*) as a result of which sorrows and sufferings, pain and misery which really belong to *buddhi*, seem to follow *puruṣa* from birth to birth. It is necessary, therefore, that through tattvābhyāsa, we should form in *buddhi*, the true conception of the nature of *puruṣa* and then with the help of this saving knowledge, we shall be able to attain liberation from the sorrows and sufferings of this world.

Change is in *Prakṛti* alone and it is the body that grows old and dies. The spirit is ever free but through misconception, bondage and liberation are attributed to the self. When the self is conceived of as bound and fettered, it experiences all the sorrows and joys that really happen to its case, i.e. the body. When discriminative knowledge is attained through tattvābhyāsa, Nature ceases to evolve in regard to the aspirant, the seeming unity is destroyed and the self attains release which is the final goal of Nature's evolution. It is through a long course of spiritual training that the intellect becomes free from the soiling influences of rajas and tamas,[1] it becomes almost similar to the puruṣa in purity and transparence. In that purified condition of the buddhi, is reflected the true nature of the spiritual principle and so the '*buddhi*' feels itself to be different from and unrelated to the pure and transcendental soul as a result of which ignorance of the jīva is totally destroyed. Under such circumstances, Nature turns its back on the liberated puruṣa and ceases its activity

[1]Rajas and Tamas cannot, however, be totally eliminated but their presence will be harmless for all practical purposes.

of binding such a self to this life of saṃsāra. It should, however, be remembered that with the attainment of release by a single puruṣa *prakṛti* does not cease to function. There are other *puruṣas* who are still to be liberated and Nature goes on working in her own way for the release of those bound souls. The released *puruṣa* too perceives prakṛti, but is no longer deluded by her powers of creation. In that state of release, both the principles exist: What has been brought to an end is the delusion under which puruṣa thought that the evolutes of nature were its own creation and therefore identical with itself.

Now, the question arises, how is this beginningless delusion to be removed? Or how is tattvābhyāsa resulting in liberation, to be done? The tattvābhyasa, prescribed for liberation embraces *yogaprakriyā* which has been fully discussed in the *Yogasūtra* of Patañjali.

In the initial stage, the study of the Sāṁkhya philosophy will provide the aspirant with parokṣa jñāna (Mediate knowledge) of the distinction between puruṣa and Prakṛti. The aspirant will receive instructions on the Sāṁkhya state from the preceptor. This is the stage of *śravaṇa*. Next stage is the stage of *manana*. This is the stage of rational reflection. The aspirant will reflect on the truths learnt from the Sāṁkhya sūtra rationally; he will drive out all possible objections that can be raised against the Sāṁkhya by reasoning and arguments (*yukti* & *tarka*) with the result that the truths (gained from the Sāṁkhya philosophy) will become firmly rooted in his mind. This is the stage when the aspirant develops a firm faith and respect (*śraddhā*) for *ātma sākṣātkāra*. This *śraddhā* automatically results in *virya* or eagerness and mental capacity to undertake the difficult task of self-realisation. The *vīrya*, in its turn, increases dhyānaśakti or the power of meditation. The aspirant, then, becomes fit for attaining the stage of *samādhi* which is the stage of pure knowledge and self-realisation.

Hence, after the stage of *manana* the aspirant enters into the stage of *nididhyāsana* or the stage of actual yogic practice which in due course, results in immediate knowledge of *ātmasvarūpa*.

The eight limbs of the yogic process are to be followed strictly and in order: of course, *yama* and *niyama* are to be practised (in a sense) even in the initial stage to become the *adhikārī* for *tattvajñāna*. This is because a man, with a pure intellect alone, is capable of grasping the true significance of the scriptural truth. Before coming to the preceptor, the aspirant should have a broad general training in

ethical disciplines—a training which is absolutely necessary to develop human character; otherwise there cannot be much hope of success in the stages of spiritual life. But when the aspirant follows the path of *aṣṭānga yoga*, the ethical disciplines prescribed for yogic *sādhanā* and devotional practices are to be performed rigidly and with concentrated attention.

When the aspirant will rise upto the mental level of one pointed attention and will be able to remain there steadily for a long period of time, he will become the fit person to attain *samādhi* with the help of attention and contemplation (*Dhyāna, dhāranā*). The *samādhi* that takes place in the *ekāgrabhumi* of the *citta* is called *samprajñāta samādhi* which again, involves four stages. These four stages are known as four forms of concrete communion (*saṃprajñāta samādhi*).

In the first stage, there is the perception of gross substances and also of the distinction between consciousness and the gross substances of the world. Consciousness, no doubt, will be still *viṣaya* of the *cittavṛtti* (since caitanya will be reflected in the vṛtti of the gross object): even then, consciousness will be perceived as something different from the gross substance. When an individual remains in the *aviveki* stage, he can perceive neither the pure consciousness, nor the gross object in its pure form. He, then, perceives both consciousness and gross matter in a mixed form. So long as the *citta* does not become steady, consciousness in its pure form cannot be perceived. Such perception, therefore, occurs only in the stage of yoga. By repeated performance of the triad of attention, contemplation and meditation, this spiritual progress will become steady and firmly rooted in the personality of the aspirant and he will be able to perceive the difference that exists between consciousness and the gross matter. This stage is known as *savitarka* stage in the yoga philosophy.

The next stage of spiritual progress is the stage of *savicāra* when by practising the triad of attention, concentration and meditation, the aspirant will be able to perceive the difference of consciousness from all subtle things of the world. Here, we should remember that if anybody follows the path of yoga without possessing *tattvajñāna*[1] he will not be able to have a perception either of the *mahābhūtas* or of the *tanmātras, indriyas* etc. in their pure form. Consciousness too,

[1]i.e. the parokṣa *jñāna* of the difference between *Jaḍa* and *Caitanya* is not properly attained by the aspirant.

will be perceived by him not in its pure form but in a state of indistinguishable union (*avivikta* state) with the subtle parts of *Prakṛti*. This is what happens to *videhalayī* and *Prakrtilayī yogins* who still suffer from *aviveka*. Such a *samādhi* which has ignorance at its root is known as *bhavapratyaya*. But the aspirant, who has got his *viveka-jñāna* firmly rooted in him, by *śravana, manana* etc. and has also been able to perceive the distinction between *caitanya* and the gross matter of the world is, now, in a position to perceive the *śuddha svarūpa* (pure form) of the subtle substances of the world and also of the true form of consciousness. Although he will be able to perceive *indriyas* in this stage, still his egosense or *ahaṁvṛtti* will not be annihilated. *Ahaṃvṛtti* which lies at the very root of our practical life and without which dealings in the practical sphere, cannot be carried on, is very firmly rooted in us. Removal of egosense, therefore, needs strenuous spiritual *sādhanā*. This *ahaṃvṛtti nirodha* becomes the special *sādhanā* of the third and the fourth stages of *saṃprajñāta samādhi* which are known as *ānanda samādhi* and *asmitā samādhi*.

In the stage of *ānanda samādhi*, the object of meditation is purely *sāttvika ahaṃkāra*. Due to the application of *dhyāna, dhāranā* and *samādhi* to *svāttika ahaṃkāra, rajas* and *tamas* parts become practically ineffective, only the pure sattvāṁśa of ahaṃkāra remains operative. Sattva is of the nature of happiness or bliss. Hence, in the stage of *ānanda* (due to increasing activity of the *sattva guṇa*) the aspirant experiences a pleasurable feeling all the time. This happiness is pure happiness (unmixed with the effects of *rajas* and *tamas* which have become inoperative). Many aspirants become interested in the enjoyment of this unmixed happiness and prefer to remain in this stage. They do not make any more efforts to reach the highest stage of liberation. The happiness enjoyed in the ānanda stage is inferior to the bliss which forms the essence of consciousness. Since self-realisation is regarded as the highest and the best, the self must be admitted as the object of love and adoration. That which is very dear to us, is surely of the nature of *ānanda*. (*Yat paramānandarūpo na bhavati sa niratiśaya premaviṣayo na bhavati, Pañcadaśi*). Hence, to attain self-realisation, one has to go beyond the third stage of the *saṃprajñata samādhi*. He has to make concentrated efforts to rise up to the *asmitā* stage which is the final stage of the concrete union or *saṃprajñāta samādhi*. By the time the asmitā stage is reached, the egosense that individualises a jīva, comes to an end; its

cause however, (in the form of mahattattva permeated with consciousness,) does not cease to be. By applying the triad of attention, concentration and meditation, the aspirant is capable of having a perceptual knowledge of the pure *mahattattva* and also of its distinction from consciousness which is the *svarūpa* of the aspirant. This is the stage which cannot be properly described in words. In this stage also, there will be some *vṛttis* of the form of *jaḍa* (unconscious) along with the *caitanyavṛtti* but there will be no awareness of what this *jaḍaviṣaya* is. Just as in the cases of some of our dreams, we can simply remember that we have dreamt of something but what this something is, is beyond our recollection, in the same manner, in this stage also, there is only the manifestation of the *vṛtti*; the object of the vṛtti is not known. It is because the object or the *grāhya* is not manifested that there is no differentiation between *grahitā*, *grahaṇa* and *grāhya* even though the intelligised intellect in the form of *grahitā* and *vṛtti* in the form of *grahaṇa* are manifested. *Vṛtti* is no doubt manifested; even then we cannot describe it, because its object is not manifested. It appears as nirviṣayaka *vṛtti*. It is because such *vṛtti* is beyond the comprehension of human beings that the Nyaya-vaiseṣika and Rāmānuja have not admitted the existence of *nirviṣayaka jñāna*.

Asaṃprajñāta Samādhi

Saṃprajñāta Samādhi is not the final stage of the svarūpa avasthāna of the *puruṣa* because in this stage, there is still the manifestation of consciousness through vṛtti. Manifestation of conciousness without vṛtti is what is described as svarūpasthiti of the *puruṣa* in the *sūtra* "*Tadā draṣṭuḥ svarūpe avasthānam.*"

Hence the aspirant has to reach another stage of *yoga* which is known as *asaṃprajñāta* stage or the stage in which *puruṣa* is manifested without *vṛttis*. Such a manifestation of *puruṣa* is possible only when all vṛttis are stopped.

In the stage of *saṃprajñāta samādhi*, vṛtti annihilation starts and progresses step by step and finally it is completed in the *asaṃprajñāta* stage of *samādhi*. It is because all vṛttis are stopped in the *asaṃprajñāta* stage, that this stage is known as the stage of *vṛtti-nirodha*. Now, such a state, in which all *vṛttis* are stopped and consciousness is manifested without *vṛttis*, lasts (in the beginning) for a short duration. With the disappearance of all vṛttis, consciousness is

manifested in its pure form: *vivikta*[1] condition is attained and snare of *prakṛti* is totally removed. This is the stage of *jīvanmukti*. The *jīvanmukta* has risen upto the stage of *svarūpa avasthana* but this stage has not become firmly rooted as yet. Hence, the *jīvanmukta* will have to make efforts to attain this *svarūpa sthiti* permanently. *Vṛtti* should not rise (even for a moment) either spontaneously, or by efforts. This is the first stage of *asaṃprajñāta samādhi* or the stage of *jīvanmukti* according to Sāṁkhya-yoga. How long this stage will continue will depend upon *prārabdha karma*.

When the *asaṃprajñata* state or the *nirvṛttika* state will become steady and fixed, vṛttis will be stopped for ever. There will no more, be any *grahaṇa* and consequently the feeling of *grahitā*, *grahaṇa*, too, will come to end. *Citta* or *buddhi* in this stage, will stop functioning for ever and so it will start contracting which will ultimately result in the merging of the *citta* in its causal substance (i.e. the *gunas*). So long as *buddhi* persists in its *buddhi* form (although it may be contracted to a considerable extent), the *jīvanmukta* will continue to live in this world: because there will still be the vital function due to the existence of the *citta*. As soon as *citta* gets merged in the *guṇas*, the vital function too stops automatically and the yogi is separated forever from the body. This is the stage of *videhamukti* according to Sāṁkhya-yoga.

[1]Vivikta: Differentiated.

Chapter 4
Theology

MEANING OF SĀṂKHYA ATHEISM (NIRĪŚVARAVĀDA)

The classical Sāṁkhya represented by the *Sāṁkhyakārika, Sāṁkhya Sūtra* etc. is regarded as Nirīśvara Sāṁkhya and it is held that there is no place for devotion and worship of God in the classical Sāṁkhya.

It is, of course true, that the Sāṁkhya School has not admitted God as the efficient and material cause of the world as has been done in the advaita vedānta. Even then, it is not proper to say that there is no scope for devotion and worship of God in the classical Sāṁkhya. The term "*Nirīśvara*" really implies that according to classical Sāṁkhya, there is no other conscious principle, besides the *puruṣa*. This *puruṣa* has been described in the upaniṣads as asaṁga. So to keep this upaniṣadic conception unimpaired, the classical Sāṁkhya has not described *puruṣa* as the efficient and material cause of the world. (In the opinion of the Sāṁkhya school the cause is bound to be changeable in nature). Although *puruṣa* has not been described as the cause of the world, still *puruṣa* is absolutely necessary for creation in the sense that Prakṛti becomes vitalised and fit for evolution due to the sannidhi of *Puruṣa*. Hence, the function of the advaitic God is, here, done by the *Puruṣa*. According to advaita vedānta, creative urge does not belong to Brahman in its pure form. It is the māyopādhika Brahman that really palpitates with the creative urge. The creative desire is a *vṛtti* of *māyā*. The Sāṁkhya view, if understood properly, is not very different from the view of the advaita vedānta. According to Sāṁkhya, the creative desire may be supposed to arise in the cetanaviṣṭa *Prakṛti*.[1] Creation is the result of this creative urge. According to advaita *vedānta* also *māyā* is the real material cause of the world. It is because Saguṇa Brahman or God is the adhyakṣa[2] of *māyā* that He is said to participate in world-creation. The question, therefore arises, what is the meaning of this

[1]Prakṛti permeated with consciousness.
[2]Adhyakṣa: One who exercises supervision.

adhyakṣatā in the advaita vedānta.

Now, God, in the advaita vedānta, is consciousness, qualified or limited by samaṣṭi antaḥkaraṇa or *māyā*. Brahman, by accepting *māyā* or Samaṣṭi antaḥkaraṇa as a qualifying adjective (*Viśeṣaṇa*) appears as the creator, preserver and destroyer of the world. It is because *māyā* becomes a viśeṣaṇa or adjective of God that He is regarded as the adhyakṣa of *māyā*. Consciousness, qualified by samaṣṭi antaḥkaraṇa (samaṣṭi antaḥkaraṇa viśiṣṭa caitanya) is the creator God. When *māyā* becomes simply a limiting adjunct (upādhi) of consciousness, the latter, then, appears as Īśvara sākṣi and 'serves as the steady revealer and steady background of creator God. This is the position of the advaita vedānta in regard to God.

In the philosophy of Sāṁkhya, however, we find that consciousness of *puruṣa* reflects through samaṣṭi *buddhi* and thereby makes samaṣṭi buddhi its own avacchedaka. This consciousness can be compared with the Hiraṇyagarbha of the advaita vedānta. Hence, in the Sāṁkhya too, consciousness can be regarded as the adhyakṣa of the *buddhi tattva* or samaṣṭi *buddhi*. When this samaṣṭi buddhi serves simply as a limiting adjunct of *puruṣa* caitanya, then the latter assumes, simply, the form of sākṣi. According to Sāṁkhya, samaṣṭi buddhi or *mahattattva* possesses lordly powers (aiśvarya). Hence, there is no harm if *puruṣacaitanya*, which has samaṣṭi buddhi as its avacchedaka, is accorded the place of God of the advaita vedānta. By worshipping such a God, the aspirant may be the possessor of many puruṣārthas except mokṣa or liberation.

Truly speaking, the aspirant who follows the course of Sāṁkhya-*Sādhanā*, has to reach *samaṣṭi buddhi* by passing over *vyaṣṭi buddhi* (individual intellect). In the initial stage, he should realise that his consciousness, which is the revealer of his body, is different from the body. Next, he should realise that his consciousness is also different from his sense-organs and the mind. Even when this type of realisation dawns upon the aspirant, he still feels that his consciousness is non-different from his ego-sense (ahaṃvṛtti) and the intellect. Hence, in this stage, also the aspirant thinks of himself as an individual. When, by means of saṃprajñāta *samādhi*, this ego-sense disappears, then the aspirant feels his non-difference from the *Samaṣṭi buddhi*: just as the worshipper of God of the advaita vedānta realises his identity with all jīvas, as soon as his feeling of individuality and separateness disappears, in the same manner the aspirant, who

feels his non-difference from the *Samaṣṭi buddhi* only, experiences a sort of sāmyabhāva (sameness) with all things and beings of the world. God of the advaita vedānta is the yoni of the whole world: *mahattattva* of the Sāṁkhya too, is regarded as the seed of the whole world. After reaching the state of non-difference with *samaṣṭi buddhi*, the aspirant very easily passes on to the stage where he realises his distinction from the *samaṣṭi buddhi* and *prakṛti*. If *Māyopādhika caitanya* of the *advaita vedanta* can be the object of devotion and worship, then the samaṣṭi *buddhyavacchinna caitanya* of the Sāṁkhya too can inspire an aspirant with devotion and can very well serve as an object of his *upāsanā*.

It is true that Vācaspati Miśra in his commentary on the *Sāṁkhya-kārikā* no. 56. has refuted the existence of God. In the first and the 5th chapters of the Sāṁkhya pravacana sūtra, too, we meet with refutation of the existence of God. But all these refutations simply indicate that in the opinion of the Sāṁkhya school, there is no conscious adhyakṣa[1] of *prakṛti* excepting *puruṣa*. The arguments as stated in sūtras of the 1st chapter of the *Sāṁkhyapravacanabhāṣya*, run as follows :

(a) "On account of the non-proof of Īśvara."
(b) "As Īśvara can be neither free, nor bound, nor be anything of a different character, there is no proof of his existence."
(c) "If free from desires and attachment He cannot be the creator, and if bound, He must be as ignorant as we are. So, He cannot exist as the creator God."
(d) "The sacred texts, which speak of Īśvara are either glorifications of the free self or homages paid to one made perfect by yoga".

The above arguments may be summed up in the following manner.

God does not exist, for if He exists, he must be either bound or liberated. A bound spirit cannot be accepted as God because of his attachment with merit and demerit, nor can a freed soul be regarded as the creator God, as He would have no desire to act and create this manifold world. Hence, God cannot be admitted as the agent in the process of creation because of his liberated and non-attached nature. Nor can we say that God has undertaken the task of creating this universe disinterestedly for the good of his own creatures only.

[1]Supervisor.

The world is so full of sins and sufferings that it cannot be said to be the creation of a good God who works only for the benefit of his own offsprings.

The 5th chapter contains some tenets, which when interpreted, give us the following view :

God is supposed to create the world of pleasures and pains for all living beings in accordance with the law of karma. The wrong doers are punished with pain and suffering but the doers of good deeds are blessed with pleasures. If this is so, then let karma alone become the agent of the products of action: what need is there of a creator God?

Here, it is clear from these arguments that the Sāṁkhya school is not in favour of recognizing any conscious principle as the cause of the world because consciousness cannot remain immutable if causality is ascribed to it. When *puruṣa* is capable of vitalising *Samaṣṭi buddhi* by Sannidhi only then where is the need for admitting another conscious principle as the efficient and material cause of the world? *Puruṣa* cannot be regarded as cause because *puruṣa* is an immutable principle. The creative urge does not arise in pure puruṣa: This urge belongs to Samaṣṭi buddhi permeated with consciousness. Intelligised buddhi-tattva is actively and independently producing power in the form of aviveka. When the creative desire and also the creative activity belong to intelligised mahattattva, then there is no sense in describing puruṣa as the creator God. The word God stands for that conscious being who, of his own accord, becomes the material and the efficient cause of the world.

In the advaita vedānta too, it is a false Godhood (*Īśvaratva*) which has been ascribed to Brahman. The desire for creation and also the creative activity belong to *Māyā*, but these are superimposed on Brahma due to ajnāna. Brahman is regarded as world-cause only illusorily (vivarta kāraṇa). In other words, Brahman is cause in name only and not in actual fact. Of course, according to advaita vedānta, it is the mayopādhika Brahman who prossesses lordly powers. *Māyā*, in the form of potential creative power belongs to God: so, in the advaita vedānta, mayopādhika Brahman is regarded as the creator God. The Sāṁkhya school does not believe in vivarta vāda or the illusory modification of the cause in the form of the effect. In the opinion of the Sāṁkhya, causality and mutability cannot be separated even in thought. Hence, in the Sāṁkhya, lordly power, creative potentiality and creative activity etc. belong to intelligised Prakṛti.

In the act of creation, Prakṛti is the primary principle (*Pradhana*). Prakṛti is the world-cause and *puruṣa* is asaṃga in the strict sense of the term.

Thus from the above discussion, it becomes clear that Sāṁkhya too can claim to have a God in the form of intelligised mahattattva in a manner similar to that of the advaita vedānta where, too, Brahman by nature does not possess any aiśvarya. Just as there is scope for *Īśvara upāsana* in the advaita vedānta, in the same manner, there is scope for devotion and worship of God in the Sāṁkhya. By means of *upāsanā* the follower of the Sāṁkhya, too, will be able to enjoy the fruits prescribed by the scriptures.

In the case of avatāras like Ram, Krishna etc., there is no origination and destruction of consciousness: but these avatāras possess buddhis (*the upadhis*) which are endowed with highly developed moral excellences and extra-ordinary powers. It is because of their extra-ordinary *buddhiśakti*, that they are regarded as sarvajña. There is better scope for admission of such avatāras in the Sāṁkhya Philosophy, than in the advaita vedānta. In the advaita vedānta, consciousness is one. Distinction in the forms of Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Maheśvara is due to differences in the upādhis whereas in the Sāṁkhya Philosophy, which admits plurality of selves, there is difference not only in the upādhis but also in the jivapuṛusa or souls which become associated with the *upadhis*. These *avataras* are the objects of love and worship.

Appendix 1

The Problem of the Existence of God

Questions concerning the existence and reality of God are very significant from the point of view of human life. Those who believe in God, believe also that the ever-shining light of God is in every living being. The Divine Light or the Light Eternal is the central fact in human-life and all higher values which adorn the character of human beings, are believed to be the finite crystallization of Divine Goodness. God or Divinity is the source of the world and life and is also the protector and benefactor of the entire creation. Being Almighty and Eternal, God is supposed to be absolutely independent and uncaused.

Human beings are finite, frail, limited in power and dependent entirely on external conditions which are wholly beyond their control; because of their finitude and limitation they are incapable of fulfilling all aspirations of their minds in the material world. Their desires are often frustrated, their powers fail, their health is frequently affected by diseases, which finally destroy their material bodies which are so dear to them. These evils of life are sure to befall each and every human being and the thoughts of these evils always cast a gloom on the life of the average man. This utter helplessness in the midst of the various turmoils of the worldly-life leads him to think of a Supreme being not only as a source of the world but also as a merciful, loving and responsive Being who (Through mercy) comes into intimate personal contact with the needs and sorrows of all who love Him and pray to Him with humility and devotion.

The Utilitarian approach of the average man

The average man believes in the existence of God because God is, for him, the only power which can enrich his worldly-life with various kinds of enjoyable pleasures, after removing all obstacles that may crop up in the way of his enjoyment. His devotion to God is, thus, utilitarian. It is based on the worldly-relation of 'give and take.' He

offers prayer to God and wishes to receive through His agency, happiness and prosperity in his mundane life. It is because of this utilitarian character of his devotion to God that the average man is always found to swing like a pendulum between belief and disbelief in God. When he prays to God and gets what he asks for, he declares emphatically the reality of a Divine Personality. When he is baffled and is adversely affected by undesirable conditions of life, inspite of his repeated prayers to God, he becomes suspicious about the existence of a Divine all powerful Being; he does not even hesitate to declare that there is no God and no ruler of the world. So far as the average man is concerned, the existence and the non-existence of God is relative to the fulfilment and non-fulfilment of their worldly desires through prayers. If his prayer for worldly happiness bears fruits, God exists for him; if his prayer fails, God also fails to have any meaning for him.

Approach of philosophy and religion to the problem of God as found in the Western world

If we go through western philosophy and religion, we find that the western philosophers and theolo gians have approached the problem of God dispassionately on the basis of reason and faith. Faith also gives us certain knowledge and it is generated in us through the operation of the recognized sources of knowledge. Wavering faith is no faith. Faith inspires a man to speak with assurance of the existence of an abiding ideal; It gets very deeply rooted in human nature and is very intimately linked with the forward march of man in search of his desired goal. If a man has faith in the existence of Divinity, he is sure to open himself to the divine inflow so as to be able to become clean and good, expansive and spiritually advanced. Faith, indeed, is energy-giving' and creative. It acts as a force in the life of a man and leads him to his spiritual goal. A true believer cannot remain satisfied without discovering and knowing the object in which he has pinned his faith. Truly speaking, faith in Divinity is a faith in moral and spiritual values of life and one who believes in God, lives always in the light of these values in all spheres of his existence. He never approaches the problem of the existence of God from an utilitarian point of view. In fact, God is the key-note of the life of His true devotee who devotes all time and energy to have a direct relationship with Him. He wants God only and nothing else. He lives and moves and has his being in God. Such is the approach of a truly religious man to the problem of the existence of God. Theocentric religion has an inner tendency to become a value-centric religion because God is regarded as the source and ground of all moral and spiritual excellences. Religion involves not only a subject and an object but also an intimate relation between the two. This relation is an intimate personal relation of love and respect for a super-human being who is at once the Supreme value and the standard of all values. Although on the subjective side, the devotee is aroused more through feelings and emotions, still cognition and volition too are essential ingredients of religion. On the objective side, religion refers to a divine Being with whom the devotee seeks to have a living relation through worship, love and service.

While religion is mainly an emotional attitude towards God, Philosophy is essentially a cognitive approach to the problem of the Highest Reality. A Philosopher's approach to the problem of God is thus, based on reasoning and argumentation: his quest is a quest for truth and knowledge and his attitude is detached and objective. A number of theologians and philosophers of the western world have struggled hard to answer the question of the existence and reality of a Supra-personal Spiritual Being and the main arguments which they have offered reveal the variety of ways which have been devised in the west to answer this significant question of human-life and human aspirations.

Some arguments of the western philosophy and religion considered in brief

The arguments which are generally offered in the west to prove the existence of God are termed as (1) Cosmological, (2) Teleological, (3) Moral and (4) Ontological.

The aim of the cosmological argument is to reason from our actual experience of the world to an absolutely necessary cause of this experience. In our worldly experiences of various kinds, we find that the events which cause experiences are all conditioned events; one event produces another one along with its specific feeling tone. If we take all the events of the world under consideration or the world as whole, we are consequently forced to admit the existence of an uncaused supreme cause as the root of the world. The conditioned

world exists and it must be the effect of an absolutely necessary being as otherwise we shall have to move endlessly in the midst of a vortex of conditionality without finding any resting place. This, indeed, is an argument which refers to the transitory, non-substantial and everfleeting nature of the events of the world. We are not satisfied with the ever-changing and imperfect character of our empirical life as it always keeps us confined within the sphere of conditionality and uncertainty of the worldly events. We, therefore, believe that an eternal and all-sufficient Being must exist necessarily not only as the uniting thread of the various events of life and the universe but also as the ground and explanation of all facts and phenomena of the world. According to the teleological argument, on the other hand, the first cause is not only unconditioned, absolute and omnipotent, but it is also supremely intelligent. We find that things of the world are selected properly and combined beautifully to serve as means to some ends; we are, therefore, led to believe that the world is brought into being, sustained and regulated by an omniscient Being whose knowledge is perfect and infinite. A supreme mind is working behind this systematic universe in which lower ends are subordinated to higher ones and a process of continuous adjustment is going on. The moral argument on the other hand, asserts that the world is a moral order and that its purpose is essentially moral. This is so because the world has emanated from a supremely intelligent God who is essentially moral. God possesses not only infinite intellect and power but also goodness and moral perfection. It is because God is supremely good and absolutely moral that higher inspirations of a higher life move the hearts of human beings in different degrees in the enlightened moments of their empirical existence. Dr. Rash dall has said "An absolute Moral Law or moral ideal cannot exist in material things. And it does not exist in the midst of this or that individual. Only if we believe in the existence of a Mind for which the true moral ideal is absolutely in some sense real, a Mind which is the source of whatever is true in our moral judgement, can we rationally think of the moral idea as no less real than the world itself, only so can we believe in an absolute standard of right and wrong, which is independent of this or that man's actual ideas and actual desires as the facts of material nature. The belief in God, though not like the belief in a real and active self, a postulate of there being any such thing as Morality at all is the logical presupposition of an

'objective' or absolute Morality. A moral ideal can exist no where and no how but in a mind from which all Reality is derived. Our moral ideal can only claim objective validity in so far as it can rationally be regarded as the revelation of a moral ideal eternally existing in the mind of God.[1]

The cosmological argument seeks to prove the existence of God as the uncaused first cause of the world. It is the conditioned character of the worldly events that lead a thinking mind to believe in the existence of an uncaused Being as the source of the world; because an unconditioned being alone can produce a conditioned world. Further, the wonderful regularity and order of the phenomenal occurrences of the world impresses beyond measure the mind of a thinker and he realises through reasoning and argumentations that such an ordered world which maintains its equilibrium in a wonderful manner, can not be the creation of any material and unintelligent being. Hence, God is conceived by him as an intelligent law-giver who is guiding and controlling the events of life and the world in a harmonious and end-fulfilling manner (*i.e.*, in a teleological manner). Again, there are moral and spiritual values which human beings alone can be conscious of; 'value-awareness' is peculiar to human beings and the moral and spiritual values alone constitute the elixir of human-life. Man feels that he is guided in his activities by the ideal of goodness and this ideal seems to exert an authoritative influence on his life. This ideal of goodness cannot float in the air. It must have a conscious being as its support and that being is God. God is goodness. Moral excellences which constitute the golden strings of a human-life are the finite forms of the Divine Excellence finding expressions through earthly mediums.

There is another significant argument for proving the existence of God. This is called ontological argument. This is an argument that seeks to prove the existence of God from the very idea of God.

According to Descartes, we have the idea of God as the most perfect being and since this idea is a clear idea there must be a Supreme Being corresponding to it. A clear and distinct idea necessarily points to a fact.

Truly speaking, God is the source of both thought and nature. The conscious life of a man is based on Divine consciousness. Hence, every human thought and every human idea necessarily indicate the

[1] *The Theory of Good and Evil*, II.

existence of God. The idea of God which arises spontaneously in human mind, therefore, presupposes the existence of Divine consciousness.

The above discussion regarding the western attitude towards the problem of God and His existence will enable the reader to have a better understanding of the same problem from the Indian point of view. Religion, which India has proclaimed, is a religion of humannity. It aims at raising man to the level of divine purity and excellence by awakening in him his sleeping divinity. God is not separated from man. The Isa upanishad has declared "By the Lord is enveloped all this, whatever moving thing there is in the world.' In other words, the whole universe is an expression of God. It is the joy of the life Divine which is finding expressions in and through all the forms and figures of the world. All evolutionary changes bear the stamp of Divinity and proceed towards the single goal, namely, the perfection and completion of life in man. The presence of God can be felt every where by one who has acquired the power of feeling and visualising truth. God is the indwelling principle of both Man and the world. God is pouring out His delight and Love continuously in this world and it is because of this divine gift that the entire creation remains lively and refreshed even in the midst of decay and death. Man can feel his oneness with God only if he can perceive and realise the presence of Divinity in the inner recess of each and everything of the world. This is the real *sādhana* of man and it is through this *sādhana* that he can attain the perfection of his own being and can also have a taste of immortality which is his divine heritage. The goal of human life, according to the upanishadic tradition, is to express the infinity of his being through his finite life and finite actions. It is the body of man that is destroyed but the luminous being which is his real essence is eternal and indestructible. This essence is his divinity which is birthless and deathless.

Though in India, both the orthodox philosophy and the orthodox religion have accepted the authority of the vedas, still neither of the two can be called dogmatic or authoritarian. Here, reason has not been made a slave to scriptural authority. According to Vacāspati, all scriptures cannot claim authoritative domination. Only the meaningful scriptures can claim such authority. Scriptures, to be authoritative, should possess intelligibility and should admit of rational interpretation. Reason is to act as a corrective to religious

beliefs. It is because of this intimate relation between reason and revelation that in India religion has never been separated from Philosophy. They are united and integrated in such a manner as to lead a man effectively to the attainment of his highest and the best. Peace eternal is the supreme human goal and both philosophy and religion open up for man a higher way of living that culminates in Peace and Perfection of Life. It is because of this intimate relation between philosophy and religion that the former has always laid great emphasis on ethnical life as an indispensable condition of liberation or self-realisation. Philosophy is not merely a form of rational reflection about the mystery and meaning of life and the world. It is also a source of inspiration which favours continuous moral and spiritual growth of man, thereby, enabling him to transform his philosophical knowledge into an art of living in the light of Truth and Goodness.

Regarding the problem of the existence of God, however, the philosophical systems, based on the upanisadic tradition, differ in their perspectives. We shall however discuss here only the views of the Nyaya system, the Sāṁkhya-yoga system and the Vedanta system of Saṃkara.

The Nyaya system proves through inference, the existence of God. God can be established on the basis of the fact that the world is an effect. An effect can be produced by such an intelligent agent only who (1) knows directly the material to be used for the purpose of producing the effect (2) has a desire to produce it and (3) also makes an effort to produce the effect. In regard to the world as an effect, we can assume the existence only of an omniscient and omnipotent Cause, capable of fulfilling all these conditions. That cause, therefore, is God. Further, the way in which different parts are arranged indicates the existence of an intelligent cause and that intelligent cause is no other than God. In fact, God can be known to exist by means of intelligence possessing the potency of skillfully creating this world. The being that is characterised by the possession of such intelligence is to be regarded as God. He creates the world according to meritorious and demeritorious actions of living beings. He exists as the efficient cause of the world. The 'creative nature or Prakṛti, atoms and actions are all unconscious and as such they can be made active and productive only through the agency of a conscious being. That conscious being is God. Moreover, pleasure, pain,

merit, demerit can occur in a proper and regulated manner only if the world is governed by a conscious Being. Divine consciousness is eternal.

Udayana has skillfully presented him arguments for establishing the existence of God and his arguments are treated as classic arguments of the Nyaya school for proving the existence of God. He has given eight reasons in favour of God's existence, and these reasons can be summarised in the following manner:

(1) The world, being an effect like a jar, must be produced by an intelligent agent.

(2) The universe is composed of (unconscious) atoms. Atoms should combine to produce the world. So, there must be an intelligent prime mover to move atoms to meaningful actions. That prime mover is God.

(3) The nniverse must be supposed to be supported by the conscious force of a conscious being otherwise it would have fallen down. Just as a stick carried by a flying bird does not fall down in the same way the universe does not fall down because there is a conscious being (i.e. God) to support it.

(4) We use words to signify definite things. There must be a first intelligent being who has settled the meanings of different words definitely. This intelligent being is God.

(5) The vedic judgments are faultless and true. This proves that the author of the vedas must be without any defect and his knowledge must be correct. This author can be no other than omniscient God.

(6) The vedas which are similar to *Ayurveda* must have an author. This author is God.

(7) The vedas are composed by a conscious being because they are composed of sentences like the *Mahabharata*.

(8) In the beginning of creation, there was no other conscious being except God. So, numbers like two, three etc., could be produced at that time by the apeksabuddhi of God.

All the arguments, advanced by the Nyaya philosophy, prove the existence of God as the efficient cause of the world and not as the material cause. He produces motion in the atoms which then group together in different ways to bring the world into being.

Since God gives creative motion to the atoms, He is regarded as the creator of the world. God is also the destroyer of the universe; it is through Divine agency that atoms get disintegrated at appropriate time. The whole of creation is supported by God. It is through Divine guidance that all padarthas of the world associate and dissociate according to the actions of the individuals. He behaves like a loving father and provides man with different ways to exhaust the effects of their past actions.

Here since the Nyaya seeks to prove the existence of God as the cause of the world from the world as an effect, it may appear to us that the system is giving us an instance of the cosmological proof of the western world.

The Nyaya argument however, differs to a certain extent, from the cosmological argument of the west. It is cosmological in the sense that here we reason from the world to its first cause, but the Nyaya has never referred to the fleeting and conditioned character of the worldly events to prove the existence of an unconditioned and necessary being as its cause; on the other hand, the followers of this school have referred to the vastness of the universe with its innumerable variety and have asserted that such a big effect cannot be produced by the limited knowledge and power of human beings.

The Nyaya argument from the world as an effect to God as its cause has a teleological orientation as well. This argument implies that the agent of the world is a conscious being who possesses direct knowledge of the material which he wants to use for the production of his desired effect. His action therefore, is purposive and is directed towards the fulfilment of a definite end.

The Nyaya philosophers seem to have felt that the teleological argument should not be treated as an independent argument to prove the existence of God. It should be linked with the cosmological argument which considers the world as an effect. Atoms which, in their opinion, are the material stuff of the universe, are arranged not chaotically but in a harmonious system which is meaningful and purposive. So, the existence of such a world justifies the existence of an intelligent agent as its creator and controller. When we reflect upon the world, we do not only discover its conditioned nature but we do also feel that the conditioned events are arranged as ends and means. The earth, water and the sunshine serve as means to the preservation of the plant life. The plant again serves as a means to the preservation of the life of lower animals. Again both plant and animal life serve as means to human life and human mind. Such an arrangement and adoptation of means and ends in the world proves

the existence of an intelligent first cause. By linking together the cosmological and the teleological proofs for the existence of God, the Nyaya philosophers have displayed soundness of their power at judgment.

The Philosophers of the Nyaya school have also sought to establish the existence of God on the ground that He alone can be the author of the vedas as well as of the words, sentences and their meaningful arrangement. This argument is unique and has no counterpart in western philosophy and theology.

God also exists as the moral ruler of the universe. He is the giver of the fruits of actions and the upholder of justice in human life. Unless God is accepted as the moral supervisor, the distribution of fruits of actions in a planned manner cannot be explained.

The main arguments of the Nyaya school in favour of God are, as under:

(i) God is the creator of the world.

(ii) God is the supervisor of merits and is the dispenser of the fruits of actions in accordance with the law of Karma.

(iii) At the beginning of each creation, God becomes the teacher of the vedas.

According to the Nyaya philosophy, reflection on God or understanding the nature of God by means of inferential thinking is essential for liberation.

Īśvaramananam Cādṛṣṭadvārā
Svātmasākṣātkāra dvārā vā muktau hetuḥ. (*Nyayakusumanjali*, 1st Stavaka, I)

Reflection on God produces desert as a result of which liberation is attained. It also produces in the aspirant the desired fitness for self-realisation. Both self-realisation and God-realisation culminate in liberation.

It is generally held that the Nyaya philosophy has not accorded any significant place to the Sruti or revelation and has taken the help of Yukti and tarka (reasoning and argumentation) to prove the existence of God. There are some scholars who hold that the Nyaya Philosophy has no immediate connection either with Vedic literatures or with tradition. Such views, however, do not seem to be correct and convincing. The Nyaya being an orthodox (astika) Philosophy, is based on the upanishads and is not really unconnected with tradition established by the Upanishadic thoughts.

The Nyaya too has followed the Upanishadic method consisting of Sravana manana and mididyasana for the realisation of both 'Self' and 'God'. At first, one has to gether full and correct knowledge of God from the Sruti, smriti etc. After that, he has to perform worship in the form of reflection on God by inference and argumentation. The last stage is meditation on God whose nature has been fully revealed by the śruti and whose existence has been fully assured of both by revelation and reasoning. All these three vidhis are necessary for pure and profound realisation of Divinity.

Nyāyacarceyamīśasya mananavyapadeśabhāk
Upāsanaiva kriyate śravanāntarāgatā (*Nyayakusumanjali*, 1st Stavaka, 3)

This assertion of Udayana reveals clearly the close connection of the Nyaya philosophy with the upanishads.

To make a sincere attempt towards realisation of the nature of God by means of inferential thinking is nothing but a form of Divine worship which is to be followed by deep concentration and meditation.

Saṃkara, the great exponent of the advaita Philosophy and a staunch believer in revelation has followed the same discipline consisting of three stages, namely Sravana, Manana and Nididhyasana, for the attainment of self-realisation or liberation.

After ascertaining the nature of Brahman from the Śruti, the aspirant is advised to have recourse to rational thinking of Brahman so as to be able to remove all doubts regarding the nature of Reality and the world-cause by rational argumentations. This is to be followed by Nididhyasana which is constant musing of Brahman as sat, cit and ananda. The last stage is to be adopted only when the aspirant is rationally convinced of the truths revealed to the seers of the upanishads through intuitions at the highest level of communion with the Reality; Śaṃkara has used rational arguments to refute 'Prakritivada' of the sāṁkhya 'Paramanuvada' of the vaisesikas, mere efficient causality of God of the Nyaya school and so on. While refuting the Prakrtivada of the sāṁkhya, Śaṃkara has also given cosmological and teleological arguments to prove the existence of Brahman as the world cause. He has shown by reasoning that nothing else but brahman can be regarded as the cause of the world. Although Śaṃkara has repeatedly said that Brahman can be known only through scripture and not through argumentations, (Śrutyava gāhyamatigambhīram paraṁ brahma na tarkāvagāhyam (*Brahma-*

sūtra, Śaṃkara bhāṣya, 2.1.31) even then he has admitted the imperative need for the exercises of reason to resolve all sorts of conflicts and confusions regarding the views of Brahman as the non-dual Reality. He has considered the views of his opponents with a rationalistic method. Śaṃkara has quoted profusely from the sruti because the ultimate questions such as the existence of God, creation of the world, the ultimate goal of man etc., are beyond perception and inference. So these are to be known through revelation. The Nyaya philosophers, however, have not done so. They have followed with Zeal the "manana vidhi" so as to be able to have firm faith in Divine Existence which has been so forcefully established and repeatedly declared in the sruti. These philosophers, too, will agree with Śaṃkara that God with His wonderful powers can not be known through any other source than the sruti. The admission of Sravana Vidhi as the first stage of spiritual discipline, proves that the upanishads are treated with great respect in the Nyaya philosophy as well. The Vedanta has developed a tradition and has also been divided into different schools; the exponents of these schools have interpreted the upanishads and the Gita from their own standpoint. Hence, they have no difficulty in explaining all super-sensible problems with the help of the sruti, smriti etc. The Nyaya has no such tradition and the upanishads and the Gita have not been commented upon by the followers of the Nyaya school.

Śamkar's View

According to Śaṃkara, qualityless Brahman appears as a qualified and personal God because of the beginningless Nescience or Māyā that resides in man and covers the vision of his eye of wisdom. Due to the operation of such ignorance, the real form of Brahman is covered and both the self and the not self are joined together to create a fictitious ego-sense. This false ego-sense (adhyāsika ātman) enjoys through the internal organ the false effect, i.e., the false world of the false Māyā. When Brahman through reflection, vitalises Māyā and makes it fit for becoming the changeable matrix of the world, lordly powers emerge in the Sāttvika upādhi (limiting adjunct) which are falsely ascribed to Brahman. Brahman, thus, seems to assume the role of God in respect of both the universe and the man. Brahman, in the form of God, becomes the object of religious worship. He is the creator, preserver and destroyer of the world. The conception of God is

inseparably associated with the conception of the world. The world and the world-creator are related to each other. God is both the material and efficient cause of the world. He is also the giver of the fruits of actions. God is to be realised by means of devotion or bhakti. The worshipper of God, however, can not attain liberation in its true form. The worshipper of God goes to the Brahmaloka. On reaching Brahmaloka, he becomes the possessor of lordly powers, excepting the power of creation.[1]

While in Brahmaloka, the soul remains in the presence of God and enjoys divine pleasures under the supervision of God.

The most striking feature of Śaṃkara-Vedānta is that it has recognized absolute non-difference between man and God, a recognition that is supposed (by the advaitins) to have enhanced the dignity of man beyond measure. There is non-difference between Man and God, God and the qualityless Absolute. Man appears to be different from God only when he is considered from the narrow perspective of the individualistic worldly-life. From the point of view of Truth and Reality, there is absolute non-difference between Brahman and the individual self.

Śaṁkara has advanced the following arguments to prove the existence of God, because according to him, God can be known by direct realisation, by inference and also by scriptural testimany. A 'Siddhavastu' (accomplished thing) can be known through more than one source. While explaining the sūtra no: 2.3.9. Śaṃkara has asserted that Brahman should be regarded as the uncaused cause of the world otherwise, we shall not be able to save ourselves from committing the fallacy of infinite regress. Since the world is an effect, it must have a cause and that cause is God "Whose origin in impossible". Śaṃkara, too has said that the things of the world have been so meaningfully arranged as to suggest the existence of an intelligent being as its creator.[2] An unconscious cause can never produce such an ordered world. These arguments correspond to the cosmological and teleogical arguments of the west. The teleological argument, however, has been introduced by Śaṃkara not so much to prove the existence of God as to refute the Sāṁkhya view of an unconscious first cause of the world.

The most important proof that Śaṃkara has given us to establish

[1] *Brahmasūtra*, Śaṃkara's commentary, 4.4.17.

[2] *Brahmasūtra* bhāṣya 2.2.1.

SAMKHYA ON GOD
... if there is no place for devotion and worship of GOD in the classical samkhya. It is also generally held that Samkhya is nirisvara and yoga is sesvara...

the existence of God may be described as an ontological one. According to Śaṃkara, to have the clear and correct knowledge of a thing, a man's attention should first of all be drawn towards that specific object of knowledge. It is only when one pays his attention to an object wholeheartedly that knowledge arises in his mind spontaneously in conformity with the object. So our clear and correct knowledge of an object always implies the existence of the object (III.2.21) Brahmansutra bhāṣya.

Moreover, the idea of liberation, too, implies the reality of Brahman because liberation is nothing but the realisation, on the part of the individual soul, of its oneness with the Brahman. Brahman is consciousness, existence and bliss and the realisation of one's own nature as that is what is called perfection or liberation. Since liberation is realisation of one's own nature as Brahman, this realisation must be based on Reality as otherwise it can never be a realisation in the true sense of the term.

God has also to be admitted as the moral ruler of the universe. Since fruition of an action takes place long after the performance of the deed, the action itself cannot be the producer of its fruits. So, it is absolutely necessary to recognize the existence of God as the ethical ruler of the universe. God creates this world in accordance with the accumulated merits and demerits of the individual soul.

God has also appeared in the advaita-vedānta in the form of Hiraṇyagarbha. The totality of subtle bodies is said to have constituted the body of Hiraṇyagarbha; the totality of intellects constitute his limiting adjunct. Consciousness that identifies itself with these totalities is called Hiraṇyagarbha. He is present everywhere. All objects of the world are rooted in Him. He is the essence and the Vital principle of the whole universe. He is the upholder of all actions, the regulator of all actions, and the distributor of the fruits of all actions. He was manifested first. Other souls have received their respective subtle bodies from him. The conception of Hiraṇyagarbha is the conception of a personal God who is represented as manifesting himself directly through the development of the material world.

We shall, however, remember that according to Śaṃkara, there is only the unqualified Reality or the nirguṇa Brahman. Owing to the diversity of illusory intellects, the qualityless Reality is falsely thought of as 'Saguṇa-Brahman', Īśvara, Hiraṇyagarbha, Viṣṇu, Rudra, Jīva, Jagat and so on.

The conception of God is to be adhered to only when Brahman is spoken of as the material-efficient cause of the world. Brahman appears as God in relation to the world. As ultimate Reality, Brahman is qualityless.

Thus, even though God, according to Śaṃkara, is necessary for the average man on the path of his spiritual march, still it is imperative on us to remember that from the transcendental point of view, God also is illusory and phenomenal; A liberated person looks upon God only as the false ruler of a false world. For him, nothing is real except the 'nirguṇa Brahman'.

[redacted]

When we come to Sāṁkhya-yoga, we find a different approach to the problem of a Personal Divinity. If we go through the available Sāṁkhya-texts, it appears to us as if there is [redacted] is also generally held [redacted] may summarise here, some of the [redacted] made use of by various commentators of the Sāṁkhya philosophy to refute the existence of a 'creator-God'.

Since the unconscious 'creative-nature' or Prakṛti is endowed with the power of making teleological movement (like the unconscious milk which flows spontaneously from the udders of the cow for the nourishment at the calf) creator-God is unnecessary. Moreover, the existence of God as the creator of the world cannot be rationally justified. Why should God create the world? Being a completely satisfied Person, He cannot create the world to satisfy an unfulfilled desire. Nor can He be supposed to create the world out of compassion; because prior to creation, souls, not being associated with the bodies, cannot have feelings of misery and pain. God can not be supposed to be compassionate either. Had He been so, he would not have created a world full of tears and frustrations.

It is, however, urged that God bestows pleasures and pains on the living beings, following the law of Karma. The wrong-doers are punished with pain but the doers of good actions are blessed with pleasures. If this is so, then let Karma alone become the agent of the products of actions. What need is there of a creator-God?

Even the argument that actions are unconscious and as such these are to be supervised by God, is not a sound one. When the 'creative-

...Prakriti ... Prakriti ... is capable of manifesting itself in infinite variety... and the regulating force operate to control and diversify the ...efficient causes creative ~~cause and~~ flow of the three constituents...

nature' is supposed to possess inherent capacity to create according to virtuous and vicious actions of embodied living beings, the existence of God, for doing this work, is absolutely redundant.

All these arguments are based on the refusal of the Sāṁkhya philosophy to admit God as the 'material-efficient, cause of the world. [redacted]is to be regarded as both the material and efficient cause of the world. [redacted]r the 'creative-nature[redacted]but all the modifications are not simultaneously manifested in the same place at the same time. This is because tamoguṇa, which acts as a covering, prevents the effect from getting manifested. Efficient causes (nimittas) are necessary to remove the covering constituted of the tamoguṇa. An efficient cause does not generate movement in the 'creative-nature' but it simply removes the covering and helps the effect to get manifested. It simply exercises influences for the removal of impediments. The material cause, the efficient cause, and the regulating forces are all necessary to produce a particular effect. Since merit, demerit, space and time etc., are natural, they cannot move the 'creative-nature' or Prakṛti to action. The 'creative-nature' or Prakṛti is inherently mobile.

Here, we should remember that in the case of common creation, the movement of Prakṛti from the subtle to the gross, is natural and uniform. It is only in the creation of varieties that the[redacted]Here, the distinction between the efficient [redacted]cause is a distinction of the practical world. Since these efficient causes are natural (Prakṛtika) from the metaphysical point of view, the *Sāṁkhyakārikā* does not give any definition of the efficient cause. The single causal substance in the form of the 'creative-nature' is both the material and the efficient cause of the world. No ever-free Divine personality is postulated here either as the 'material-efficient' cause of the world as in the Vedānta or simply as the efficient cause of the world as in the Nyāya philosophy. Since all products of the 'creative-nature are existent from beginningless time, both the 'world-bound' citta and the ever-free citta' should also be supposed to be so existent.

The fact that the Sāṁkhya philosophy has not admitted a third eternal and divine personality in the form of God who is eternally engaged in creation and destruction of the world cannot, however, be regarded as a basis for asserting that there is no scope for devotion and worship of God in the classical sāṁkhya. In the chapter on theology (of this book) an attempt has been made to show how the 'consciousness-principle' which has aggregate of intellects as its limiting adjunct, can serve as God having a position similar to that of Hiraṇyagarbha of the advaita-vedānta.

Swami Hariharananda, (the founder of Kapila Math and a profound exponent of the Sāṁkhya-yoga philosophy) has very aptly explained, why an eternal God as the creator of the world has not been admitted in this system.

According to *Yogasūtra* 1.23, God has been described as a special kind of eternally liberated soul. His uniqueness lies in the fact that He is ever free, ever liberated. In other words, God is a particular soul who has never been affected by afflictions, actions, results of actions or the latent impressions of actions. In the opinion of Swami Hariharananda, the existence of such an eternally free soul is logically justifiable. If worldly souls involved in the worldly-life from beginningless time are supposed to be cxistent then an eternal soul, free from beginningless time, can also have justification for existence.

That free and world-bound souls are existent from beginningless time is the view of both the Sāṁkhya and the yoga, according to the founder of the Kapila Math.

Further, to be free from beginningless time implies that God possesses a 'citta' which is always calm, always wise and always endowed with divine greatness. Such a soul cannot be many because one liberated soul is to be distinguished from another by means of the prior unpurified cittas which were different in different cases.

This cannot be done in the case of God who is ever free and is, therefore, the possessor of His pure citta from beginningless time.

As the possessor of a free 'citta', God becomes a unified category of the consciousness-principle and 'creative nature'. Being a composite category, God cannot be regarded as an original eternal principle besides puruṣa and Prakṛti.

Again, because God is an ever free personality, He cannot be supposed to have any desire to create the world. He is indifferent to both creation and dissolution. It is not possible for us to justify rationally how an ever-free God can be the Creator, Preserver and Destroyer of the world. Since God possesses discriminative knowledge from beginningless time, His ever pure 'citta' always remains in a merged state. He is, therefore, beyond the control of the three consti-

tuents (guṇas) and as such He is aptly described as Nirguṇa.' His ever-free nature does not justify His interference in the 'world-affairs as the Creator, Preserver and Regulator of the universe.

The yoga philosophy has proved the existence of such an eternally free God Who is Omniscient, by inference.

Knowledge is progressive. It goes on increasing from lower grades of living beings to higher ones. God is that Being in whom knowledge has reached the highest point. The person who possesses knowledge in its full and complete form, is called Īśvara.

Inference, however, only proves that an omniscient God exists. It cannot reveal to us the specific characteristies which God possesses. These are to be known through scriptures. God, being an ever-free spirit, cannot be unkind. No impure thoughts or feelings can ever arise in a pure citta. Divine compassion finds expression in God's desire to save suffering human beings through instructions and to fulfill this compassionate task, He assumes a creative mind (whenever necessary) and imparts instructions to the seakers of truth with a view to awakening in them the glow of the saving knowledge. This Nirguṇa Īśvara is an object of devotion, according to the Sāṁkhya-yoga school, although God, in this form, has not been mentioned in the available texts of the Sāṁkhya school. This seems to be due to the fact that the philosophy of Sāṁkhya is concerned mainly with the ultimate principles which are at the root of the creation of world. God, however is a composite category, having consciousness and internal organs as ingredients, which fall under the dual principles of purusa and prakṛti. So God has not been explicitly dealt with in the classical Sāṁkhya.

Man is, no doubt, fond of exercising his own will power (atmaśakti) but he has also a softer side which prompts him to depend on some higher authority, capable of bearing his whole burden on the up-hill journey of his life. Man is fully satisfied when both these aspects are properly integrated and both of them are emphasised upon. Sāṁkhya-yoga philosophy has given due recognition to both these aspects of human-natureby prescribing knowledge as well as devotion as means of liberation. The path of devotion (Īśvara pranidhana) gives full satisfaction to the dependent nature of Man. Too much emphasis on one aspect only, to the exclusion of the other, produces either scepticism with its intolerable vanity or perverted emotionalism.

Man should not pray to God for material prosperity and happiness. He should aspire for knowledge and cleanliness of his heart. If an aspirant places his mind in the calm and serene mind of God and meditates on calmness and divine purity, the divinity, hidden in his heart, gets gradually manifested through Divine Grace with the result that finally he becomes equal to God in peace and purity. Both will-power and the spirit of dependence on God mingle together to produce the highest good of man.

God, according to Sāṁkhya-yoga, is not the creator of the world. Nor is He the giver of the fruits of actions. Whatever is happening is happening due to natural functioning of the three guṇas according to their own inherent laws. Causal necessity is the determining factor in the natural world. No ever-free God is necessary to move the three constituents to action.

According to Swami Hariharananda, however, the Sāṁkhya-yoga philosophy believes in the existence of a Being, perfected by Yoga in his previous birth (qualified God). He is a creator in a limited sense. He creates from pre-existent materials, He is called Hiranyagarbha. He is a yogin, who succeeded in reaching the stage of Sasmita Samādhi in his previous birth, as a result of which he has become omniscient and omnipotent in his present birth as Saguna Īśvara (qualified God). It is from his resolution that a particular creation gets manifested. It is wrong to hold that an ever-free divine personality is the efficient cause of this world. In fact, the Yogasutra Bhasya 3.45 refers to such a Saguna Īśvara as the efficient cause of the world. The whole world is supported by the mind of such a divinity. As soon as the world gets manifested, all living beings, who still possess latent impressions, suitable for re-embodiment, get associated with appropriate subtle and gross bodies in accordance with their own samskaras. In fact, the Sāṁkhya-Sutras "Sa hi Sarvavit Sarva Karta" and "idrsesvara siddhih siddha" prove the existence of such a maker of the world who has become Īśvara by means of his own spiritual sadhana. When Hiranyagarbha, presiding over a particular creation, attains liberation, the world gets dissolved immediately. Each creation is effected through the resolution of a particular Saguna Īśvara or Hiraṇyagarbha who plays the role of the creator and the preserver of the world for a limited period of time. It is this Hiraṇyagarbha who has been referred to in the upanisads as Saguna Brahman. It is from the resolution of this qualified Brahman that the world gets manifested. The world emerges from the divine consciousness of the

form "I am in all things which exist and all exist in myself." The minds of all percipients are activised by the divine mind. The ideas of the divine mind affect minds of all animate beings of the world in such a manner as to produce in them various sensations which constitute the external world.

The way, in which the conception of Hiraṇyagarbha as the creator of the world has been introduced in the Sāṁkhya-yoga philosophy and has also been assigned the place of a Divine Mind, influencing the minds of all worldly beings, seems to be an original contribution of Swami Hariharananda Aranya. It is a significant contribution to the Sāṁkhya-yoga philosophy in the sense that this conception possesses the potency of giving a rationally satisfactory explanation of the manifestation and non-manifestation of the world through the working of a divine mind without in any way jeopardizing the original position of this system of philosophy, regarding the evolution of the world from an independent Prakṛti.

CONCLUSION

Whenever we make an attempt to interpret religion rationally with the help of argumentation and rational process, we prove the exis- tence of God as the uncaused first cause of the world. He is the source of all things and the fashioner of finite lives. The ultimate pur- posiveness which binds both the animate and the inanimate worlds, is nothing else but divine purposiveness. This purposiveness can, there- fore, be viewed as a uniting thread. Its aim is to give man (Who is the highest category in the living world) full scope for his develop- ment and perfection. Man should be able to attain all human values which will make him pure and perfect. Since the purposive nature of God aims at the completion of man as man, it appears that all parts of the universe are operating in different ways solely for the fulfil ment of this divine end.

Our firm faith in such a divine personality and Divine Goodness enables us to raise ourselves higher and higher in the sphere of moral and spiritual perfection. It is only when a man succeeds in manifesting, in his character all moral and spiritual values that we say, "God has been revealed in him." God has been called 'father' and 'lord', 'friend' and beloved and is, thus, brought into a close and sweet relation with man.

The Nyaya philosophy has admitted a personal God as the creator

and destroyer of the world. He is not, however, the creator of the atoms. Atoms, soul, space, time, mind etc. are all eternal and co-existent with God. It is by God's purposive will that the first action starts in the atoms. These atoms then follow their own laws and bring the world into existence.

God according to the Nyaya is external to the individual soul but there is an intimate relation between the two. God is the loving and affectionate father and is always concerned with well-being of man. He is always eager to inspire man to do what is beneficial to him. His pure nature and immeasurable compassion prompts Him to work untiringly to remove the miseries of man. Inspite of such an affectionate bond between God and Man, the Nyaya system is not competent to arouse true religious fervour in a devotee of God. There is an unbridgeable distance between the two. Man may seek His favour and affection like a child seeking the same from his respected and dignified father but he cannot cling to Him as his own soul, as his beloved and as one who becomes one with him. The devotee cannot say "you and I are one in love and by making you the living ideal of my life, I shall become as pure and divine as you are. Wherever such emotional outflow is possible, there the real religious urge and fervour too become noticeable. This type of religious heat cannot be generated by the Supreme Personality of the Nyaya School whose necessity is more philosophical than religious. God, here, is no doubt, all powerful, just and merciful. He is the creator, the controller and the distributor of happiness and misery to human-beings in accordance with the law of Karma; but God is not love and bliss; nor is He the indwelling spirit in man. He is, no doubt, the teacher of the scriptural knowledge and He has also created the world with a view to imparting the knowledge of the rightway of living to man. Even then, we cannot overlook the fact that the Nyaya system has admitted the existence of God because according to this school, an effect, to be produced needs the operation of an intelligent efficient cause. The world as an effect, therefore, needs the efficient causality of an intelligent being and that intelligent being can be no other than God. Metaphysical explanation of the intelligent efficient cause of the world may satisfy the intellect of a man but it cannot offer proper nourishment to a human heart which yearns for love and communion. If God is identified with love and bliss and, thus, becomes the support of a loving human heart, then the face of the world changes

at once in the eyes of a devotee of God. Man cannot rest satisfied merely by feeding his intellect with logical arguments. He has an intense desire to know the highest and the best so as to get nourishment directly from that supreme source by coming in close relation with it. He wants to place his beloved God in the citadel of his loving-heart so that he may open all the fragrant petals of his pure and elevated being through Divine grace and divine inspiration. This desire of the heart can be well satisfied by a God Who Himself is love. If God is only a God of Reason and not also of heart, then such a God may be pleasing to a philosopher but the devotee will not be satisfied with such a Supreme Being as his object of devotion. Love has a natural power of attraction and this power is the divine power with which God of Love is endowed. God has sown the seeds of His great love in the fertile soil of human-hearts. It is this power which unites the living beings by its silken thread and draws them towards God,—the infinite source of infinite love and happiness. Thus, human beings get the scope for their moral and spiritual growth as a result of which they can have a direct experience of bliss and sweetness of God. Being bound in the soft and precious chain of love and sympathy, human hearts get more and more purified. Religion, thus creates a wonderful music of love in this world by attuning human hearts with the Divine heart.

Our journey to the appex of life is a journey from the finite expressions of love to the Infinite Love itself. The unity with all creatures, when realised through love, gives the devotee a very delightful and all-pervasive concept of existence. The various forms of joy that start from a man's own self in relation to persons and things of the world, are to be regarded as having their ever-expanding source in the Divine Love. At such a wonderful moment of a wide and expansive existence, everything partakes of the nature of love for the devotee. He has plunged himself, as it were, into the very source of love in which he has lost his separate existence. It is the pure and disinterested love, rooted in the love of God, that can certainly lead to the full blossoming of the devotee's moral and spiritual life.

The advaita vedanta holds that God is bliss. Being bliss, God also becomes an object of love. The two statements 'God is bliss' and 'God is love' convey the same truth. Bliss indeed is the inner aspect and Love is the outer expression of Divinity. God dwells in the heart of man as bliss and when this bliss is expressed in the external world,

it assumes the form of love and devotion.

Śaṃkara, too, has, admitted the following as the main characteristics of God:

(i) He creates, sustains and destrays the world.
(ii) He punishes the wicked and rewards the virtuous.
(iii) He upholds the moral balance of the world. He distributes grace.

(Tadanugraha hetu ke naiva ca vijnanena moksa siddhi bhavitum arha-lī)

Since Śaṃkara has admitted God as the material—efficient Cause of the world, God has become both immanent and transcendent. God is very near; He is also far away. The devotee's heart is always bathed with the milky flow of divine love.

The fact that love and devotion to a qualified and creator God is necessary for man on the path of his spiritual march, has been recognized by Śaṃkara also. For that reason, he has introduced the qualified Brahman. Being false, this qualified Brahman is, however, incapable of arousing intense love and devotion in the heart of a devotee. The devotee of God wishes to remain always a devotee so as to be able to drink the nectar of divine-love all through his life. He never wants to use his sincere devotion for God as a means to another higher stage. He has no desire to transcend the stage of his God-realisation so that he may reach the stage of the qualityless impersonal being. He never adopts the path of religion, thinking that this path is suitable for him so long as he is ignorant. According to advaita it is in the state of ignorance only that the devotee as devotee has to cling to God as his refuge. As soon as his eye of wisdom opens, he realises the falsity of the object of his love and devotion and forsakes Him. This, however, is not true. A believer in God has a firm faith that God will always dwell in his heart and will always support him and nourish him. Śaṃkara has declared the world as false; he has falsified the God of religion and he has also made the devotee, with his concrete thoughts, emotions and will, a mere appearance. God is apparent, and the devotee too is apparent. Both of them are mere projections of imagination which disappears completely when knowledge arises.

Sāṁkhya-yoga according to Swami Hariharananda has admitted both Saguna Īśvara and Nirguna Īśvara. Nirguna Īśvara is nirguna as it is not under the influence of the three guṇas. This God is external to individual soul. Saguna Īśvara on the other hand is an individual

soul that attained perfection through asmita Samādhi in the previous birth. It is because of the admission of such produced gods that the Sāṁkhya-yoga philosophy has given a dignified status to man; every man is supposed to carry within him the potency of godliness. If this potency can be actualised, then he can become a Saguna Īśvara, possessing lordly powers. He can then transcend this stage and attain liberation which is nothing but the realisation of himself as pure consciousness-principle, devoid of any relation to anything else. Ever-free God on the other hand, becomes an ideal in our spiritual efforts to attain divinity and purity like Him. This ideal which becomes the source of religious inspiration and religious fervour naturally becomes very dear to the devotee, because by surrendering himself to such an ideal he can rise higher and higher in the scale of perfection. Man gets attached to such a spring of grace and compassion and his heart clings to Him with immeasurable love and devotion. By loving God, the yogin also changes into that form and becomes calm, serene and pure. The seed of godliness, hidden in him, gets manifested through such whole-hearted devotion and produces the desired moral and spiritual elevation of the yogin.

If we follow this interpretation, we can do away easily with the objections raised against the God of Yoga by Śaṃkara. Śāṃkara has said that the divine personality of the yoga philosophy is another category besides puruṣa and Prakṛti. All the three categories are eternal, all-pervasive and partless. So, there cannot be any 'supporter-supported relation' among them.

Swami Hariharananda has proved cogently that God is not a single and ultimate category in yoga. He is a combination of both puruṣa and prakṛti. He has been described in the yoga-philosophy as eternally free. The eternally free principle is that being, who posseses from eternity, a citta endowed with discriminative knowledge. Since God is always the possessor of discriminative knowledge, his citta is a merged one. God is not therefore a third category in the yoga besides puruṣa and prakṛti. Swami has also shown that God has not been recognised in the yoga either as a creator of the world or as the giver of the fruits of actions to the living beings. It is not the function of God to distribute worldly pleasures and pains in accordance with the law of Karma. Man is born with samskaras and tendencies, according to the kinds of actions performed by him in his previous births. He cultivates those tendencies in the present life, gets engaged in

actions which are in keeping with these tendencies and thus goes on weaving his net of birth, life-span and worldly enjoyment of happiness and misery. Situations, under which a man is placed, controls to a certain extent his pleasure and pain and these situations are not determined by his past actions. Situations change continuously owing to inherent dynamism of the three gunas. God is omniscient. He knows that it is by going beyond the sphere of the gunas through cultivation of detachment and also by making continuous efforts to realise his true nature that a man can attain permanent peace which is termed liberation. Hence God creates a mind (nirmana citta) and with its help imparts knowledge and other necessary instructions to human beings with a view to bringing them on the right path of living.

Man's misery is due to his perverted perspective of life which makes him forget his higher existence as pure consciousness, beyond the confines of all prakrtika relations. When a man's individuality cannot develop properly through an ever-extended sphere of existence and experience due to his deep involvement in the worldly affairs, he cannot form a correct and wide idea of his own self; as a result, he identifies himself with all his sorrows and pains which befall him and sheds tears under their heavy pressure. The empirical personality of a man is actually reacting to diverse life-situations and is not, therefore, static in nature. Various experiences and activities of life are all the time arising, developing and enriching the empirical personality of a person. The experiences which a person gathers in his living-state modify his character and also find newer and newer expressions in the external world. Beyond this empirical personality, is the immutable 'seer' with the reflected light of which the empirical personality is getting revealed with its multi-coloured experiences. God makes man conscious of his real essence which is immutable, peaceful and serene.

It is the Saguna Īśvara who has willed the things of the world to be what they are. He is the lord of the creation that has become manifested through his resolution and so a yogin, too, does not want to cause any disturbance in His world by making any change in the order of things, willed by Him.

The wish of the previously perfected one (Hiranyagarbha) is respected by the yogins who do not go against Īśvara. It is this perfected Saguna Īśvara that has been referred to by the Sāṁkhya sutra when it has said "He is all knowing and all-powerful,"

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